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“The Enormous Failure of Nature”: 
Famine and Society in the Nineteenth Century
Introductory Notes
Andrew G. Newby
Department of World Cultures, University of Helsinki
This miscellany is composed predominantly of papers that were presented to the 
“Nineteenth-Century European Famines in Context” symposium, held at the Bank 
of Finland’s Museum (Rahamuseo) in Helsinki, in December 2015.1 The Helsinki 
meeting was the second of four international events arranged by the International 
Network of Irish Famine Studies [INIFS] between April 2015 and April 2017, each of 
which has had a different theme and associated publication.2 Under the leadership 
of Marguérite Corporaal (Radboud University, Nijmegen), with co-directors Peter 
Gray (Queens University Belfast), Oona Frawley and Luke Gibbons (NUI Maynooth) 
and Andrew Newby (University of Helsinki), the network received major funding 
from NWO (Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research) in 2014.
INIFS connects scholars conducting innovative research on the Great Irish 
Famine, and seeks to develop the interdisciplinary dialogues and methodologies 
necessary to face four central challenges in the field. These are: (i) comparative 
analyses of the media through which the legacy of the Famine was transmitted; (ii) 
an investigation of the imperial power structures that shaped the progression and 
representations of the Famine; (iii) an examination of the evolution of transatlantic 
and transpacific diasporas of Famine emigrants; and, (iv) parallel studies of the 
Great Hunger and famines taking place in other temporal and geographical contexts 
but under analogous conditions. The Helsinki symposium focussed particularly on 
the fourth of these challenges, and brought together researchers from a variety of 
national and disciplinary backgrounds.
1 <http://www.ru.nl/irishfaminenetwork/meetings/> (accessed 1 Mar. 2017) 
2 In addition to the current volume see King & Corporaal, 2017; Corporaal, Mark-Fizgerald & 
Frawley, 2017 (from the Nijmegen and Maynooth conferences respectively). A publication from 
Belfast (April 2017) will be released in due course.  
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Despite the 1860s Finnish famine being recognised as one of Europe’s final 
large-scale mortality crises, international relations scholar Vanessa Pupavac has 
noted that it remains “virtually unknown” abroad, a point which was reinforced by 
Cormac Ó Gráda’s claim that it “received little attention at the time and is rarely 
discussed or analysed outside Finland.”3 Moreover, it has been suggested regularly 
in recent years that Irish famine studies can be strengthened by more systematic 
comparative work.4 As a means of addressing these historiographical issues, a 
provisional agenda for comparative Finnish-Irish famine studies was published in 
2015, and a thematic priority of the Helsinki meeting was to therefore to explore and 
analyse comparisons and contrasts between these “Great Famines”, and facilitate 
the development of partnerships which could produce collaborative research long 
after the end of the current project.5 While acknowledging the importance and 
potential of a bilateral comparative dialogue, however, it was considered vital to 
add further context, including contributions on the Scottish Highlands, Estonia, 
and Lithuania. Furthermore, although Özge Ertem and David Ludvigsson were 
unfortunately absent from the seminar, their important work on  (respectively) the 
Ottoman Empire and Sweden has been included in the final collection. 
Reports from the second half of the nineteenth century reinforce the idea that 
these crises cannot be studied exclusively on a national level. For example, as 
the Great Finnish Famine entered its most destructive phase in January 1868, the 
London Standard newspaper recognised a much larger-scale – potentially global 
– humanitarian crisis.
No phenomenon of the modern age is more remarkable than the enormous failure 
of nature in many countries of Europe, Africa and Asia. From all quarters we have 
heard, or still hear, the appalling cry of famine… It is impossible to suggest to eyes that 
have not witnessed them the reality of the horrors consequent on these fell visitations. 
Among ourselves the thought of a few wretched beings perishing of starvation in the 
winter time causes society to shudder, and the bare fact that a lonely and scattered 
population were, a little ago, dying of hunger in the glens of Connemara, sufficed to 
turn a full stream of pity and help towards those barren districts. But the misery we now 
speak of it the scourge of millions; the victims are not to be counted; the food of whole 
provinces has been blighted; and the ravage spreads like a pestilence, traversing rivers 
and mountains, invading frontiers, laying the land desolate for hundreds of miles.6 
While contemporary accounts in the nineteenth century seemed well aware 
of the international context of these catastrophes subsequent historiographies 
3 Pupavac, 2014, 82; Ó Gráda, 2015, 107.
4 Ó Ciosáin, 2013, 705; Curran et al., 2015, 2–3. 
5 Newby & Myllyntaus, 2015, 145–65.
6 The Standard, 13 Jan. 1868. 
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of famine have developed very much within national paradigms.7 Bill Kissane’s 
recent work on civil war has, however, provided an excellent model for how a 
historical topic can be developed from (i) a national focus to (ii) a comparative 
focus (again, in Kissane’s case this was a Finnish-Irish comparison), using the 
lessons learned from the bilateral comparison to (iii) construct a much broader 
transnational framework.8 Such an approach is absolutely possible in the field of 
historical famine studies.9 There are consistent themes which emerge in various 
crises: the role of societal structures in exacerbating or easing the natural element 
of the disaster; political agency; the increase in social unrest / dislocation (and 
subsequent downplaying e.g. of incidences of crime in famine societies); the role of 
domestic and international philanthropy; the tension between charity and “self-help”; 
the international / imperial political context; commemoration and representation. 
This volume contains reflections on all of these themes, highlighting some of the 
latest research on famine in the nineteenth century. The articles make innovative 
contributions to “national” famine narratives, but also offer insights which provide a 
basis for new comparative work.
Today, as perhaps befits a “father of the nation”, Johan Vilhelm Snellman’s statue 
looks out sternly from the main entrance of the Bank of Finland. A key difference 
between Finland and Ireland in the nineteenth century was that Finland’s devolved 
position within the Russian Empire had allowed it, by the 1860s, to create that 
Central Bank and develop independent fiscal policies.10 As the finance minister in 
the 1860s, it was Snellman who occupied a role similar to that fulfilled by Charles 
Trevelyan in Ireland twenty years earlier. And yet, the reputations of the two men 
could scarcely be more divergent. Even though the economic and trade policies 
enacted by Snellman and his colleagues did not prevent the mortality crisis of 1867-
68,  their emphasis on cultural and economic self-sufficiency meant that it was 
preferable for Finland to “fail alone, rather than be saved by Russian intervention”.11
Declan Curran’s article examines the impact of the Bankers (Ireland) Act of 
1845, a local variation of Britain’s restrictive monetary regime, imposed on Ireland by 
the parliament in London. In particular, the Curran ponders the question of whether 
such a policy was appropriate during a time of famine. Snellman also features 
7 Two other current research networks are engaged in pioneering transnational famine research. 
The “Hunger Draws The Map” project, based at the University of Oxford and funded by the 
Leverhulme Trust (2016-18), analyses the famines that struck Europe during and immediately after 
World War One. The research group “COMPOT – Famines in Historical Context”, funded by the 
Joint Committee for Nordic Research Councils in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NOS-HS) 
and based at the University of Turku, has also held several workshops and is making an important 
contribution to theorizing famine in a transnational context. This includes the key question of what 
actually constitutes famine, and the terms used in different languages. For these networks, see 
<http://greatwar.history.ox.ac.uk/?page_id=2202> and <https://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/hum/yksikot/
suomenhistoria/tutkimus/projektit/Sivut/COMPOT_nalanhataprojekti.aspx> 
8 Kissane, 2000a; Kissane, 2000b, Kissane, 2013; Kissane, 2016. 
9 Ó Gráda, 2009, and Ó Gráda, 2015, have already demonstrated this potential.
10 Newby & Myllyntaus, 2015, 153. 
11 Newby, 2014b, 394.
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prominently in Heidi Reese’s analysis of the Helsinki administration’s handling of 
the famine. Many of Reese’s observations resonate strongly with Irish readers, 
such as the policy that gratuitous aid should be witheld for fear of de-moralizing the 
people (an idea already apparent in the Quaker aid distributed in Finland a decade 
earlier).12 Some comments emanating from the Finnish elite – such as the Governor 
of Mikkeli Province’s hope that the “harsh hunger” would educate the people in “many 
things” – also hark back to British attitudes towards Ireland, particularly the idea of, 
in David Nally’s phrase, “imposing civility”.13 Stripped to a large degree of the racial 
and national element which marked metropolitan Victorian attitudes towards both 
Irish and Scottish Highland Celts, these comments suggest a potential disconnect 
along class lines, or between metropole and province, which was subsequently 
erased in an overarching narrative of “Finnishness”. From a Finnish persective, it 
is worth considering why Snellman’s reputation is so overwhelmingly, though not 
by any means universally, positive. The Irish reader, however, might also ponder 
whether having a Home Rule administration in the 1840s would simply have meant 
having economic policies enacted by a local “Trevelyan”.
Social insecurity is also a theme that runs through Ciarán Reilly’s study of 
the cottiers of Tullygarvey, Co. Cavan, in an excellent example of how previously 
unused archival sources can be used not only to build up a picture of a particular 
locality, but also posit much broader conclusions. The importance of delving in to 
this under-researched stratum of Irish agricultural society is highlighted by recent 
work on the Finnish case, which has stressed the huge increase in the class of 
landless labourers in the 1800s, a development which also had lethal implications 
for famine-era mortality.14 The theme of social precarity is also addressed in 
Miikka Voutilainen’s innovative analysis of marriage and household structure in 
Finland on the eve of the Great Hunger Years. Although recent studies have implied 
that Finland’s demographic structure was dominated by the preventive check, 
Voutilainen argues that the recurrence of famine in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries tends to undermine the argument that such behaviour was necessarily a 
socio-economic safeguard. In examining the structure of households, Voutilainen 
presents new theories around the interplay between preventive checks and rural 
precarity. 
Although 1867-68 is arguably best remembered for the demographic catastrophe 
that hit Finland, the crisis was generally framed by contemporaries as part of a 
wider crisis that also affected Swedish Norrland (to Finland’s north-west), and many 
parts of the Russian Empire, including the Baltic Provinces. Kersti Lust’s article on 
famine relief in Estland and Livland raises important questions about regional and 
imperial structures, as well as the more general notion – recently reformulated by 
Norbert Götz in the context of ninteenth-century European famines – of a “moral 
12 Newby, 2015, 112. 
13 Nally, 2011, 129–73.
14 Häkkinen & Forsberg, 2015, 105–6; Voutilainen, 2015, 125. 
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economy”.15 In a narrative that has strong echoes of the Irish situation – not only 
in the 1840s but also, for example, during the more localised Gorta Beag of 1879-
80 – Lust explores the limits of state intervention, the way in which traditional 
“community” institutions were able to cope with a modernising economy, and the 
persistence or otherwise of paternalistic bonds between noblity and peasantry.
A notable feature of the famines which affected Europe in the late 1860s was 
the extent to which international aid criss-crossed the continent. This fundraising 
took place on a personal, institutional and even state level, and highlights a complex 
array of motivations, linked to trade links, geopolitical interests, class, ethnic or 
religious solidarities, and in some cases simple “Christian charity.” Some of this 
activity is reflected in Özge Ertem’s article on two famines which hit Anatolia in 
the Ottoman Empire (1873-75 and 1879-81), both of which received considerable 
international attention and demands for “a large amount of private benevolence” 
to be “called in to immediate exercise”.16 Again, this account of state institutions 
struggling with the crisis, of a breakdown in social solidarity, and the terms on 
which charity was provided, has resonances with Finland, Ireland and many other 
societies.17 Vitally, Ertem points out some of the self-interest inherent in ostensibly 
philanthropic state actions, and a transnational study of famine relief as a facet of 
international relations in the nineteenth century seems likely to be a fruitful area for 
future exploration. 
The Great Famine hit Finland in the aftermath of the Crimean War, just as its 
political leaders were developing a national identity that focussed on hard work, 
education, and adherence to the law. This last feature was key in distinguishing the 
Finnish national movement from those rebellious peoples such as the Polish or the 
Irish, and the Turku-based newspaper Aura made the explicit point in 1894 that:
The position of the Finnish people cannot be compared with that of 1880s Ireland… 
observance of the law and a sense of justice have always been the Finnish people’s 
finest properties… Even during the great famine [1867-8], when huge quantities of 
people died from lack of bread, even though they had been very hard-working, they did 
not become openly violent [or] steal other people’s property, and [it was] even less likely 
that they would plot in secret in order to hurt others.18
Miikka Vuorela’s article takes this persistent assertion about Finland’s Great 
Famine Years and scrutinises it with fascinating results, offering suggestions as to 
why, despite a rise in crime against property, interpersonal violence did not appear 
to increase significantly in the 1860s.
The memory and memorialization of famine is a theme that has blossomed 
in recent years, not least because of the potential for comparison between the 
15 Götz, 2015, 155–8. 
16 Famine in Asia Minor: Appeal dated Edinburgh, 6th November 1874. Accessed via Haithi Trust.  
17 Newby, 2014a, 61; Newby, 2015, 107; Kinealy, 2013, 279. 
18 Aura, 18 Apr. 1894. 
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Irish and Ukrainian cases.19 The articles by David Ludvigsson (on Sweden) and 
Andrew Newby (on Finland) both deal with issues of memory and representation 
of the hunger years of the 1860s. In his analysis of the Swedish Broadcasting 
Corporation’s 1977 documentary Ett satans år, Ludvigsson notes the contemporary 
social context which coloured the representation of the Norrland famine. Newby’s 
interim report on memorials to Great Hunger Years, likewise, highlights the idea 
that monuments tell us as much about the society that erected them as the events 
that they commemorate.
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The World of the Cavan Cottier 
during the Great Irish Famine
Ciarán Reilly
Centre for the Study of Historic Irish Houses & Estates, Maynooth University
In 1845, on the eve of the Great Irish Famine, the cottier class numbered some 
three million people. Despite such large numbers we know little of the individual 
experience of cottiers as they are absent from both the historiography and the 
social memory of the period. At the bottom of the social and economic pyramid, and 
entirely dependent on the potato as their staple diet, the cottier class remain hidden 
in the Famine narrative, mainly because of the supposed paucity of sources. And 
so the cottier class remains the largest body of people in nineteenth-century Ireland 
about whom we know the least. This essay considers the world of the cottier, using 
recently discovered primary sources from County Cavan as a case study. Theirs 
was a precarious existence and one which was often determined by outside factors, 
beyond their control. Yet, the question remains: who was ultimately responsible for 
them when the Famine crisis commenced. Landlords, at the top of the economic 
pyramid or the small farmer class who had facilitated their existence?
In Cavan the poor are unemployed and starving. Inflammation of the stomach and 
diarrhoea are frequent, and attributable to the use of bad potatoes. Insufficiency of 
food is the cause of present disease, and fever will break out to a frightful extent, in the 
event of scarcity of food.1 
During what came to be known as ‘Black 47’, 1847, the worst year of the Great 
Irish Famine, those, like the cottier Catherine Brady near Cootehill, County Cavan 
were rather forthright in their assessment of the chances of surviving another 
winter, claiming that she would ‘inevitably starve’.2 Brady’s claim was not unique 
and numbering more than three million people in the early 1840s, the ‘cottier’ class 
were amongst the first to succumb to the hunger and disease which the Famine 
1 Quoted in Sydney Morning Herald, 25 Jul. 1846.
2 Centre for the Study of Historic Irish Houses & Estates, Maynooth University, Lucas-Clements 
Archive [LCA], ‘Petition of Catherine Brady, (1847)’. 
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brought.3 Naturally given their numbers and role in agriculture they were central 
to the Irish rural economy on the eve of the Famine. They were central also to 
much of the pre-Famine agitation which characterised rural Ireland as access to 
land was a recurring grievance across the country. These claims for land were all 
the more pronounced following the introduction of the Irish Poor Law Act of 1838 
which made provision for, amongst other things, the creation of the workhouse 
system. It was the cottier class who were predominantly targeted for expulsion 
as landlords and their agents wished to remove poverty from sight, safe in the 
knowledge this numerous cottier population would find sanctuary in the workhouse. 
At Strokestown in County Roscommon, for example, the removal of cottiers was 
carried out in order to provide land for a proposed railway line, while for others it 
was the embellishment or creating of demesnes.4
Despite such large numbers we know little of the individual experience of 
cottiers as they are absent from both the historiography and the social memory 
of the period.5 At the bottom of the social and economic pyramid, and entirely 
dependent on the potato as their stable diet, the cottier class remain hidden in the 
Famine narrative, mainly because of the supposed paucity of sources.6 Indeed, 
since most were deemed to have been illiterate or have received little education, 
they were unlikely in the first place to have left any written account of their lives 
behind. Moreover, largely because of the landholding system in nineteenth-
century Ireland, with cottiers pitted at the bottom of the pyramid, they frequently 
do not appear in estate or public documents. Their ‘nomadic’ nature (houses 
were temporary structures and moved with the work) meant that the majority did 
not hold leases, pay rent or contribute to the landed estate in such ways, and so 
they remain the great ‘hidden’ class of nineteenth-century Ireland. As a result it is 
difficult to reconstruct their everyday lifestyle. Remaining on the ‘outside’, cottiers 
do not appear on land valuation surveys of the early nineteenth-century carried 
out by landlords, or indeed in the governments’ ‘Tithe Applotment Surveys’ of the 
1820s and 1830s. In some instances they do not appear in parish registers (births, 
marriages or death records) thereby furthering alienating them from the historical 
record. And so the cottier class remains the largest body of people in nineteenth-
century Ireland about whom we know the least.
This paper, then, attempts to reconstruct a cottier community in County Cavan 
during the Great Famine using a unique set of records (the Lucas-Clements 
archive) which were generated by the people themselves. In the main these papers 
which form part of the Lucas-Clements archive highlight how cottiers reacted to, 
and were helped, once the Famine commenced in the mid-1840s. Taking the 
3 O’Danachair estimated that there were 768,000 cottier families in 1841, meaning almost 3.9 
million people, or almost half the population of Ireland. See O’Danachair, 1980–81, 154.
4 Reilly, 2014a, 51. 
5 See for example, O’Danachair, 1980–1981; McMahon & O’Neill, 2010; Duffy, 1977.
6 Reilly, 2014b, 8. 
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barony of Tullygarvey as a case study, this paper identifies how landlords and relief 
committees attempted to provide assistance for this teeming population in the midst 
of crisis. Significantly, this cottier population comprised  Catholics and Protestants, 
thereby challenging casual assumptions about rural poverty. This paper will also 
highlight the role played by cottier women and the varying attitudes towards them. 
In the pre-Famine decades cottiers had supplemented their incomes and indeed 
managed to survive mainly on the ‘cottage industries’ which were carried out in the 
home. In Cavan these industries included spinning, weaving, shoemaker, basket 
making, flax dressing, milling and dressmaking. Where in the pre-Famine decades 
women were prominent in the production of items which were sold outside the 
house, their role or value diminished with the downturn in the economy and the 
onset of Famine. In many cases the excess of women became somewhat of a 
burden on individual cottier families.
Part of the reason for the lack of understanding of the world of the cottier is 
the difficulty there is in trying to define the term, which even to cotemporaries was 
‘imprecise’ and ‘often vague’.7 Moreover, the fact that the term was interchangeable 
with ‘landless labourer’ meant that it was easy to confuse these numerous sections 
of the community. When the British Government undertook a Poor Inquiry of Ireland 
in the 1830s they found that the term was ‘variously employed and understood’ 
throughout the country. Somewhat mistakenly however, the report found that 
the cottier system was largely ‘undergoing dissolution’ but that it still prevailed in 
counties Tyrone, Fermanagh, Monaghan, Wicklow, Queen’s County, King’s County 
and Kilkenny. And even within these counties there were regional variations and 
the term ‘cottier’ was used to describe holders of land from a quarter of an acre to 
five acres. Likewise, in the barony of Tullygarvey in County Cavan, the term cottier 
was variously used; indeed even the people themselves referred to each other as 
‘cottars’ and ‘cottagers’.8 
The increased cottier population centred on the development of Irish agriculture 
following the boom period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, when 
during the Napoleonic Wars Ireland was effectively the ‘granary’ of Britain. By 
1800 most Irish farmers prospered because of the labour of the cottier class which 
enabled them to work larger tracts of land with this overabundance of cheap labour. 
By extension, the small farming class used these ‘bound’ labourers as a means of 
carrying out contract work on larger farms and other manual labour. As a means of 
countering the downturn in the economy and maximizing profit from the land, Irish 
agriculture also underwent a period of improvement from 1815 onwards, particularly 
in areas of drainage and land reclamation. Most of this manual and cumbersome 
work was carried out by the cottier. The earl of Charleville at Tullamore, King’s 
County, for example, reclaimed 5,000 acres in the 1830s which until that point 
7 Poor Inquiry (Ireland), 1836, App. H, 1836 2:4. 
8 For the purposes of this study, I define a cottier as the holder of a quarter acre of land or less, 
and usually no land at all.
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was not part of the estate map or survey.9 However, despite their central role in 
this ‘silent’ reclamation revolution, cottiers were at the bottom of the social and 
economic pyramid, living on marginal land and themselves often occupying the 
edges of bogs, mountain and undrained land. Eking out an existence on the tiny 
patch of ground, or ‘potato garden’ as it was commonly called, there was little 
effort placed in the construction of their cabins for cottiers moved with the work. 
Each cottier was provided with a small portion of land in front of the cabin to sow 
potatoes. In return for this ‘small holding’, the cottier repaid the farmer by work in 
kind, usually 200 days in the year. In doing so they were ‘bound’ by an unwritten 
contract, which could be terminated by either part at a moment’s notice and without 
recourse to the law. For this reason, as O’Tuathaigh argues, cottiers were ‘the most 
insecure class’.10
What made the system so detestable was that farmers could charge as high a 
rent as they liked, demanding so many days labour in return, and in turn offered as 
little ‘potato ground’ as they liked. Naturally, such arrangements gave rise to dispute 
and fuelled much of the agrarian tension and crime. The nature of this ‘bound’ 
contract meant that the cottier rarely handled cash and so was perpetually in debt 
to the small farmer. Indeed, on the eve of the Famine the Devon Commission, which 
reported into the State of Land and Occupation in Ireland believed that want of 
capital for farmers to pay cottiers was a serious problem.11 The Devon Commission 
also suggested that landlords should take responsibility for the cottier labourers 
and ensure that they had a house and adequate ground to grow a crop. Failing this, 
the commissioners suggested that fines should be imposed on small farmers who 
neglect the needs of the cottier.12 This system of perpetual debt was criticised by 
the British M.P. and social commentator, Edward Wakefield, in 1812 when he wrote: 
The cotter tenant hires a cabin, the worst in the country, with a small patch of potato 
land, at a rent of thirty shillings per annum…. At the same time he works for his landlord 
at the small wage of 5d per day; but when he comes to settle, he receives nothing, as 
the food of his few sheep is set off against what he charges per labour. In this manner 
the poor cotter must toil without end, while his family eats up the produce of the small 
spot of land he has hired. This is called by the lower classes of the Irish ‘working for a 
dead horse’, that is to say getting in debt.13
Wakefield was not alone in condemning such practices and pre-Famine social 
commentators regularly made a point of this. So too did writers of fiction, from 
William Carleton to Canon Joseph Guinan and those who used the memory of the 
9 Belfast, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland [PRONI], Charleville Papers, T/3069/B/19. 
‘Statement of the value and location of the Charleville estates in Ireland, c.1830.’
10 Ó Tuathaigh, 1972, 133-4.
11 Report on the Occupation of Land in Ireland, 605–606: xix, 1, 36. 
12 Report on the Occupatoin of Land in Ireland, 605-6: xix, 1, 35–6. 
13 Wakefield, 1812, i, 253. 
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Famine as the backdrop to their novels.14 The miserable condition of cottiers was 
also frequently noted by travel writers who toured Ireland on the eve of and during 
the Famine. In Galway, for example, the Scottish philosopher, Thomas Carlyle, 
unsympathetically remarked upon the cottiers’ dependence on begging: 
poor cottier digging his little plot of them, three or four little children eagerly “gathering” 
for him: pathetic to look upon. From one cottage on the way side, issue two children 
naked to beg; boy about 13, girl about 12, ‘naked’ literally, some sash of rag round 
middle, oblique-sash over shoulder to support that, stark-naked would have been 
as decent (if you had to jump and run as these creatures did) and much cleanlier. 
Dramatic, I take it, or partly so, this form of begging: ‘strip for your parts, there is the car 
coming!’ Gave them nothing.15
With the downturn in the Irish economy after 1815 and the collapse of cottage 
industries, cottiers became almost entirely dependent on the potato crop for their 
survival. A year of scarcity or the failure of the crop brought obvious hardships but 
the cottiers managed to overcome these short-term setbacks. This resilience had 
been honed over several generations; from 1700 to 1845 Ireland had experienced 
twenty-seven failures of the potato crop. However, each of these years was 
followed by a bountiful harvest allowing the cottier and his family to recover. Thus, 
the sustained failure of the potato crop (commonly referred to as phytophthora 
infestans) in the late 1840s and early 1850s in Ireland disproportionately affected 
cottiers. However, outside factors, often beyond their control, had hastened the 
demise of the cottier in the years preceding the Famine and had greatly diminished 
their resilience. For example, the ‘Night of the Big Wind’ in 1839, Ireland’s most 
violent recorded storm, wreaked havoc on the cottiers’ makeshift homes. Moreover, 
the failure of the harvests of 1840 to 1842 meant that an already impoverished 
community were on the brink of disaster.
In County Cavan cottiers formed a large body of the population, more than one-
third in the county’s eight baronies.16 Located on the edge of Ulster, on the eve of 
the Famine the 2,500 acre Lucas-Clements estate at Tullyvin, near Cootehill had a 
significant number of cottiers. Indeed at the height of the Famine it was estimated 
that the Tullygarvey relief committee, which catered for the Lucas-Clements 
tenants, provided assistance to almost 2,000 cottiers who were given a pint of 
‘good soup’ three times a week.17 Initially, with the coming of the potato blight in 
September 1845, there was little cause for concern in Tullygarvey and the cottier 
community, it was believed, had a store of potatoes to last winter. By the spring 
of 1846 however there was a realisation amongst the local gentry that alarm had 
14 See for example, Carleton, 1847; Guinan, 1910. 
15 Carlyle, 1882, 188. 
16 In the barony of Castlerahan in County Cavan, for example, some 2,842 cottiers made up 37% 
of the population; in Crosserlough 2,617 cottiers amounted to 34% of the population, while in the 
small parish of Denn there were 365 cottiers, or 31% of the population.
17 LCA, ‘Minute book of the Rathkenny Relief Committee, 1847.’ 
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turned to panic amongst the cottier community. In April 1846 it was reported that 
typhus was raging in Cootehill where most had gone in search of food and relief. 
According to a report: 
The potatoes are run out with many families and there is no means of procuring meal; 
each farmer being able do more than the work of his own farm, leaves no employment 
for the poor. Fever is raging to an alarming extent: it commences with the poor, but has 
extended its ravages to persons in more comfortable circumstances. I have buried a 
man on yesterday, on whose exertions fifteen or sixteen persons depended tor support. 
His widow, with eleven of his family, may enter the poor-house soon as they are able, if 
admitted, for the Guardians are unwilling to admit persons rising out fever.18
Even at this early stage of the crisis it was the cottiers who were disproportionately 
affected by the Famine, reflected in the voluminous petitions for support, charity 
and relief which were sent to the relief committees. For example, the plight of 
families such as the Shevlins who were said to be ‘nearly starved to death’ and 
the Donnochos [sic] who were ‘almost starved to death’ were representative of 
this poverty. These were of course some of the fortunate ones who could pen or 
have a petition written on their behalf. By the end of the year a travel writer passing 
through County Cavan in early 1847 noted that ‘the county of Cavan I found very 
bad, almost every part, and little or no labour done the small farms, the Work-
houses all full.19
The unavailability of work on the small farms naturally drove the cottier class 
to commit crime, a fact reflected by Philip Smyth, secretary of the Larah relief 
committee who lamented that the ‘Famine has made sad savages among its 
poor’.20 Now with starvation looming they turned to the public works for survival. 
Primarily aimed at men because of the nature of the work, the public works schemes 
also included women and children. An examination of these schemes provides a 
unique insight into the world of the cottier during the Famine years. Those put to 
work ranged from fifteen to seventy years, although the average age was forty-
two. These ‘cottiers’ had little alternative than to apply to the relief works and an 
examination of their holdings suggested that they needed alternative employment 
for survival. For example, throughout County Cavan there were regional variations: 
in the parish of Drung the average holding of those engaged in relief works was 
1.76 acres, whereas in Drumheriff it was 0.9 acres and even less (0.45 acres) 
in Cornakill. The willingness to engage in labour on the public works schemes 
distinguished them from their counterparts elsewhere where something of a culture 
of dependency on food relief had existed since the early 1830s.21
18 Dublin Evening Post, 18 Apr. 1846.
19 Northern Whig, 19 Jan. 1847.
20 Dublin, National Archives of Ireland [NAI], RLFC 3/2/4/23. Philip Smyth, Secretary of the Larah 
Relief Committee to Lord Lieutenant, Dublin Castle, 23 Feb. 1847. 
21 Reilly, 2014b, 27. 
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The Rathkenny relief committee were particularly adamant that those employed 
on the public works schemes were those who held less than three acres of land 
and possessed no cows or corn. In most cases the petitions seeking employment 
on the public works came from the ‘poor cottier class’.22 Indeed, it is interesting how 
within the cottier community there were varying ways of describing their own poverty 
with some claiming that they were ‘quite destitute’; ‘destitute of anything’ and ‘very 
destitute’. And there were numerous examples of this hardship. John Gulshannon, 
for example, petitioned for help as he had his mother, a woman aged eighty and 
confined to a bed, to support and two sisters who could not get work.23 Others like 
Michael Barlow of Lamgelton petitioned for help as he had ‘very little food’ and his 
ticket for the public works had been taken from him.24 The petitions also highlight 
another important aspect in the lives of the cottier class. The onset of Famine 
significantly altered the role of women and many were portrayed as being a burden 
on the family unit. Indeed, the number of women in a household was frequently 
used to highlight the plight of a family. Indeed, this problem of having too many girls 
was exactly what perturbed Ann and Mary Shalvey in 1847. Seeking work on the 
public works, the Shalveys’ noted that their circumstances were particularly acute 
because there was ‘five of them without a father’.25 The findings for the parishes 
of Rathkenny, Tullyvin East and Tullyvin West largely reflect other areas of the 
county, including the barony of Castlerahan where cottier families had an average 
of five people per household. However, there were individual circumstances where 
families were substantially bigger and it was not uncommon for some to have 
twelve or thirteen people. Where families of this size were predominantly female it 
caused serious concerns for survival. William Moore, for example, a poor cottier, 
informed the relief committee that he had ‘no food these many days only cabbage’ 
and as a father of ten children, four of whom were unable to work, he desperately 
sought assistance.26
Poverty in Famine-time Cavan did not know religious bounds. Indeed, an 
examination of the cottier population in Tullygarvey would suggest that there were 
a significant number of Protestants, as opposed to other areas of the country where 
the cottier class were predominantly Catholic. While it is difficult to ascertain to what 
extent Catholic cottiers were members of their church, the evidence suggests that 
they were ‘outside’ their communities, and only further analysis of parish records 
would accurately determine this. However, the fact that there were very few petitions 
written on behalf of cottiers by priests, suggests perhaps that they did not turn to 
the clergy in a time of crisis. It was less so with members of the Church of Ireland 
who sought the help of the Revd. Beresford and others in penning petitions. By 
22 See, e.g., LCA, ‘Petition of Pat Lynch’, n.d.
23 LCA, John Gulshannon to T. Lucas-Clements, 9 Dec. 1846.
24 LCA, ‘Petition of Michael Barlow to T. Lucas-Clements’, nd.
25 LCA, ‘Petition of Ann & Mary Shalvey’, nd.
26 LCA, ‘Petition of William Moore to T. Lucas-Clements’, nd.
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extension the cottier population benefited little from the relaxing of the penal laws 
and subsequent introduction of national school education in Ireland in the 1830s 
and remained very much outside the community of education. They possessed 
little education compared to the small farmer class, some of whom could read 
and/or write. This isolation within the community posed a number of problems for 
the cottier population when the Famine struck and merely identifying themselves 
proved to be one of  the biggest challenges they faced.
The survival of the cottier community in the barony of Tullygarvey depended 
largely on the local relief committees which were formed. Playing an important 
role in these committees was Theophilus Lucas-Clements, a prominent member 
of the Grand Orange Lodge and resident landlord. Crucially for the success of 
the committees, Lucas-Clements worked closely throughout the 1830s and 1840s 
with resident gentry, clergy and others in providing relief. However, despite doing 
so much, even Clements and other landholders realised that the amount of relief 
granted was insufficient to ‘answer the calls of destitution’.27 In some parts of the 
barony relief was not enough to prevent large scale mortality and the decline 
in population was staggering. In Drung, for example the population declined by 
36%; in Tullyvin West by 29%; in Tullyvin East by 36%, while in Rathkenny it 
declined by 18%. This latter figure might suggest greater relief measures close 
to Lucas-Clements’ demesne at Rathkenny, but nonetheless the task which the 
relief committees faced was significant. The scale of relief measures in the barony 
provides an insight into the level of destitution which prevailed. For example, during 
‘Black 47’ the Rathkenny Relief Committee oversaw the distribution of more than 
9,000 daily rations to a starving population. 
On a practical level the relief committee was determined that its resources should 
stretch as far as possible and provide for the thousands of cottiers who inhabited 
the barony. In order to do so, tenders were issued for yellow meal and oatmeal, 
whereby merchants were asked to submit samples of the food before being offered 
the contract. This food was distributed at the outdoor relief station set up at Tullyvin 
parsonage. Rations were generally distributed in two groups: first, to those under 
nine years of age and secondly to those over nine. To safeguard against theft, the 
committee ensured that the boiler and the cooking materials were kept secure at 
all times.28 In most instances it was deemed advantageous to provide cooked food 
to the cottiers as they did not possess the means or the knowledge to cook. In late 
May 1847, conscious that their efforts were not enough to stem the tide of hunger, 
the committee decided to increase the rations given to the poor by supplying eight 
ounces of bread with the quart of ‘stirabout’ or soup. 
Perhaps their greatest energies were spent entering and deciding on names to 
be included on the relief lists, an indication that not everyone claiming assistance 
27 LCA, ‘Minute book of the Rathkenny Relief Committee, 1847’.
28 For example, the boiler was kept at the parsonage at Tullyvin under the care of John Maguire 
and Lewis Latimor. At Rathkenny, Bernard Lynch had his wages increased for his ‘correct and 
efficient manner’ of the boiler. See LCA, ‘Minute book of the Rathkenny Relief Committee, 1847’. 
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was deemed ‘deserving’. To counteract fraudulent claims those in receipt of relief 
were given a ticket in order to properly identify them, but in most cases it was 
difficult to identify cottiers such was their nomadic existence up until this point and 
many were simply unknown to the relief committee members. For this reason many 
chose not to describe themselves as cottiers when applying for relief. It was with 
this in mind that the relief committee imposed stricter measures for inclusion on the 
public works and also in the issuing of relief.  Realising this cottiers soon scrambled 
to have character references written to vouch for their character or indeed simply 
to identify them as belonging to the district; indeed, one poor cottier described how 
his family were resident in the same area ‘since the wars of Ireland’ (meaning the 
1689-91 wars).29 However, even where people were given character references 
there were still considerable problems with ascertaining the legitimacy of claims. 
Those like Patrick Donoho [sic] claimed that certain people were ‘men of large 
properties who can live very well without it’.30 To address such claims the relief 
committee appointed a number of men to visit and inspect the legitimacy of claims. 
For example, when Robert Bannon visited and examined the ‘capital’ of Edward 
Donoho, he was happy to declare that the latter was ‘destitute of food – he is in 
great distress’.31 However, other surveys such as at the townland of Cohaw in 1847 
revealed that many of those in receipt of relief had cows and sacks of oats and 
corn, despite their claims of destitution. 
Although the general assumption is that these were merely works which 
benefited the landlord or that the work was merely ‘roads going nowhere’, in 
Tullygarvey thousands depended on it for their survival.32 Certainly mortality would 
have been far greater were it not for the judicious management of the public work 
schemes. Importantly too, the public work scheme at Rathkenny also catered for 
cottier women, those, for example, like Margaret Dunn who looked to be included 
as with eight children she was in ‘great distress’, and Ann Martin who was willing to 
carry out any work in an effort to provide for her family.33 Not everyone, however, 
was enamoured by the public works overseers and predictably there were charges 
of dishonesty and fraud levelled against them. Of course tenants removed from the 
public works list felt particularly aggrieved and accusations of bias and sectarianism 
abounded.34 Thomas Little, for example, in particular took umbrage at the fact that 
several overseers were also employing their sons, paying themselves extensive 
wages while there were ‘many distressed creatures not employed’.35 Another 
outspoken critic of the public works was the Revd Peter Clarke, PP of Drung, 
29 LCA, Peter & Pat Brady to T. Lucas-Clements, 11 Nov. 1846. 
30 LCA, Patrick Donoho to T. Lucas-Clements, nd. 
31 LCA, Robert Bannon to T. Lucas-Clements, nd. 
32 See, e.g., LCA, Robert Graham to T. Lucas-Clements, 1 Dec. 1846. 
33 LCA, William Anderson to T. Lucas-Clements, 25 Nov. 1846.  
34 See, e.g., LCA, ‘Petition of Michael Gilligan and Michael Haughey to T. Lucas-Clements’, nd.  
35 LCA,Thomas Little to T. Lucas-Clements, nd.
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who although a member of the committee was critical of some of the measures 
implemented. There was also particular ire amongst the cottier population that the 
small farmer class were included on the public work schemes, arguing that they 
were not ‘the deserving poor’. Indeed, even Lucas-Clements agreed with this point, 
arguing that the destitute who had farms would be better served working on them 
as there was ‘little or no labour going on especially in the small farms’.36 
The relative success of the Rathkenny and Tullygarvey relief committees was 
commendable, helped by the fact that there was collective effort, both Catholic and 
Protestant, and little squabbling over religious and political issues which were a 
feature elsewhere.37 Earlier crises, such as in 1822 when the government initiated 
a public works scheme, meant that the relief committee understood what needed to 
be done, although they did not have the resources to prevent mortality everywhere. 
In providing relief, the committee relied heavily on local subscriptions which by 
the summer of 1847 were almost exhausted. From July a considerable number of 
people were struck off the relief lists and work schemes after it was found that they 
had been getting relief elsewhere. Ultimately, those that bore the brunt of these new 
stringent guidelines were the cottier population.38 By the end of December 1847 
just over 300 men remained in employment on the Tullygarvey relief scheme, only 
a quarter of the number who had been active in the public works at the beginning 
of the year. Likewise, within the barony, the Rathkenny relief works had ceased 
and the Drumgoon relief committee disbanded in the same month. However, it was 
apparent to all that poverty and distress still prevailed to a large extent.39 Naturally, 
the cessation of works had a dramatic effect on this starving population. A family 
of five, for example, reported how they were left to support themselves on three 
pence worth of turnips. For others in a ‘deplorable state’ their prospects were bleak, 
‘dying of dysentery accompanied with slow fever, faster than they can be buried’.40 
The cottier class in Cavan, and elsewhere, were obliterated by the Famine. As 
Thomas Carlyle noted in 1849 while touring Ireland ‘Moor, moor, brown heather, 
and peat-pots, here and there a speck reclaimed into bright green, - and the poor 
cottier oftenest gone’.41 For some contemporary commentators there was no 
lament for the removal of the cottier class who were blamed for many of the social 
ills of the country. It was probably this that the Parnellite MP, Justin McCarthy had 
in mind when he commented that ‘terrible as the immediate effects of the Famine 
are it is impossible for any friend of Ireland to say that, on the whole, it did not 
36 LCA, T. Lucas-Clements to Robert Graham, 1 Jun. 1847. 
37 Reilly, 2014a, 70–1. 
38 The rules of the relief committee were straightforward about eligibility. According to the 
regulations laid out for the relief committees, gratuitous relief was only to be given to three groups: 
the destitute helpless; the destitute, able bodied and not holding land, and holders of small portions 
of land. In addition, the waged were not be given any relief and those that were, were means tested.
39 Dublin Evening Post, 23 Sept. 1847. 
40 LCA, unsigned letter to T. Lucas-Clements, 17 Jan. 1848.
41 Carlyle, 1882, 197.
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bring much good with it’.42 Somewhat more curtly, the County Kildare middleman, 
Charles Carey remarked that the removal of the cottier class in general would 
‘weed the country of whores, pickpockets, robbers and murderers and make a 
complete hell in America’.43 Likewise, for Hugh Dorian and others, the removal 
of such large numbers of the poor gave ‘the remainder, though few, a chance 
of thinking for themselves’.44 For cottiers theirs was a precarious existence and 
one which was often determined by outside factors, beyond their control. In many 
ways the world of cottier remained ‘outside’ of religion, education, and the local 
community alienating them further when the Famine struck in the mid-1840s. Yet, 
the question remains: who was ultimately responsible for them when the Famine 
crisis commenced. Landlords, at the top of the economic pyramid or the small 
farmer class who had facilitated their existence?
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“A Dreadful Pressure for Money”: 
the Bank Charter Act 1844 and 
Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 in the 
Context of the Great Irish Famine
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DCU Business School, Dublin City University
The Bank Charter Act 1844, extended to Ireland via the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845, 
established a highly restrictive monetary regime in Britain and Ireland, in which 
currency circulation was to be determined by a mechanistic rule-based approach 
rather than by bank discretion. This paper analyses the functioning of the Irish 
banking system during the Great Irish Famine (1845-1850) in the context of this rigid 
monetary regime, focusing in particular on the role of the government chartered 
bank, Bank of Ireland. The analysis is based on archival material from the Bank of 
Ireland Court of Directors, as well as quantitative data detailing note issue by Irish 
banks. This paper contends that while Bank of Ireland was focal point of the Irish 
banking system during the famine years, it perceived itself at this time primarily as 
a commercial bank operating within the prevailing monetary regime rather than as 
a central bank-type entity. Indeed, subsequent characterizations of Bank of Ireland 
as a “de facto” Irish central bank during the 1840s run the risk of overestimating the 
level of institutional agency possessed by Bank of Ireland within the wider monetary 
regime during the famine years.
Introduction
The Bank Charter Act 1844 is regarded as the most significant piece of British 
banking legislation of the nineteenth century. Its implementation in Britain in 1844, 
and extension to Ireland via the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845, established a highly 
restrictive monetary regime in Britain and Ireland, in which currency circulation 
was to be determined by a mechanistic rule-based approach rather than bank 
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discretion.1 This restrictive monetary regime formed part of the Irish institutional 
and economic landscape on the eve of the Irish famine.2 While the regulations 
surrounding joint-stock banking and currency issue may have been far removed 
from everyday life of those hardest hit by the famine onslaught - those landless 
labourers and cottiers operating largely in a barter economy, in which rent for a 
plot of land to grow potatoes was paid in terms of days worked for the landowner - 
matters of banking and currency were not divorced from the economic and social 
distress of those hardest hit by the famine conditions.3 Indeed, this is illustrated 
by the difficulties encountered by public works initiatives in 1846 in maintaining an 
adequate supply of silver with which to pay wages to those dependent on these 
relief efforts for survival.4
One forceful argument against the implementation of the Bank Charter Act 
1844 was the unwieldiness of a restrictive monetary regime in a time of crisis.5 The 
crux of previous episodes of British financial distress, such as those experienced 
in 1825 and 1836, had been the strains placed on the specie reserves of the Bank 
of England, as gold outflows arising from unexpected bad harvests or speculative 
investment threatened the Bank’s ability to meet its obligation to ensure convertibility 
of bank notes to gold at a fixed price and engendered a lack of public confidence in 
the soundness of bank notes issued by banks other than the government chartered 
Bank of England.6  Indeed, the financial crisis of 1825 was only ameliorated by the 
Bank of England being authorized by the British Treasury to dramatically increase its 
1 In order to regulate the issue of bank notes in Britain, the Bank Charter Act 1844 stipulated 
that the Bank of England was to be split in two, with an Issue Department which would circulate a 
fixed maximum of notes (£14 million) against securities and any further issue backed by bullion, and 
a Banking Department which would continue to operate as a commercial entity; no new banks of 
issue were to be allowed; and existing banks were to have their maximum issue fixed at their existing 
levels. When the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 extended this legislation to Ireland, the six Irish banks 
of issue were authorized to issue notes to an authorized limit with further notes issues required to be 
back by gold. Clapham, 1944, 179–183; Collins, 1988, 30; Barrow, 1975, 73. 
2 See Read, 2016, for a discussion of this restrictive monetary regime in the context of Britain’s 
overarching macroeconomic policy approach of the 1840s, which sought to maintain: (i) a fixed 
convertible currency, with banknote supply restricted to a multiple of gold reserves; (ii) free capital 
and trade flows; and (iii) an independent monetary and fiscal policy. As Read notes, this policy 
approach inevitably encountered what economists Mundell and Fleming would later characterise 
as a “macro-economic policy trilemma”: these three policy objectives could not be pursued 
simultaneously in a time of financial pressure. The deterioration in 1846 of Britain’s terms of trade, 
as costly imports were required to offset the failed potato harvest, along with the end of the railway 
investment boom and ongoing government expenditure directed towards Irish famine relief led to a 
diminution of the Bank of England’s gold reserve and exerted pressure on the fixed exchange rate 
regime.  Financial crises ensued in April and October 1847, culminating in a temporary suspension 
of the 1844 Bank Charter Act on 25 October 1847. Dornbusch & Frenkel, 1984, 236; Fleming, 1962, 
369–379; Mundell, 1963, 475–485; Read, 2016, 411–434. 
3 Regional and social differences in pre-famine agricultural commercialisation are detailed by Ó 
Gráda, who points firstly to the west of the country as undertaking less commercial farming, due 
to farm sizes being smallest and dependence on the potato as a subsistence crop being greatest, 
and secondly to smallholders and labourers nationwide undertaking less commercial farming, partly 
because they consumed the subsistence potato crop produced on their plot of land and paid their 
rent mostly in labour. Ó Gráda, 1988, 51.
4 Hall, 1949, 218. 
5 See, e.g., Bankers’ Magazine, Jul. 1844, 224.
6 Dimsdale & Hotson, 2014, 33.
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level of note issue in order to assuage panic amongst the general public.7 The Bank 
Charter Act 1844 would remove the discretion of the Bank of England to increase 
the amount of currency in circulation in times of economic stress – a limitation 
which the deficient potato harvest of 1845 would place under severe scrutiny, as it 
necessitated an importation of grain which would trigger an unanticipated outflow 
of gold from the British financial system.8 
The extension of the Bank Charter Act to Ireland in 1845 had far-reaching 
implications for the Irish banking system: it removed the Bank of Ireland’s monopoly 
over the issuing of notes with a 50 mile radius of Dublin; the right of note issue 
was to operate on the same basis across the six existing Irish banks of issue; the 
Act prohibited the entry of new note-issuing banks into the Irish banking system; 
it placed an upper limit on the note issue of Irish banks that could be backed by 
government securities; it fundamentally altered the position of Ireland’s government 
chartered bank, Bank of Ireland, within the Irish banking system; and it furthered an 
ongoing process which saw the Irish banking system increasingly subsumed into a 
wider banking system, centred around the Bank of England. 
The onset of famine resulted in very different consequences for Irish banking 
than it did for the wider Bank of England-centred system. As anticipated by the 
Bankers’ Magazine, the worsening British trade imbalance and the substantial 
diminution of Bank of England gold reserves triggered by the famine conditions 
would inevitably reveal the impolicy of rigid monetary policy in the face of harvest 
failure: 
We repeat, however, for the twentieth time at least, that the most competent judges 
are decidedly of the opinion, that when a drain of specie reaches that point [where 
insufficient gold was at hand to support the issuing of currency in excess of the £14 
million securities-backed note circulation permitted by the Bank Charter Act 1844], Sir 
Robert Peel’s banking law will never work in practice, and that its temporary suspension 
must be the inevitable result.9 
The problem facing Irish banking, however, was entirely different: rather than 
the monetary asphyxiation thrust upon the Bank of England, Ireland was afflicted 
by a debilitating economic marasmus.10 The currency circulating in Ireland 
contracted from £7,404,366 to £3,833,072 from January 1846 to August 1849, an 
unprecedented diminution of circulating medium which, as the Dublin University 
Magazine lamented, was not due to monetary or commercial crisis but rather the 
stagnation of all Irish enterprise and industry in the face of famine conditions: “it 
is because there is nothing to sell, and nobody to buy, that the wants of Ireland, 
7 Clapham, 1944, 98–103; Fetter, 1965, 112–114.
8 Bankers’ Magazine, Oct. 1847, 484.
9 Bankers’ Magazine, Feb. 1847, 265.
10 Anon., 1849, 374.
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in respect to currency, and therefore our supply of currency have diminished one-
half.”11
In the early months of the famine banks did not encounter financial distress, 
as corn prices remained high and public works projects supported currency 
circulation and transactions.12 However, as noted by W.N Hancock, Professor of 
Political Economy in Dublin University (now Trinity College Dublin), the deficient 
potato harvest devastated the rural barter economy and led to a scramble for notes 
of small denomination and silver coin: 
In consequence of the potatoe [sic] failure, the system of barter which had previously 
prevailed in Ireland became no longer possible, and a currency was wanted to supply 
its place; as the transactions which had thus been previously carried on by barter were 
of small amount, and as the only legal currency for small payments in Ireland is silver, 
a demand was immediately created for silver coin.13 
The process by which silver coin was drained from circulation was succinctly 
captured by the Dublin University Magazine: 
this silver coin has been extorted from the industrious classes by the severest pressure. 
[..] The £400,000 in silver coin, which has forced its way into the banks, and now lies 
there a dead and unprofitable weight, is withdrawn from the circulation of the country.
[..] Thus it was that the silver coin, which had been, in more prosperous times, kept in 
circulation in the country was forced upon the banks.14 
Despite their opposition to the monetary regime enshrined in the Bank Charter Act 
1844 and Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845, Hancock and the Dublin University Magazine 
acknowledged that the Irish economic malaise did not arise from inflexible monetary 
rules:
There is not a bank of issue in Ireland at this moment which could not issue, with 
perfect safety and profit, double the amount of its present issue, if they could only 
find in the country customers whose legitimate transactions could accept it. [..] The 
diminishing amount of money in circulation in Ireland is, therefore, quite independent of 
any effect produced by the laws under which our currency system is now regulated.15
It is in this context that this paper analyses the functioning of the Irish banking 
system during the Great Irish Famine (1845-1850), through the lens of the 
government chartered bank, Bank of Ireland. 
11 Anon., 1849, 373.  
12 See footnote 71, below.
13 Bankers’ Magazine, Aug. 1847, 345.
14 Anon., 1849, 380. 
15 Anon., 1849, 374.
Declan Curran
25
Based on an analysis of archival Bank of Ireland Court of Directors’ Minutes from 
1844-1854, as well as bank-level note issue statistics published in the Bankers’ 
Magazine from January 1846 onwards, two findings emerge that offer insights 
into the nature of Bank of Ireland’s  role within the Irish Banking system: (i) while 
fulfilling public duties as and when they arose was a prerequisite to it receiving its 
government charter, correspondence between the Bank’s directors and the British 
Treasury prior to the implementation of the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 indicate 
that the Bank of Ireland perceived itself at this time primarily as a commercial bank 
operating within the prevailing monetary regime rather than as a central bank-
type entity; and (ii) while Bank of Ireland assumed a number of responsibilities 
commonly associated with Central Banks, such as lender of last resort in times 
of bank failures, Bank of Ireland’s systemic initiatives were primarily ones which 
aimed to facilitate transactions between itself and other Irish commercial banks. 
To illustrate the partial nature of Bank of Ireland’s systemic involvement in the Irish 
banking system, this paper points to Bank of Ireland’s policy towards note issue 
during the famine years. Once it adjusted to the requirements of Bankers (Ireland) 
Act 1845, Bank of Ireland’s note issue did not approach the limit authorized by 
the Act until economic activity recovered in the years after the famine. In this 
regard, Bank of Ireland’s monetary stance was in keeping with that of the other 
Irish commercial banks during the famine-era: its note issue responded to the level 
of Irish commercial activity and the availability of profitable opportunities to extend 
credit. Indeed, it could be argued that by preventing a Bank of Ireland monopoly of 
note issue, the 1845 Act ultimately stymied any future metamorphosis of Bank of 
Ireland into a fully-fledged central bank.
Taken as a whole, this paper argues that modern-day characterizations of 
Bank of Ireland as a “de facto” central bank during the famine years run the risk 
of overstating the influence of Bank of Ireland within the monetary regime as a 
whole and of overestimating the level of institutional agency that Bank of Ireland 
possessed in terms of Irish famine-era monetary and economic policy.
Bank of Ireland and the Irish Banking System 
 in the Advent of Bank Charter Act
Established through legislative charter in 1783, Bank of Ireland fulfilled the role 
of banker to the government: it administered the lodgement of all public monies, 
received all revenue payments, managed the national debt, and provided short-
term advances to the Irish exchequer.16 The legislation establishing Bank of Ireland 
stipulated that no other body exceeding six persons could issue bills or notes 
payable, thereby granting Bank of Ireland an unrivalled position of strength in the 
Irish banking system. Bank of Ireland’s capital arrangements also afforded it a level 
16 McGowan, 1990, 12–13.
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of government support unavailable to other commercial banks: it has legislative 
approval to raise capital of £600,000 which it then advanced to the government as 
a loan with interest to be paid by an annuity of £24,000.17 In what was a precursor to 
the 1826 Banking Co-partnership Act’s curtailment of Bank of England privileges, 
legislation introduced in 1821 permitted the formation of banks with more than six 
partners beyond a radius of fifty (Irish) miles of Dublin. The Irish Banking Act of 
1824 repealed earlier legislation which had required the names of all partners to 
appear on bank notes and had debarred any banker from engaging in import or 
export trade.18 
These legislative changes ushered in an era of Irish joint-stock banking, as 
evidenced by the founding of Hibernia Bank (1824), Northern Bank (1825), Provincial 
Bank of Ireland (1825), The Belfast Banking Company (1827), National Commercial 
Bank of Ireland (1834), the short-lived Agricultural and Commercial Bank (1834), 
and The Royal Bank of Ireland (1836). The spread of branch banking nationwide 
ensued, as the newly formed joint stock banks established 173 branches between 
them between 1824 and 1845.19 By 1845 the Irish banking system comprised of 10 
Irish joint stock banks and two independent branches of the National Bank (Carrick-
On-Suir and Clonmel), and only four private banks (compared to 22 private banks 
in 1820).20 
This rapid expansion of the Irish banking system ground to a halt with the 1845 
Bankers’ Act (Ireland), which extended the 1844 Bank Charter Act to Ireland. Once 
the 1844 Act was introduced in Britain, it was not possible to allow Bank of Ireland 
to have discretion over note issue within the same monetary system.21 The 1845 
Act removed the Bank of Ireland’s Dublin-centred note issuing privileges, with all 
joint stock banks existing at that time now allowed to issue notes within the Dublin 
region.22 Note issue in Ireland was now limited to a fiduciary issue based on the 
existing circulation of the Joint Stock banks, with any additional issue required to 
be backed by bullion. In this regard, the note issue of Bank of Ireland was now 
subject to the same criteria as the other Irish banks of issue.23  The legislation also 
17 Barrow, 1975, 3.
18 Barrow, 1975, 64.
19 Barrow, 1975, 220.
20 Collins, 1988, 52–53, Table 2.4; savings banks, targeting small savers, and loan fund banks, 
which provision of small investment loans, typically of a few pounds, to traders, crafts people, and 
smallholders, also formed part of the pre-famine Irish banking system. As Ó Gráda notes, both were 
hit hard by the famine: total balances in Ireland’s savings banks fell from £2.92 million in 1845 to 
£1.33 million in 1848, while the aggregate value of loan funds fell from £1.87 million in 1845 to £0.72 
in 1848. Ó Gráda, 1999, 149–156. See also: McLaughlin, 2014, 569–591; Ó Gráda, 2009, 21–36.
21 As the Chancellor of Exchequer noted in a letter to the  Bank of Ireland in April 1845:“it was 
not judged advisable to subject banks in Scotland or Ireland to a different scale from that applied to 
Banks in England”; Bank of Ireland [BOI], Minutes of the Court of Directors [MCD], 23 Apr. 1845.
22 McGowan, 1990, 14. 
23 Letter from the Chancellor of Exchequer to the Bank of Ireland on 22 April 1845: “in the 
amendment which it is proposed to make to the law affecting banking in Ireland, it is not intended to 
make any distinction to the regulations that are applicable to the circulation of the Bank of Ireland 
and which will apply to that of the other banks in Ireland”. BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
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deterred the entry of new joint stock companies into the Irish banking system, as 
note issue was only permitted by those joint stock banks already in existence when 
the legislation was introduced in 1845.24 McGowan argues that these legislative 
changes weakened the position of the Bank of Ireland as an emerging Irish central 
bank while strengthening the central position of the Bank of England over the 
monetary system as a whole. On the other hand, Hall, official biographer of Bank 
of Ireland, and MacDonagh both contend that that the 1845 Act extended Bank of 
Ireland’s functioning as a central banking institution, as Bank of Ireland’s leadership 
role amongst Irish joint stock banks became more formal and specific. McDonagh 
cites, by way of example, Bank of Ireland’ development of a clearing house for note 
exchange between Irish banks; its allocation of stock of coin to each of the provincial 
capitals with local agents given discretion in advancing specie for short periods 
to other banks; and, newly freed from interest rate restrictions, the expansion of 
its role as “bankers’ bank”.25 Bank of Ireland had already established itself as a 
lender of last resort, albeit a reluctant one, in exceptional circumstances.26 Munn 
traces Bank of Ireland’s activity in this regard to the crisis of 1814, when three 
Dublin bankers (Robert Shaw and Co., Alexander and Co., and Ball and Co.,) were 
provided with special drawing facilities on the understanding that further assistance 
would not be forthcoming. However, Bank of Ireland was required to take on the 
mantel of lender of last resort once again in 1820, when rising agricultural prices 
eroded public confidence in Irish banks.27 The Bank provided assistance to all 
Dublin banks and a number of country banks, though it could not prevent the wave 
of country bank closures which ensued.28 Further instances of Bank of Ireland’s 
preparedness to grant accommodation to all other Irish banks can be seen in 1833 
(co-operation with Provincial bank), 1836 (Provincial, Agricultural and Commercial, 
Ulster, Hibernian, Belfast, and National banks), and 1839 (Provincial, National, and 
Royal Irish banks).29
The banking architecture that had emerged in the United Kingdom by the 
nineteenth century comprised of three distinct banking systems – in England 
and Wales, in Scotland, and in Ireland – with separate institutional and legal 
developments. However, as Collins notes, “commercial ties between the three 
countries in the form of inter-bank agencies and accounts in London helped 
provide important institutional links across money markets”, and Barrow points to 
market operations undertaken by Bank of Ireland, such as discounting London 
commercial bills and keeping surplus specie reserves on deposit with the Bank of 
24 McGowan, 1990, 35.
25 McDonagh, 1983, 34.
26 McGowan, 1990, 13.
27 Ó Gráda, 1995, 56.
28 Within a two week period in May-June 1820, seven of the fourteen banks servicing the southern 
counties of Ireland had folded. Barrow, 1975, 17–9; Collins, 1988, 12.
29 Hall, 1949, 154–71; Munn, 1983, 26–7.
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England, as facilitating close links between the English and Irish money supply.30 
The 1800 Act of Union, in transferring the Irish seat of Government from Dublin to 
London, led to a shift in the financial centre of power for the Irish banking system. 
The amalgamation of Irish and British exchequers and public debt in 1817, and of 
Irish and British currencies in 1826, bound Irish banking tightly to a wider British 
banking framework in which the Bank of England was the central actor.31 Indeed, 
McDonagh paints a particularly stark picture of this evolving banking landscape: 
“Bank of England now dominated the combined national finances, and Ireland was 
reduced to a branch office of the British treasury”.32 
Notwithstanding this amalgamation of both exchequers and currencies, Bank of 
Ireland has been characterized by Munn as having emerged in the early decades 
of the nineteenth century as the de facto Irish central bank.33 Munn points to three 
aspects of Bank of Ireland’s role within the Irish banking system as being indicative 
of what he considers to be de facto central bank status:  (i) Bank of Ireland’s 
fulfilment of a lender of last resort function for other Irish banks when the need 
arose; (ii) its role as the “bankers’ bank” within the Irish system, a role which despite 
initial reluctance it assumed to a greater extent after the introduction of the 1845 
Act;34 and (iii) its role as “government bank”, which stemmed from its government 
charter.  Ó Gráda characterizes Bank of Ireland’s role in the Irish nineteenth century 
banking system as being that of a quasi-central bank, rather than de facto central 
bank, based on the fact that while Bank of Ireland was the acknowledged lender of 
last resort for Irish banks, it was also their commercial rival. This characterization 
arguably better reflects both the partial nature of Bank of Ireland’s central banking 
functions and the fact that Bank of Ireland faced potential conflicts of interest 
between its public duties and commercial interests.35 Elsewhere, Ó Gráda also 
refers to Bank of Ireland in the early nineteenth century as a proto-central Bank, 
due to its emergence of as lender of last resort within the system.36 However, the 
1845 Act can be seen to stymie any future metamorphosis of Bank of Ireland into 
a fully-fledged central bank, as its prospects of attaining a monopoly over note 
issue were effectively extinguished. As Hall notes, while the the English Act was 
designed so that the issue of notes in England and Wales would ultimately pass 
30 Collins, 1988, 30; Barrow, 1975, 170–5.
31 McGowan, 1990, 13.
32 McDonagh, 1983, 31.
33 Munn, 1983, 19–32.
34  Munn notes that Bank of Ireland’s reluctance to lend to other banks can, in part, be attributed to 
the fact that prior to 1845 it was bound its charter to adhere to a maximum interest rate of 5%. Other 
factors cited are the relative smallness of the Dublin money market, and Bank of Ireland’s view that 
in the normal course of business banks should depend upon their own resources; Munn, 1983, 27–
8.
35 Ó Gráda, 2012, 200.
36 Ó Gráda, 1995, 145.
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into the hands of the Bank of England, Bank of Ireland note-issuing operations 
were regulated on the same basis as the other Irish banks of issue.37 
Bank of Ireland and the Imminent 
Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845
The minutes of the Bank of Ireland Court of Directors meetings in the months 
preceding the introduction of the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 provide a unique 
insight into the bank’s perception of both its own role in the Irish banking system 
and its concerns regarding the imminent legislation. Analysis of Court of Directors’ 
minutes reveals that the kernel of the bank’s argument against the Bankers (Ireland) 
Act was that of defence of its commercial interests against competitive forces. 
The consequences of the imminent banking regulations for the Irish economy or 
monetary system as a whole are alluded to but do not feature prominently in the 
discussions and correspondence of the directors. The Court of Directors’ minutes 
of this period also reveal that Bank of Ireland perceived itself first and foremost as a 
commercial entity. As discussed below, Bank of Ireland characterised the distinction 
between itself and the other commercial banks in terms of its sound management 
of government funds and substantial capital base, rather than in terms of any claim 
that it provided central banking functions for the other Irish commercial banks or for 
the Irish monetary system as a whole. 
The drafting of the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 coincided with discussions 
regarding the renewal of Bank of Ireland’s government charter. These discussions 
had been initiated in February 1844 when a Bank of Ireland deputation travelled to 
London to meet the Chancellor of the Exchequer.38 Further meetings ensued in April 
1845 when Bank of Ireland representatives travelled to London at the behest of the 
Prime Minister, Robert Peel.39 On the issue of renewing the bank’s government 
charter, it became clear that this renewal would involve a curtailment of the note 
issue monopoly within a 50 mile radius of Dublin that the bank had enjoyed since 
1821. On April 21st 1845, Bank of Ireland governor, Thomas Crosswaithe reported 
back to his fellow directors that Peel was “quite decidedly against the continuance 
of our privileged distance”.40 The meeting also served as a first briefing by Peel to 
Bank of Ireland regarding his intended Bankers (Ireland) Act.41  
37 Hall, 1949, 211.
38 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1844; Hall, 1949, 201.
39 BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
40 BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
41 The proposed legislation and removal of Bank of Ireland privileges were further detailed in 
a letter from the Chancellor of Exchequer to Bank of Ireland dated 22 April 1845; in which the 
Chancellor provided assurances to the bank that “the withdrawal of this privilege shall in no degree 
affect the relations between the Bank of Ireland to the Government. We propose that the Bank of 
Ireland should still continue as at present the banker of the State”; BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
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Bank of Ireland reluctantly assented to curtailment of its privileges as part of 
the renewal of its government charter, with Crosswaithe appealing to his fellow 
directors to “[forward] any objections which they deem advisable”, before adding 
“we can only add that we do not think better terms can be obtained”.42 His fellow 
directors also appeared to recognise the political expediency of accepting Peel’s 
terms: “we do not consider it necessary to trouble you or our friends with any further, 
than that we are satisfied that you have done as much for our establishment as 
could be expected”.43 However, as the Bankers (Ireland) Act was still at a formative 
stage, Bank of Ireland was invited to outline its concerns regarding the prospective 
legislation.44 The Court of Directors’ minutes from May-June 1845 document these 
concerns and offer insights into Bank of Ireland’s perception of its role within the 
Irish banking system. 
Bank of Ireland’s initial response to the proposed reforms reflected the bank’s 
focal position in the Irish system and indicated the bank’s recognition that stability of 
the banking sector as a whole was a prerequisite for its own wellbeing.  The minutes 
of the Court of Directors record the bank’s initial concerns regarding the proposed 
reforms, as stated in a letter dated 24 April 1845 from the London deputation 
(Thomas Crosswaithe; Thomas Wilson; and George Carr) to the Chancellor (Henry 
Goulbourne).45 The deputation state that they “are of the opinion that sufficient 
checks not provided against the dangers of over issue in the country”, arguing that 
if banks were permitted to issue a proposed legalized circulation of £6,272,000 
not backed by gold, and as those banks also held gold in the region of £1,700,000, 
total Irish note issue could reach £8,000,000 without those banks being required 
to obtain any additional specie.46 Bank of Ireland viewed this proportion of gold 
to note issue as being too low and “liable to abuse, and may give rise to serious 
consequences”.47 This issue of ease of note creation among Irish banks is also 
alluded to in a letter of 23rd May 1845 by George Carr to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, calling for more stringent rules to be put in place.48 
Systemic banking sector concerns are also evident in a letter dated May 10th 
1845 from the Governor to Carr in London, which was written in anticipation of 
draft of the Bankers (Ireland) Act, instructing him to consult with the banks legal 
advisor [Mr. Fairfields] “and lose no time in making any remarks which occur to you 
or him”.49 The letter ends with one guiding principle for Carr in his inspection of the 
imminent draft legislation: “at all events no increase in the number of banks of issue 
42 BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
43 BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
44 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1845. (Letter from Chancellor of the Exchequer to Bank of Ireland).
45 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1845.
46 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1845.
47 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1845.
48 BOI, MCD, 19 Jun. 1845.
49 BOI, MCD, 10 May 1845.
Declan Curran
31
will be sanctioned”. This instruction appears to set out in no uncertain terms the 
position of Bank of Ireland with respect to reform of the Irish banking system, and 
is suggestive of commercial rather than public considerations.50 
While issues regarding the soundness of note circulation and the prudence of 
competitor banks arguably pertain to both commercial and public domains, the 
bank’s additional objections to the proposed legislation resided very much within 
the commercial realm. One such issue revolved around the publication of accounts. 
Bank of Ireland strongly objected to proposals that the Act require it to publish 
financial information of a similar level of detail as that required from the Bank of 
England, arguing that as it “no longer has any peculiar control over note issue”, it 
should only be required to publish the same information as other banks of issue.51 
A further commercial concern which arose during the 1845 Act’s passage 
through parliament was that of mortgage lending. Bank of Ireland’s original charter 
prohibited the bank lending on the security of land. At the second reading of the 
bill on 12 June 1845, a motion was tabled by Dundalk MP Thomas Redington 
proposing that Bank of Ireland should be allowed to lend on mortgage in a similar 
manner to other commercial banks. However, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
strongly opposed this motion, arguing that a government chartered bank should 
not be exposed to the financial risk that could arise from this type of lending.52 In 
a subsequent letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Carr appears to concede 
the argument regarding mortgage lending (“we reluctantly yield to your judgment 
on this point”), while continuing to protest against the proposals regarding the 
publication of financial information.53 
Bank of Ireland also moved to protect its existing arrangements regarding 
interest income arising from its management of government funds, objecting to a 
clause in the legislation which appeared to allow for the interest rate receivable to 
be reduced.54  This issue of management of public monies came to the fore again 
in June 1845. A letter dated 13th June 1845 from Carr to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer sees Carr remonstrating against a proposal made by the Chancellor to 
allow banks other than Bank of Ireland receive public monies.55 
Carr’s protestation against any diminution of Bank of Ireland’s responsibilities 
in terms of managing public funds provides an insight into how Bank of Ireland 
perceived its role within the Irish banking system. Carr describes Bank of Ireland 
as “the great chartered bank of the country with a large paid up capital placed in 
the hands of the Government”. In emphasising the bank’s ability to “secure[s] the 
50 BOI, MCD, 10 May 1845.
51 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1845.
52 Hansard, 12 Jun. 1845, cc. 437–9; Hall, 1949, 206.
53 BOI, MCD, 10 Jun. 1845. In 1864 Bank of Ireland was eventually granted the power to extend 
credit secured by mortgage. McGowan, 1990, 15.
54 BOI, MCD, 17, 24 May 1845.
55 BOI, MCD, 14 Jun. 1845.
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payment of those deposits beyond the possibility of loss from adverse times or 
mismanagement”, Carr’s argument contrasts the strength of Bank of Ireland as a 
commercial entity to weaknesses inherent in other Irish banks: “the small paid up 
capital of the other banks, all retained in their own hands; very limited amount of 
government or other immediately available securities compared with the extent of 
their circulation and deposit liabilities”.56 Notable here is Carr’s characterization of 
Bank of Ireland as the sole government approved commercial bank, rather than 
as an institution of systemic importance to the banking system as a whole. Carr’s 
defence of Bank of Ireland’s position was met with approval by Crosswaithe, who 
conveyed “the satisfaction of the court with the prompt and very efficient manner 
in which you resisted the proposal to remove any of the public business from the 
Bank of Ireland.”57 
Bank of Ireland Functions during the Famine Years
This section explores the extent of Bank of Ireland’s central banking functions 
during the famine years, by contrasting its inter-bank endeavors in this period with 
its activities in the sphere of note issue. While the former lend themselves to the 
idea that Bank of Ireland had emerged as a central bank of sorts, the latter appear 
to be primarily concerned with facilitating smooth inter-bank transactions rather 
than an on-going macro-level involvement in monetary policy. 
The Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 received royal assent on 21st July 1845 and 
came into force on 6th December 1845.58 In anticipation of the implementation 
of the Act, Bank of Ireland sought to ensure that additional supplies of gold and 
silver coin would be provided by the Bank of England and the Royal Mint. Bank 
of Ireland initiated this process on 31st July 1845 via a letter to the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, with correspondence continuing throughout the following months.59 
While Hall characterizes this process as one where “the Directors decided that 
the silver coinage should be considerably augmented”, this appears to overstate 
the influence of Bank of Ireland in this instance. The correspondence between 
the two parties depicts the situation as one where Bank of Ireland briefed the 
Chancellor regarding “the necessity which will exist on and after the 6th December 
next for a very considerable augmentation to the amount of silver coin in circulation 
in this country to meet the want of the public consequent on the withdrawal of all 
bank notes for fractional parts of a pound”, with the Chancellor responding that 
he “had anticipated an increased demand for silver in Ireland and that the Mint 
56 BOI, MCD, 14 Jun. 1845.
57 BOI, MCD, 14 Jun. 1845.
58 See http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1845/act/37/enacted/en/print.html for full text of The 
Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict c 37). 
59 BOI, MCD, 31 Jul. 1845.
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was employed in an extensive coinage of silver, with a view to meet it”.60 The onus 
was then on Bank of Ireland to ensure that their request for additional coinage 
was met in a timely manner: “As the period is fast approaching when that supply 
will be required, our Court have requested me to beg you will be kind enough to 
give me some idea of the probable period when its delivery in this country may be 
expected.”61 
On September 23rd, Bank of Ireland estimated that, in addition to the £125,000 it 
had imported in the preceding months for its own needs, a further £300,000 would 
be required to meet the want of silver in Irish circulation. The Bank’s justification for 
this exigency acknowledges the impact of legislative change on Irish demand for 
silver coin but otherwise appears to be somewhat ambiguous, given the unfolding 
events surrounding the deficient potato crop: “there are complaints of a want of 
silver in Ireland consequent it is supposed on the full employment of the working 
classes, and there will be a considerable sum required on the withdrawal of all 
bank notes containing fractional parts of pound”.62 
On 28th October, Bank of Ireland requested an additional £125,000 in silver 
coin (“The suppression of the notes for the fractional part of one pound renders 
it necessary to provide a considerable quantity of silver”), as well as £200,000 in 
gold.63 The latter request was made in the context of adjustment to the imminent 
legislative changes: “Although at present we anticipate no difficulty in the working 
of the Banking Bill in Ireland, yet at the period when the act comes into operation 
is fast approaching, we should like [..] to make such arrangements with your bank 
as might [facilitate] the obtaining gold, if under any unforeseen emergency such 
should be required.”64 The Governor of the Bank of England stated his willingness to 
accommodate the Bank of Ireland in these requests, with the seamless introduction 
of the legislation appearing to be paramount: “it is scarcely necessary for me to 
state that every facility which the Bank of England can legitimately grant to the 
Bank of Ireland in carrying out the new Irish Bank Bill, will be readily afforded.”65 On 
24th November Bank of Ireland requested that a further £200,000 of gold be made 
available, with their correspondence suggesting that deteriorating local conditions, 
rather than contingency in the face of legislative change, were coming to the fore: 
“we had hoped we were sufficiently provided with specie to meet the operation of 
[the] Banking act, but the demands on us for our notes, from a variety of causes, 
are such that I feel we shall be obliged to import a further amount of Gold to the 
extent at present of £200,000. […] One of the causes I allude to is the existence at 
60 BOI, MCD, 17 Sep. 1845.
61 BOI, MCD, 17 Sep. 1845.
62 BOI, MCD, 23 Sep. 1845.
63 BOI, MCD, 28 Oct. 1845.
64 BOI, MCD, 28 Oct. 1845.
65 BOI, MCD, 31 Oct. 1845
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present of a run on the savings banks here, which may continue and extend.”66  The 
Bank also refers to the tendency of the public to “hoard our notes.”67 
Despite this indication of financial stress in November 1845, Irish commercial 
banks did not encounter significant difficulties in 1845 or 1846. In testimony before 
the Committee on Commercial Distress on 27th June 1848, Robert Murray, General 
Manager of Provincial Bank, notes that it was not until the 1846 potato crop failed 
that “very great apprehensions were entertained”, with “the demand for money 
for the supply of food [becoming] very large during the months of November and 
December 1846”.68 Murray attributed the banks’ vigour despite the deteriorating 
conditions in large part to government expenditure on public relief works:
The issue of the banks in Ireland was kept up in 1846 almost entirely by the Government 
expenditure; there was less produce, the growth of Ireland, to sell in 1846 than in 1847, 
but yet the issue kept up, both of bank notes and of silver in the hands of the lower orders, 
and in 1847 it was very much diminished in amount by reason of the discontinuance of 
that expenditure, and the country was thrown upon its own resources.69 
In its capacity of banker to the state, Bank of Ireland was designated by the 
British Treasury as agent for the Board of Public Works in the handling of relief 
funds. The minutes of the Court of Directors record a letter from Charles Trevelyan 
dated 4th September 1846, in which the Treasury consigning £80,000 in silver 
coins to Ireland via the steamship Comet “in order to enable the Bank of Ireland 
to continue to afford to the Board of Public Works in Ireland the assistance which 
has hitherto been given by that establishment in the payment of the men employed 
up on relief works”.70 In November 1846 Bank of Ireland advised the Treasury that 
demand for silver coin “on account of the Board of Public works have been so 
great as nearly to exhaust that supply in some and greatly exceed it at others of the 
various places at which it was deposited and also a very large sum of the ordinary 
supply kept by the bank at other locations for the general wants of the country […] 
I am now advised by the Board of Works that an immediate supply of £50,000 is 
required and a further supply of £50,000 will most probably be also required”.71 By 
the month of January 1847, a total sum of £1,000,000 had been sent from London 
w, with the need for further funds anticipated.72 Bank of Ireland for its part was 
anxious to ensure that it would not be charged commission by the Bank of England 
for this non-commercial transfer of funds, and its representations to the Bank of 
66 BOI, MCD, 24 Nov. 1845
67 BOI, MCD, 24 Nov. 1845.
68 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, qq. 6669, 6672.
69 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6669.
70 BOI, MCD, 4 Sep. 1846.
71 BOI, MCD, 17 Nov. 1846.
72 BOI, MCD, 23 Jan. 1847. 
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England on the matter in January 1847 the bank was keen to downplay its role in 
the process: 
That as a Government operation originating in England from Public Revenue lodged in 
the Bank [of England] there, the transmission of these monies as a matter of account 
between the two Banks may be looked on rather as a transaction of the Bank of England 
than of the Bank of Ireland.73
Bank of Ireland undertook two further initiatives in the wake of the 1845 Act 
which were of significance for the Irish banking system as a whole. Firstly, the 
establishment of a note clearing system in November 1845 saw Bank of Ireland 
place on formal footing the note exchange facilities that it had previously been 
providing for other Irish joint-stock banks.74 Secondly, Bank of Ireland extended its 
role as “bankers’ bank” to the Irish joint-stock banks.75 The two Dublin-based non-
issuing joint stock Banks (Hibernian Bank and Royal Bank), who had agreed to 
issue Bank of Ireland notes exclusively, were afforded overdraft facilities at 2 per 
cent below the usual overdraft rate.76 The three joint stock banks of issue whose 
head offices were situated in the North of Ireland (the Northern, Belfast and Ulster 
Banks) were also accommodated with overdraft facilities up to a limit of £150,000 
on the deposit of bills or other securities, at the current rate charged by the Bank 
of England.77 
Munn characterizes these Bank of Ireland initiatives as the adoption of a co-
operative response to the curtailment of its monopoly position under new legislation.78 
Both Hall and McGowan refer to these initiatives as indications of Bank of Ireland’s 
leadership amongst the Irish joint-stock banks, with the former noting the changing 
relationship between the Irish joint stock banks subsequent to the 1845 Act: “its 
[Bank of Ireland] leadership of the Irish banks became more formal and specific”.79 
These commentators tend to discuss the Bank’s growing dominance among Irish 
joint-stock banks in terms of an extension of its role as a central bank. While Bank 
of Ireland was in a position to exert its influence over the other Irish joint-stock 
banks, it is also important to recognize the limit of the Bank’s focal role within 
the Irish banking system. Given the fact that the Irish currency resided within a 
wider monetary union, as well as the restrictive nature of the Bank Charter and 
Bankers (Ireland) Acts, the constraints on Bank of Ireland’s systemic influence are 
73 BOI, MCD, 23 Jan. 1847.
74 BOI, MCD, 5 Nov. 1845. For details regarding the workings of the exchange, see McDonagh, 
1983, 36. Munn notes that Irish note clearing arrangements were based on the Scottish model and 
were twenty years ahead of a similar initiative in England. Munn, 1983, 31. 
75 The 1845 Act abolished the 5% ceiling on the interest rate that Bank of Ireland could charge on 
loans. McGowan, 1990, 15.
76 Hall, 1949, 212–4;  McDonagh, 1983, 36.
77 Hall, 1949, 212–4;  McDonagh, 1983, 36.
78 Munn, 1983, 31.
79 McDonagh, 1983, 36.
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discernable in relation to note issue during the famine years. As outlined below, 
the Bank’s approach to note issue appears to adhere to a commercial banking 
rationale rather than that of a macro-level central banking entity. 
Irish banking activity and currency circulation remained robust in 1845 and 
1846 despite the onset of famine conditions, as temporary public relief measures 
and high grain prices supported ongoing commercial activity.80 As illustrated in 
Figures 1 and 2 below, total Irish note issue remained above the limit [£6,354,494] 
authorized by the Bankers (Ireland) Act until May 1847. The circulating medium 
then contracted rapidly: by September 1849 it had diminished by over one third, 
and note issue levels did not approach the authorized limit again until 1853. In his 
testimony before the Committee on Commercial Distress, Robert Murry (Provincial 
Bank) attributed the currency contraction to the debilitating effects of harvest failure 
on trade and commercial activities:
The greater portion of the produce of Ireland is provisions, and there was, comparatively 
speaking, none to sell; that which produced circulation in Ireland had almost ceased to 
exist for such a purpose; the provisions grown in the country during the year 1846 and 
during the last year were altogether wanted for the sustentation of the people of the 
country ; they were not to be exported; the people consumed the whole, and they had 
nothing to sell ; they could not both eat and sell it; therefore, that which had produced 
circulation before had disappeared, and could not be brought to market. 
Further insight into famine-era changes in both the note issue and specie 
holdings of Irish banks can be seen in Figures 3 and 4. While note issue remained 
above the authorized limit in 1845 and 1846, banks were required to back this 
excess note issue with gold holdings. However, once note issue began to diminish 
in 1847, banks reduced their gold holdings.81 The pattern of notes issued under £5 
is also indicative of the diminution of trade related to agriculture, as notes of small 
denominations were of particular importance in agricultural trade.82 The increase of 
silver holdings among the Irish banks illustrates a phenomenon alluded to earlier: 
as failure of the potato crop impeded the workings of the rural barter economy, 
silver coin was “abstracted out of the hands of the lower orders, with whom silver 
circulates to a large extent; in consequence of the severe and continued pressure 
80 Hall, 1949, 218.
81 As Murry noted in his evidence before the Committee: “the price of corn and produce of every 
kind not only ranged high in 1845 and 1846, but the issue during those years, particularly in the 
months of November, December, January and February, got considerably in excess of the permitted 
issue, consequently the banks were called upon to keep an excess of gold at the head offices over 
the permitted circulation”. Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6691.
82 Gilbart sets out what he considered to have been the key features of Irish currency circulation 
at the time. According to Gilbart, the annual changes in the Irish circulation were governed chiefly 
by the quality of the harvest and the prices of agricultural products. Circulation was traditionally at 
its lowest point in August and September prior to the harvest, and then rose rapidly until January, 
after which point it gradually declined. Notes of the smallest denomination experienced the most 
significant increase, as these were extensively used in the purchase and sale of agricultural produce; 
Gilbart, 1852, 307–326.
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upon them, it was wrung out of their little hoards and keeping places, and placed 
in the hands of the banks.”83
The rationale of commercial banks for contracting their note issue was, in 
Murray’s view, one of lack of profitable opportunities. When asked if the diminution 
in the amount of money employed in discounts had arisen from a diminution of the 
demand for it, or as a result of the diminution of the credit of individuals, Murray’s 
response indicated that by 1847 Irish commercial activity had ground to a halt:
Both causes operated; where parties failed, your business was merely to wind up their 
accounts as soon as you could; and there was also a want of commodities upon which 
to advance money; there were not the commodities to buy and sell in Ireland, which 
gave illegitimate rise to commercial transactions, and consequently there was a great 
decrease of commercial bills from the commencement of the year 1847 to the present 
date [June 1848]; that has existed and still continues.84 
When Bank of Ireland’s note issue is examined during the famine years, as well 
as pre- and post-famine, it is seen to behave in a manner very similar to that of the 
note issuing Irish joint stock banks. Table 1 summarizes the correlation coefficients 
of monthly note issue growth rates between Bank of Ireland and the other Irish 
note-issuing banks from April 1843 to December 1854. Bank of Ireland monthly 
note issue growth appears to be highly correlated with that of the other banks in 
question [0.48-0.83], particularly with that of Provincial Bank [0.83]. 
Bank of Ireland does not appear to lead other Irish banks, aside from the three 
northern Irish banks that it accommodated with overdraft facilities. As illustrated by 
Provincial Bank’s 1-month lead correlation coefficient [0.28], the note issue growth 
of other Irish banks for a given month is not highly correlated with Bank of Ireland 
note issue growth of the previous month. If anything, there is an indication that 
Bank of Ireland’s note issue growth tended to lag one month behind that of its 
competitor, Provincial Bank [0.54].85 Indeed, Gilbart notes that the note-issuing joint-
stock banks whose branches were chiefly located in agricultural districts tended to 
expand circulation more rapidly in response to the harvest season than Bank of 
Ireland, whose branch network was predominantly located in large towns.86
83 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6607.
84 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6761.
85 Gilbart, 1852, 308.
86 By 1845, Provincial Bank had opened 38 branches nationwide (including head offices), with 25 
branches located in towns recorded in 1841 census as have population of less than 10,000). Bank 
of Ireland, in comparison, had established 24 branches  nationwide by 1845, of which seven were in 
towns of population less than 10,000. See Barrow, 1975, 215–219 (App. 3).
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Table 1: Correlation Coefficient of monthly growth in note issue, April 1843–Dec 1854 (Bank 
of Ireland: 1 month lead, contemporaneous and 1 month lag).
Source: Author’s calculations based on data available from Bankers’ Magazine, various issues. 
A further insight into the mindset of commercial banks in the initial years of 
the famine is provided by Murray’s description of Provincial Bank’s discount rate 
policy. Provincial bank feared exposure to the risks inherent in grain speculation 
and sought to limit this activity by reducing discounting facilities and increasing 
discount rates: 
There was a strong impression, from the large supplies of food that must be imported 
into Ireland, in consequence of the failure of the potato crop, money must become 
scarce, and that therefore it was necessary to increase the value of it, in order to 
prevent over-speculation in food; and it was deemed necessary, in the months 
of November and December, to look very cautiously to all transactions, and, upon 
particular transactions, to increase the rate of discount, though there was no increased 
rate of interest generally, till the 26th of January,1847.87 
Bank of Ireland’s discount rate for Irish bills can be seen to have moved in a 
similar fashion: the rate was initially increased to 5% on 5th November 1845, at 
which it stayed until 27th January 1847 when it was raised to the same level of the 
Provincial rate (51/2%). The banks continued to raise their interest rates in tandem 
throughout 1847, reaching a peak of 8% in October 1847 at the height of the British 
financial crisis.88 
Although succinct relative to that of Robert Murray, the testimony of Bank of 
Ireland governor John McDonnell before the Committee on Commercial Distress 
provides insight into bank’s views regarding circulation during the famine years. 
When asked if he was aware of any want of circulation in Ireland, McDonnell’s 
response (“I think not, I am not aware of any complaint of that sort”89) is supportive 
of the view set out in greater detail by Robert Murray (above) that circulation levels 
were a reflection of the diminished level of trade undertaken in Ireland during the 
famine years. Indeed, when Murray was asked if during the commercial distress of 
1847 he felt a want of circulation, his answer was a terse “None”.90 
87 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6672.
88  Bank of Ireland discount rate changes from Jan.-Oct. 1847: 27 Jan. (51/2%); 12 Apr. (6%); 6 May 
(7%); 14 Jul.  (61/2%); 27 Oct. (8%); Provincial Bank discount rate changes from Jan.-Oct. 1847: 26 
Jan. (51/2%); 23 Mar. (6%); 5 May (61/2%); 15 May (7%); 14 Jul. (61/2%); 27 Oct. (8%). 
89 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6616.
90 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6698.
 Clonmel  
National 
Bank
Carrick-on-
Suir National 
Bank
National 
Bank
Ulster 
Bank
Northern 
Bank
Belfast 
Bank
Provincial 
Bank
Bank of Ireland (+1) 0.36 0.34 0.62 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.28
Bank of Ireland 0.70 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.48 0.55 0.83
Bank of Ireland (-1) 0.47 0.46 0.26 0.41 0.24 0.30 0.54
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More generally, on the impact of the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 on Bank of 
Ireland, McDonnell did acknowledge a role for Bank of Ireland in influencing Irish 
currency circulation, but argued that this role had been diminished by the removal 
of the bank’s monopoly on note issue within the 50-mile radius of Dublin; “under 
the former state of things the Bank had the power, if too full a circulation took place, 
in some degree of checking it; that power was taken from them, and I think in that 
way it [the Act of 1845] operated injuriously”.91 While appealing to a circumscribed 
ability to discharge public duty may have had a strategic dimension in this instance, 
it nonetheless serves as a reminder that while a number of Bank of Ireland’s 
systemic functions within the Irish context expanded in the aftermath of the 1845 
Act, the Act crucially did not envisage Bank of Ireland developing a note-issue 
monopoly along the lines of that envisaged for the Bank of England. 
Despite this, McDonnell was firmly of the view that the 1845 Act did not inhibit 
the practical workings of Bank of Ireland during the famine years: “The Act of 1845 
regulated the Irish banks and the Scotch banks; I think it had very little effect in 
Ireland, and no injurious effect I should say. […] My impression is that it afforded 
greater protection to the general credit of the country, and prevented much of the 
misery and ruin which would have resulted if banking had been ad libitum, as it 
was before.”92 The prohibition on the new banks of issue entering the Irish banking 
system appears to have been a particularly welcome development for Bank of 
Ireland: “Banking before that time had not been, I think, managed with the care, 
or based on the capital, that ought to form the basis of banking, and banks were 
formed that never ought to have been permitted to issue paper; the Acts of 1844 
and 1845 put a stop to that.”93 
Conclusion
The difficulty in assessing the functioning of central banks in former times stems 
from the heterogeneity of their origins and development. As the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) have noted in a recent study, the earliest progenitor central banks 
were the dominant commercial issuers of banknotes and bankers to the government 
– with the former, frequently bestowed via government privilege, providing these 
banks with sufficient scale to support government banking requirements.94 While 
monetary stability was crucial to these banks, this was motivated by their desire 
to ensure their own liquidity rather than by wider macroeconomic concerns.95 The 
development of lender of last resort functions and informal banking supervision 
91 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6618.
92 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, qq. 6612, 6644.
93 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6613.
94 Bank for International Settlements [BIS], 2009, 17–20. 
95 BIS, 2009, 19.
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were also driven by commercial self-interest rather than by a public-good objective. 
As long as mechanical standards of convertibility, such as the gold standard, 
remained in place, central bank discretion in terms of monetary policy and currency 
management was greatly circumscribed. 
While modern-day definitions of central bank functions encompass a wide 
range of monetary policy and regulatory functions, central banking in the mid-
nineteenth century was still at a formative stage.96 Indeed, the Bank Charter Act 
1844 and the mechanistic monetary regime which it implemented represented a 
legislative initiative to fundamentally alter the early development of one of the most 
influential central banks of that time, the Bank of England.  The ad hoc development 
of central banks from commercial entities to public institutions is neatly captured by 
Andreadēs in his biography of the Bank of England: “in 1844 people were very far 
from anticipating [..] that the Bank would cease to be a bank of discount and would 
become the guardian of the cash reserve for the commercial world.”97
This institutional ambiguity also applied to nineteenth century Bank of Ireland 
within the Irish banking system, and was complicated yet further by the gravitational 
pull exerted on the bank by the Bank of England and British Treasury. As discussed 
above, the government-sponsored Bank of Ireland was called upon to both fulfil 
routine public duties, such as the collection of public monies, and to execute 
exceptional interventions on behalf of the government, such as facilitating the 
introduction of the new banking legislation, the transmission of relief funds, and 
alleviation of banking crises. Bank of Ireland was also keen to maintain its dominant 
position among the Irish joint-stock banks, and indeed when the Bankers (Ireland) 
Act 1845 altered the Irish banking landscape, Bank of Ireland moved to extend and 
make more formal the exchange and overdraft facilities it afforded to the other Irish 
joint-stock banks. 
This chapter argues however, that while Bank of Ireland fulfilled a leadership 
role amongst other Irish joint-stock banks, it is important to appreciate the limits 
of Bank of Ireland’s influence within a monetary system that by the mid-nineteenth 
century has become increasingly centered around the Bank of England. Given the 
fact that the Irish currency formed part of a wider monetary union, as well as the 
restrictive nature of the Bank Charter and Bankers (Ireland) Acts, the constraints on 
Bank of Ireland’s systemic influence are discernable in relation to note issue during 
the famine years. With the Bank Charter Act 1844 envisaging a monetary system in 
which currency circulation would regulated in a mechanistic fashion via the Bank of 
England, it was inevitable that Bank of Ireland’s discretion in relation to note issue 
would be greatly circumscribed. As mentioned earlier, the Bankers (Ireland) Act 
1845 may have ultimately stymied any future metamorphosis of Bank of Ireland into 
a fully-fledged central bank by preventing a Bank of Ireland monopoly of note issue 
and holding all Irish note-issuing joint stock banks to the same criteria regarding 
96 Archer & Moser-Boehm, 2014, 7–8.
97 Andreadēs, 1924, 246.
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authorized note issue and gold-back note issue beyond the authorized limit. In any 
event, Bank of Ireland does not appear to have played an active ongoing macro-
level role in monitoring or directing monetary conditions in Ireland in the years 
after 1845. Bank of Ireland’s monetary stance appears to have been in keeping 
with that of the other Irish commercial banks during the famine-era: its note issue 
responded to the level of Irish commercial activity and the availability of profitable 
opportunities to extend credit. 
As this chapter shows, fundamentally Bank of Ireland perceived itself at this 
time primarily as a commercial bank operating within the prevailing monetary 
regime rather than as a central bank-type entity. Correspondence between 
the bank’s directors and the British Treasury prior to the implementation of the 
Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 sees the bank define itself in terms of its performance 
in handling government monies and its substantial capital base rather than in terms 
of its systemic import within the Irish banking system. Fulfilling public duties as 
and when they arose was a prerequisite to it receiving its government charter, and 
the inter-bank initiatives it undertook from 1845 onwards were primarily focused 
on facilitating smoother transactions between Irish joint stock banks as well as 
enhancing its own dominant position among these joint stock banks.
Understanding the role of Bank of Ireland within the Irish banking system on the 
eve of the famine is significant as it provides an insight into the Irish institutional 
landscape at this critical juncture in Irish history. The onset of the famine had 
deleterious effects on Irish economic and commercial activity, as evidenced by the 
dramatic contraction of Irish currency circulation from 1847 until the early 1850s. 
Rather than subscribing to a broad brush depiction of Bank of Ireland as a central 
banking entity at this time, a more detailed exploration of its role and functions 
during the famine years indicates that it was not endowed with the institutional 
agency required to assume an active role in directing Irish monetary affairs at this 
time. Indeed, it may be that the strength of its inter-bank leadership within the Irish 
context at that time obscures our view of Bank of Ireland’s limited ability to exert 
influence across a wider monetary system centered around the Bank of England.
The author wishes to thank Bank of Ireland for granting access to their archives of 
the proceedings of nineteenth century Court of Directors’ Meetings. The author is 
also very grateful for research assistance provided by Chitra Raghu. 
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Figure 1: Average monthly note issue (Bank of Ireland and total Irish), April 1843–Dec 1854
Source: Bankers’ Magazine, various issues.
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Figure 2: Average monthly note issue by Irish joint-stock banks, April 1843–Dec 1854
Source: Bankers’ Magazine, various issues.
Figure 3: Average monthly Irish note issue by note type, Jan 1846–May 1848
Source: Second Report of the Committee on Commercial Distress 1848, Q. 6691.
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Figure 4: Average monthly gold and silver holding of Irish banks, January 1846–May 1848
Source: Second Report of the Committee on Commercial Distress 1848, Q. 6691.
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The Question of Moral Economy 
and Famine Relief in the Russian 
Baltic Provinces of Estland 
and Livland, 1841–69*
Kersti Lust
Estonian Institute for Population Studies
Russian rulers recognized the principle that ‘good government’ nourishes its people 
in bad years. The paper addresses the question how the principle of paternalist 
‘moral economy’ was translated into practice or more specifically, what the Russian 
central government did and ordered the others--manorial lords, communities--to do 
in this respect. It appears that throughout the period under study, the Russian rulers 
as well as the Baltic German nobilities made efforts to place the responsibility for 
the peasants’ maintenance on the shoulders of communities (i.e. local peasants). 
The paper discusses the results of such policy. Through references to famine 
experiences in Russia Proper it looks at the adequacy of official relief efforts from 
the point of whether these kept people from dying and starving, or failed to do so. 
In different socioeconomic contexts, the same policy gave different results when 
measured in terms of the demographic response to short-term crisis.
In 1841–47 and 1868–69, Estland and Livland were hit twice by major famines 
which developed from repeated harvest failures. In the 1840s all three Baltic 
provinces (Fig. 1) experienced famine, but the death-toll was significantly higher 
in Livland than in Estland. Crude death rate in the worst years, 1845–46, was in 
Livland 48 and 45.2 and in rural Estland 35.3 and 32.2 per thousand, respectively.1 
In the northern part of Livland (present-day southern Estonia and Ösel) it rose to 
54.2 and 49.9 per thousand in 1845 and 1846, respectively. In Kurland, famine 
* The author thanks both anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.
1 For the lack of demographic research into Estonian famines we can hereby rely on the Governors’ 
reports that provide us with rough figures. Their reliability is yet to be determined. The figures should 
be taken as providing information on magnitude rather than precise statistics. Annual Reports of 
the Governor, 1845-46 (National Archives of Estonia, subsequently RA, EAA), f. 296, n. 4, s. 1179; 
Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvs (subsequently, LVVA), 1. f., 4. apr., 317. l, ff 102-210. Data on Estland 
includes urban population and it is taken from Vahtre, 1973, 262. 
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was regionally uneven and in 1845–46 the overall population growth rate was 
positive.2 Thus, at the provincial level, the demographic consequences in Kurland 
remained rather negligible. The crisis of 1868–69 affected Estland and the isle of 
Ösel and a few regions in the south. In fact, 1869 saw the greatest demographic 
setback in Estland in the whole century. According to official statistics, the number 
of deaths was 14,324 compared to the average of 8,120 from 1859–63 (Table 2). 
Death rate was 45 per thousand and the number of births fell by almost a quarter 
which resulted in a negative population growth of minus 16.7 per thousand. Both 
hunger crises coincided with devastating famines in European Russia. In 1839–
42 and 1848–49 subsistence crises hit several regions over Russia (incl. Central 
Black Earth Region) and in 1844–46 Smolensk, Vitebsk, Minsk, Pskov and other 
western areas.3 In late 1860s, famine raged in the northern (Arkhangelsk, Grand 
Duchy of Finland) and western areas of the Russian Empire stretching from St. 
Petersburg to Kiev.4 
Protecting its subjects from starvation and extreme want has for centuries 
been one of the primary functions of government and one of the principal public 
expectations of the state.5 Some researchers attribute the government’s relief efforts 
to the governing elite’s fear of moral and social collapse, civil unrest, the loss of labour 
force and the spread of infection,6 while others point to the principle of paternalist 
‘moral economy’, which called for provision for the needy in emergencies7. In the 
following, this concept is used for expressing the relationship between the rulers 
and the ruled. In order to maintain social order, rulers had to accept, to a certain 
extent, peasant communities’ expectations that the powerful take action when their 
minimal subsistence needs were threatened.8 If that happened, they desired that 
the authorities provide for the availability of food, and set the prices of subsistence 
commodities. This expectation has often passed unfulfilled, but it has seldom been 
emphatically denied by government.9 It has also been suggested that the Chinese 
government, for example, took its role as an ultimate provider of food in times 
of dearth more seriously than its western European counterparts.10 Western poor 
relief systems were not designed to take care of large groups of people in temporary 
need during years of high food prices, but only the small fraction in permanent need 
of assistance. Therefore, the increasing numbers of landless poor, who comprised 
2 Annual reports of the Governor, 1845-46 (LVVA, 1. f., 4. apr., 316. l., ff 113-90; LVVA, 1. f., 4. 
apr., 317. l, ff 3-101).
3 Ermolov, 1909, i, 55–6. 
4 Lust, 2015, 18. 
5 Arnold, 1988, 96.
6 Arnold, 1988, 81–82; C. Ó Gráda, 2009, 197, 202.
7 Scott, 1979; Bohstedt, 2010.
8 Thompson, 1971, 76–136. For a recent analysis see Götz, 2015, 147–62.
9 Arnold, 1988, 109.
10 Bengtsson, 2004a, 140; Lee et al. 2004, 86; Fuller, 2015, 148–50.
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one-third to half of Western rural communities remained outside most Western 
systems of poor relief until the arrival of the ‘new’ poor laws from the middle of the 
nineteenth century onward.11 
The principle that ‘good government’ nourishes its people in bad years was 
recognized also by Russian rulers. In most of Europe, in the late eighteenth century 
and the first half of the nineteenth century strict regulation increasingly gave way 
to pragmatic reliance on markets.12 The Russian antifamine system combined 
administrative regulation as well as reliance on freedom of the grain trade and 
public works.13 Little is known about the prevailing ideologies among elite Russian 
politicians and bureaucratic elite during the famine years under review. The article 
addresses the question whether the principle of paternalist ‘moral economy’ was 
translated into practice, or more specifically, what the Russian central government 
did and ordered the others--manorial lords, communities--to do in this respect. The 
Russian imperial government as well as local Baltic German nobilities in Estland 
and Livland agreed that peasants should be safeguarded against hunger through 
appropriate policies and institutions in both good and bad years, but in reality, 
however, it meant that throughout the period under study, they made efforts to 
place that responsibility for the peasants’ maintenance and social guarantees on 
the shoulders of local peasants. The results of such policy will be discussed in the 
light of empirical evidence on mortality. The share of relief borne by local resources 
and the central administration are seen as important research topics in European 
historiography.14 Through references to famine experiences in Russia Proper 
(subsequently, Russia) this chapter looks at the adequacy of official relief efforts 
from the point, whether these kept people from dying and starving, or failed to do 
so. Mortality, of course, does not capture the full demographic impact of famine. 
The first two sections examine the relief system and demographic response to 
crises. The last discusses the successes and failures of government relief policy in 
Estland and Livland. 
Relief System
Being part of Russian Empire, three Baltic provinces, nevertheless, enjoyed so-
called ‘Baltic special order’ status (status provincialis), which was based on the 
recognition of the Baltic-German nobilities’15 rights in local affairs and provided 
a very firm shield of their privileges even up to the early 1880s. Although famine 
relief systems differed in some aspects, hunger relief policy was not a question in 
11 Lee et al., 2004, 91.
12 Ó Gráda, 2009, 139.
13 Robbins, 1975, 16–30.
14 Daly, 2007, 64–65, 75; Vanhaute, 2011, 50.
15 The Ritterschaft was the corporate body representing the interests of the landowning Baltic 
German nobility. 
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which the special status of the Baltic provinces mattered and the state government 
regulated it. In this section the system in the Baltics will be briefly summarized as it 
has been already discussed extensively elsewhere.16 
As long as the serfdom prevailed, estate owners were officially seen as 
caretakers of their serf peasants in difficult times. For that purpose, the nobilities of 
Livland and Estland agreed in 1763 that every landlord had to keep a grain stock 
for his peasants up to next harvest.17 Since the estate owners saw this obligation 
as unfavourable to them, it was enacted by the Russian Senate on November 29, 
1799 that in the Russian empire communal granaries under the watchful eye of 
government’s agents or noble officials (in the Baltics) had to be set up at every 
noble and crown estate.18 Serfs were obliged to contribute a certain amount of corn 
to these granaries until they contained a fixed amount of grain. General poverty 
and several crop failures did not allow peasant farmers to make the necessary 
16 The following outline is based on Lust, 2015, 15-37; Lust, 2014, 81–106.
17 Decree of the guberniia administration (RA, EAA, f. 279, n. 1, s. 585).
18 Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov (=PSZ) I, Vol. XXV, No. 19203.
Figure 1: The Baltic region in the period covered by this article. Map prepared by Avita for the 
author.
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contributions to the storehouses and the grain reserves were collected at such a 
slow pace (yearly portion was set at four litres of winter grain and 1.6 litres spring 
grain per each ‘soul’, i.e. the number of males of all ages) that the stores would 
have reached the fixed level only after decades. The slow collection meant that 
estate owners often lent the deficient corn to the communal granary. 
The Baltic serf emancipation laws of 1816–19 declared that henceforth peasants 
would lose their right to demand advance loans from manorial lords, and the 
responsibility for the peasants’ maintenance and social guarantees was placed on 
the shoulders of their communities.19 Every peasant farmer was to contribute grain 
to a communal granary until it contained a stock of c. 229 kg of grain in Livland and 
c. 441 kg of rye and 78.6 litres of barley in Estland. In 1828, this rate was lowered 
in Estland to 220 kg of rye and 61 kg of barley. According to the Rural Township 
Law of 1866, the amount of stock was unified at c. 210 kg per each male ‘soul’.20 
Also the Russian famine relief statute stipulated that communal granaries were to 
hold similar amount of grain for each male ‘soul’.21 In addition to their supplies of 
stored food, rural communities (municipalities; in Russia peasant communes) were 
entitled to possess monetary funds. In case of need, community members could 
borrow grain for consumption and planting. The fixed amount of grain stock was 
sufficient to provide very meagre subsistence. In reality the landlords still helped 
out in times of distress when community granaries could not provide the needy 
with sufficient assistance in the form of loans. In the 1840s, provincial authorities in 
Estland and Livland explicitly obliged the manorial lords to grant subsistence loans 
to needy peasants.
Unlike in Russia, capital funds at the guberniia (i.e. provincial) and central level 
did not back up local reserves in the Baltics.22 As in Russia, provincial food supply 
commissions were set up in Livland and Estland in the 1820s, but the latter ceased 
to exist already in the 1830s.23 The provincial food-supply commission under the 
chairmanship of the Governor managed cash and grain reserves for the purpose 
of famine relief and coordinated relief efforts, gathered and mediated information, 
discussed and made most of the important decisions concerning the amount of 
hunger relief, means of helping the needy, and so on, but its own money and grain 
reserves were very scanty or absent (in the 1860s). The food supply commission 
and Governor could apply to the central government for further aid. In Russia, 
the provincial commissions were abolished in 1866, and the management of food 
19 PSZ I, Vol. XXXIII (1816), No. 26 277; Vol. XXXIV (1817), No. 27 024; Vol. XXXVI (1819), No. 
27 735.
20 Makoggukonna Seadus Baltia-merre kubbermangudele Ria-, Tallinna- ja Kura-male (Riia, n.p., 
1866).
21 Robbins, 1975, 21.  
22 The three-tiered system (commune-guberniia-state) in Russia was built up step by step. For 
more see Robbins, 1975, 16–30.
23 The Estland food supply commission was initially re-established as a temporary body in 
September 1868 and put on a firm legal footing in spring the next year. 
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supply operations was turned over to the local self-government (zemstvos). In the 
Baltics, zemstvos were absent and provincial food supply commissions continued 
their work. All gubernii could rely on the state treasury. The Baltic provinces were 
entitled to request grants from the Imperial capital fund (established in 1866) only in 
very exceptional cases as they did not contribute to it. Requests for such aid were 
presented to the Minister of Internal Affairs. Loans of more than 50,000 roubles 
were decided only by the Committee of Ministers and required imperial sanction. 
In the event of a large-scale food supply crisis during which local and provincial 
reserves were inadequate, the imperial government authorized extraordinary 
measures. Russian antifamine measures included direct aid in the form of loans, 
public works, tax relief (postponements, exemptions), and interference in markets 
(price regulation, tariff reductions, export bans). In the Baltics, the government 
used direct grants of money and grain and tariff reductions with some effect in 
coping the crises. The government relief loan assigned to Livland in 1845–47 
amounted to c. 1.2 million roubles, and Estland received 100,000 roubles in 1845.24 
Kurland received a 0.5 million rouble government loan. All in all, 11 million roubles 
were assigned to the starving people statewide in 1844–46.25 In 1868–69, unlike 
during the 1840s, the central government gave interest-free loans. The Committee 
of Ministers assigned to Ösel a loan of 150,000 roubles and to Livland mainland 
districts 50,000 roubles. Estland received from the state treasury 210,000 roubles. 
Grain prices had doubled in the meantime.
The major deficiencies of the relief arrangement in the Baltics concerned the 
distribution of, rather than collecting of, the reserves. In Russia, the failure of 
the grain storage system meant that the central treasury often became the main 
source of relief in times of famine.26 Even in the best years the peasants were too 
poor to fill the granaries and peasant distrust towards the state-imposed granary-
system remained widespread. There are no scholarly analyses of the real level of 
storage in Estonian granaries in the period under consideration27 but the peasants 
were chronically indebted to communal granaries in the first decades after their 
establishment. Afterwards, unlike in Russia, the decline of the granary stores in the 
Baltics did not pave the way for future difficulties. Communal reserves fell far short 
of need when a series of unfortunate events accumulated over a period of several 
years, even though the storehouses had been full prior to the crisis, as happened 
in late 1860s. Manorial economy commanded resources that could have been 
used for feeding the population, but the Baltic provinces, however, were not self-
24 Lust, 2015, 23. 
25 Ermolov, 1909, i, 56.
26 Robbins, 1975, 18; Lust, 2015, 21; Kahan, 1989, 136; Suvorin, 2015, 17–8; Rogozhina, 2013, 
21. According to some authors grain stocks as a hunger relief measure in early modern era were in 
principle ineffective, irrespective of the country: Collet, 2010, 248.  
27 Kahk has considered a few regions of Läänemaa, poor and rather infertile areas in Estonia, 
in the 1810s–1820s and his results can be applied neither for other regions nor later time periods: 
Kahk, 1969, 170–2.
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sufficient in the sense that food shortages could have been totally averted without 
any imports of food. The Baltic ports, however, were centres of the (transit) grain 
trade, with constant export grain flows and the grain could have been easily bought 
up for relief by government. The drop of purchasing power of most peasants vis-
à-vis an increase of grain prices made such direct aid necessary. In normal years, 
Baltic agricultural output not only covered domestic demand but also provided grain 
and potatoes for its well-developed distilling industry. 
Several deficiencies related to distribution of aid can be observed. On their 
own initiative, the communal authorities were free to give out only a portion of the 
reserves. A three-tier system of supervision over the use of communal reserves 
-- manorial administration (until 1866), parish magistrate (in Livland) and county 
magistrate (in Estland), and Governor -- not only significantly slowed the aid to the 
needy but also made it dependent on the will and expertise of these officials. Each 
level in this system tried to keep local granary loans as well as relief loans from 
public funds to a minimum and so did the imperial government, who did not fully 
grant the governors’ requests for further aid. Institutional responses were shaped 
by the belief that every able-bodied person had to provide for oneself, which was 
hardly possible due to the loss of jobs, unavailability of public works employment 
and the legal restrictions on out-migration from the community (in the 1840s) and 
the province (in the 1860s). The 1866 administrative reform liberated the rural 
self-government from the local landlord’s control, but gave to it free disposal over 
only a quarter of its reserves; giving out the remaining three-quarters required 
authorization from the parish magistrate.
Not only ‘external’ institutions were reluctant to give aid to the needy. Local 
community authorities which were empowered to grant granary loans and decide 
who should receive poor relief refused their help. Furthermore, the community 
authorities would apply for a government hunger relief loan and decide over its 
disbursal. Since the elders, jurymen and half of the council members (after 1866) 
were peasant farmers, application for and distribution of relief supplies were 
dominated by the village elite. The community was collectively responsible for 
the repayment of the loan at the next harvest, which made it very reluctant to 
grant assistance to the landless. Official regulations, correspondence of various 
officials and pastors, reports and supplications reveal that communities concealed 
information about the real situation and denied the need for aid or understated the 
severity of the situation, did not ask for sufficient government relief loans, frequently 
denied granary loans to cottagers and other landless, did not purchase grain for 
their monetary reserves, and left the landless to starve.28 On the other hand, 
granary loans to peasant farmers were not held back. Communal land ownership 
as well as periodical re-allocation of land according to the number of ‘souls’ were 
unknown in the Baltics. The lines between landed peasants and expanding groups 
of landless in the village were increasingly clear-cut.
28 For the discussion, see Lust, 2015, 15–37; Lust, 2014, 81–106.
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Not only were different-level authorities reluctant to give famine aid, but also the 
fixed norms -- normally one pound per person -- were very low.
Demographic Effects
In Estland and Livland, famine conditions led to sudden rise in mortality, decline in 
fertility, and social dislocation29. Excess mortality, or at least the threat of excess 
mortality, is a defining feature of famine.30 Regardless of the ‘disease versus 
hunger’ debate surrounding the bulk of research into famine mortality, the close 
connection between harvest failures, malnutrition, increased exposure to disease 
and mortality increase has long been observed.31 Most famine victims succumbed 
to infectious disease rather than famine proper.32 In Estland and Livland, hunger-
related diseases were dysentery and typhus or ‘typhus-like’ diseases. 
The extent of famine-related mortality has not been addressed in our 
historiography. Preliminary figures on Estonia are displayed in two tables and figure 
2. Pre-famine ‘normal ratios’ are complicated to determine since in some areas the 
years 1841–47 saw an enduring crisis with short breaks and there were crop failures 
and rises in mortality also in the mid-1830s (most notably in 1835). Conversion to 
the Russian Orthodox Church in Livland in 1845–47 further complicates the issue 
since the data on vital events provided by the Lutheran clergymen do not cover a 
great number of people any more. Russian Orthodox Church records have been 
very little used to study population figures. Statistical data provided by the police to 
the Governor is unreliable. 
Various methods have been suggested for identifying mortality crises. One 
simple method is to detect pairs of succeeding years in which the number of deaths 
was at least 25 per cent above the average since the previous crisis.33 
By studying recent famines, Paul Howe and Stephen Devereux suggested 
moving from a binary conception of ‘famine / no famine’ to a graduated, multi-
level definition, and disaggregate the dimensions of intensity and magnitude.34 
Regradless of rather approximate data at our disposal, we may well suppose that 
crises in the Estonian part of Livland in 1845-46 and in Ösel in 1868-69 can be 
classified as ‘level 3’ crises according to intensity (CMR >=1 but< 5/10,000/day). In 
the Estonian case, this method, however, would be more appropriate to use when 
29 About the meaning of social dislocation Voutilainen, 2015, 124–44.
30 Ó Gráda, 2009, 92; Vanhaute et al., 2007, 25–28.
31 Voutilainen, 2015, 124; Sen, 1981, 50; Pitkänen, 1993. See also Bengtsson & Dribe, 2005, 361; 
T. Bengtsson, 2004c, 40.
32 Ó Gráda, 2009, 116.
33 Bengtsson & Bröstrom, 2011, 124.
34 Howe & Devereux, 2004, 353–72.
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knowing the daily death rates and not dividing the annual figure by 365 to find the 
average daily rate. 
Different interpretations of famine’s time-span lead to different numbers of 
surplus mortality. Famines are products of historical, social, political and economic 
processes and rarely have clear-cut beginnings or endings.35 Furthermore, the 
seriousness of the crisis varied regionally (Table 1, Figure 2). Our comparison 
refers to average rates in 1837–39. Migration was restricted and thus it has only 
negligible impact on district- and province-level data on the number of deaths. In 
the early forties mortality response was noticeable only in the districts of Võrumaa 
(Kreis Werro) and Läänemaa (Kreis Wiek). Mortality rose steeply in 1845 (Table 1, 
Fig. 1). Famine struck hardest in the southeast and south. In 1845–46, the average 
yearly number of deaths in Tartumaa (Kreis Dorpat) and Võrumaa exceeded more 
than 100 percent its prefamine norm (1837–39). In Tartumaa, the number of births 
dropped by 27.3 per cent. The districts of Pärnumaa (Kreis Pernau) and Ösel were 
hit much less. From 1845–47, in rural Estland excess deaths were c. 5,700 from 
a population of c. 258,000 (2.2%).36 We lack similar data on southern Estonia in 
the ‘decade of misery’ but it would probably not be incorrect to estimate that in 
the three districts in southern Estonia, total excess mortality in 1845–46 relative 
to earlier years (1837–39) may have been as much as c. 14,000 deaths (Fig. 2).37 
Death and birth figures returned to normal values gradually in 1846 and in 1847. 
1848 was infamous cholera year. In late 1860s, hunger crisis peaked in winter 1868 
and spring 1869. In Estland, death figures in 1869 were 76.4% higher than in 1859-
63 (Table 2). In Ösel, in 1868–69 the average number of deaths per year rose over 
100% compared to average from 1859–63. 
Table 1. Average yearly number of deaths in Estland and three districts of southern Estonia, 
1837–184638 
* Data on Orthodox population is missing in the case of Võru-and Viljandimaa but is available on Tartumaa.
35 Voutilainen, 2016, 24, 325.
36 Vahtre, 1973, 256–8. 
37 The total number of rural population in southern Estonia is unknown. Death figures (in fact, 
number of burials) are taken from church records and include only rural people.
38 The data on the number of deaths is taken from the annual reports of Lutheran pastors: RA, 
EAA, f. 1207, n. 1, s. 128, 129; EAA, f. 1205, n. 1, s. 107; Laarmaa, 2009, 165; Vahtre, 1973, 256–8.
District 1837-39 1841-42 1845 1846
Change in % compared to 
1837–39
1841-42 1845 1846
Tartumaa* 2882 3424 7793 5090 18,8 170.4 76.6
Viljandimaa 2097 2255 5109 2474 7,5 143.6 17.9
Võrumaa 1812 2195 3501 3780 21,1 93.2 108.7
Järvamaa 1201 1245 1648 1133 3,7 37.2 -5.7
Läänemaa 1772 2147 2608 2792 21,1 47.2 57.5
Harjumaa 1997 1951 2796 2451 -2.3 40.0 22.7
Virumaa 2084 2163 2800 2406 3.8 34.3 15.4
Kersti Lust
55
Table 2: Average no of deaths in Estland and Ösel, 1859–1863, 1866–186939 
Figure 2: Annual number of deaths in the parishes of Võrumaa, 1837–1846 (Lutheran 
population)*
* Data on Karula and Hargla in 1846 are not given since a significant part of the population converted to the 
Russian Orthodox Church in 1845–47.
39 Jordan, 1867, i, 21; Jung-Stilling, 1866, 26, 30. Governor’s annual reports for the years 1866–
69, 1866, 1867, 1869 (RA, EAA, f. 29, n. 3, s. 4360; RA, EAA, f. 29, n. 2, s. 4742; 4759); RA, EAA, 
f. 296, n. 1, s. 47; RA, EAA, f. 296, n. 4, s. 2364. Unfortunately we lack district level data about 
Estland. The data on 1866–67 derives from the annual reports of the governors and must be taken 
with caution. 
Region 1859-63 1866-67 1868 1869
Change in % compared to 
1859–1863
1866-67 1868 1869
Estland (incl. 
towns)
8120 7769 n.a 14324 -4.3 n.a 76.4
Ösel (Saaremaa) 1056 1075 1989 2546 1.8 88.3 141.1
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The questions about social differences in mortality and to what extent mortality 
in the past was determined by economic factors are lively debated issues.40 
During famine, mortality in Finland and Ireland was strongly dependent on social 
background.41 Narrative sources lend support to the claim that the rural poor 
suffered from hunger the most also in Estonia, at least in the late 1860s when the 
corvée had been banned.42 
With regard to social gradient in mortality, the case of Russia Proper would 
deserve special interest. Most scholars agree that during the period under review, 
Russian agriculture was relatively backward and cultivation methods were simple 
which in combination with adverse climatic and weather conditions made vast tracts 
of the country prone to harvest failures. Normal mortality rates were high43 and the 
significant under-registration of stillbirths and neonatal deaths further complicates 
the issue. Famine studies, demographic studies and studies of the living standard 
in Russia, however, have produced different and even contradicting results on 
the question of famine-related mortality.44 Great caution is required when making 
generalizations given Russia’s immense size and diversity.45
Steven Hoch in his often-cited book ‘Serfdom and Social Control in Russia’ 
(1986) has claimed, in line with common narrative, that the inability of Russian 
society to eliminate subsistence crises was one of the major features separating 
the eastern and western Europe of the nineteenth century.46 In an article published 
in 1998 he makes ‘a rigorous attempt’ to assess the nature of demographic crises in 
the parish of Borshevka from 1830–1912 and arrives to the conclusion that nutrition 
had minor effect on mortality which was determined rather by non-nutritional factors 
such as demographic factors, familial norms, and climatic constraints. Borshevka 
is located in the guberniia of Tambov, a rather poor region in European Russia. 
Hoch argues that crisis years when the actual number of deaths exceeded the 
moving average by more than 50 per cent occurred seven times from 1830–1912. 
On average, a crisis resulted in an 84 per cent increase over the normal series 
of deaths. Furthermore, the data reveal no association between the changes in 
mortality and fluctuations in prices regardless of the lag employed – zero, one, or 
two years. The peaks of mortality in Borshevka appear to be wholly independent 
of food availability as measured by prices and mortality crises occurred rather in 
40 Bengtsson, 2004b, 19–20; Bengtsson & Dribe, 2011, 389–400.
41 Häkkinen & Forsberg, 2015, 106; Voutilainen, 2016, 23; Vanhaute et al., 2007, 26. 
42 Empirical evidence to support this claim has been provided in two articles; see ref. no 16.
43 See, for example, Mironov, 2010, 478; Dennison & Nafziger, 2013, 433.
44 Authors who believe that subsistence crises affected mortality and hunger and death threatened 
Russian peasants include: Dyatchkov, 2002, 27; Kahan, 1989, 135; Moon, 1999, 296-7; Nefedov, 
2005, 198–252. Kanishchev (Kanishchev, 2011, 167–74), relying on numerous church books, does 
not deny the role of famines in the decrease of births and increase of mortality but seems to favour, 
however, Hoch’s interpretations from 1998 (see below). 
45 See for example Moon, 2006, ii, 386–8, 391.
46 Hoch, 1986, 56; Hoch, 1998, 357–68.
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summer or autumn. Grain prices were allegedly less volatile than in western Europe. 
Tracy Dennison and Steven Nafziger likewise challenge the traditional narrative 
of impoverished peasant agriculture. They find that peasants at the Sheremetyev 
family’s Voshchazhnikovo estate in Yaroslavl guberniia do not appear to have 
suffered subsistence crises. There are no references to increased mortality, even 
during those years when harvests in this region were recorded as ‘poor’.47 In both 
cases, the scale of research is by far too limited.
Sergei Kashchenko has criticized Hoch’s findings. Since Hoch uses guberniia 
level grain price data instead of local data to determine grain availability, his 
calculations are incorrect. In contrast of his findings, local prices were volatile.48 
Fluctuation of grain prices has been confirmed also by Suvorin.49 In Kashchenko’s 
opinion temporary migration was an important coping mechanism against hunger. 
Some authors have argued that crown peasants exhibited lower mortality 
levels than noble peasants in times of distress.50 Noble peasants were subjected 
to greater degrees of exploitation by their landowners than their peers at crown 
estates. Second, crown peasants were better entitled to public relief.51 
The leading social historian in Russia, Boris Mironov, hardly considers the issue 
of famine in his recent books on living standard.52 He measures the height and 
weight of recruits, grain yields, wages, mortality and fertility rates, and discusses the 
diet in long-term perspective and finds no basis for the assumption of deteriorating 
living standards in Russia. Such an ‘optimistic’ view, especially with regard to the 
late Tsarist period, is shared by many Russian and international scholars, but has 
also been challenged by some others.53 Famine in Russia Proper in the period 
under review is a vast, almost unexplored terrain awaiting further research and 
inclusion in international famine studies. 
Long-term dynamics and secular changes do not inform us on demographic 
response to short-term stress. Most probably, however, there is little evidence 
of social gradient in famine mortality since the social divisions among Russian 
peasants were not distinct and poverty was rather equally divided between 
different segments of country folk. Demographic studies of pre-industrial Europe 
have shown that the effect of fluctuations in yields and grain prices on mortality 
rates was clearly apparent in the case of the landless and day-labourers who were 
most vulnerable and were most likely to fall victim to the food crisis.54 Destitution 
and even food shortages are not sufficient to cause famines; famine mortality is 
47 Dennison & Nafziger, 2013, 429–32.
48 Kashchenko, 1999, 30–44. Unfortunately, their (public) debate has not continued since then.
49 Suvorin, 2015, 14–15.
50 Kanishchev, 2011, 163–70.
51 Suvorin, 2015, 17–18.
52 Mironov, 2010, Mironov, 2015, ch. 11.
53 See for example Nefedov, 2011, 127–136; Nefedov, 2014, 110–15.
54 Galloway, 1988, 277–78, 290; Bengtsson, 2004a, 167. 
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largely a function of ‘social vulnerability’55 caused not so much by lack of food but 
by lack of entitlement to resources. In Arnold’s description, ‘the term “entitlement” 
is used to signify legally sanctioned and economically operative rights of access 
to resources that give control over food or can be exchanged for it’.56 This access 
could be obtained through production, trade, labour, property rights and inheritance, 
or welfare provisions.   
Excess Deaths and Starvation: 
Inadequacy of Government Relief Efforts?
The seriousness of the crisis varied significantly within the provinces. Such regional 
differences can be explained by the local crop failures, the availability of local 
resources and the pace of socioeconomic development. Economically better-off 
regions recovered more quickly and the crisis was shorter, whereas in the forties in 
Võrumaa and Läänemaa it lasted for several years with short breaks. In the crisis 
years, the market failed to move sufficient amounts of cereals into famine-stricken 
areas, since the need for food there was not translated into effective demand 
because of lack of market-based entitlement and a shortage of purchasing power. 
During both crises in Estland and Livland, the grain prices escalated beyond the 
reach of the poor. Price level convergence and similar price dynamics in different 
regions in the period 1840–1900 give evidence of significant market integration in 
Estland and Livland.57 The coefficient of variation was rather insignificant and did 
not change over the decades under consideration, and the districts had similar 
price trends for rye and oats. Only recovery from sharp changes in supply and 
demand in times of famines did not proceed in the same way. During both famines, 
state authorities avoided actions to limit exports and refused to ban distillation, 
which both would have significantly increased the domestic food availability. Their 
main anti-crisis initiative was to distribute advance loans to the needy. The grain 
was bought up from merchants and the local lords of the manors and paid for 
by state resources. In the 1840s as well as in the late 1860s the leading noble 
politicians actively fought against any price regulation by the government and in the 
mid-forties they bargained with the state authorities about the price of grain bought 
up for government loan until the latter agreed to pay them the price set high.58 
Thus, the manorial lords could excessively drive the food prices and worsen the 
situation. Not only non-landed groups suffered. Crop failures turned subsistence 
farmers into ‘deficit producers’ who were forced to resort to market purchases or 
assistance loans to meet the subsistence needs of their households. In the mid-
55 Voutilainen, 2015, 124–8.
56 Arnold, 1988, 43.
57 For the data and discussion see Lust, 2013, 217–45.
58 Lust, 2013, 235–37.
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forties, the government, however, also imported substantial amounts of grain from 
near-by Russian areas. 
The factors that produce regional or local variations in crises do not necessarily 
explain the occurrence of famine in general. According to Eric Vanhaute, famines 
triggered by harvest failures only took place when societal institutions failed and 
the moral economy ceased to function.59 High death rates and drop in births in 
times of famines in Estland and Livland give evidence of the insufficiency of aid 
and the (non-)functioning of the (local) food distribution. The government’s role in 
food policy was manifold. Drèze and Sen distinguish between two aspects of social 
security, that which provides protection and that which promotes security. The 
former is concerned with preventing a decline in living standards whereas the latter 
refers to the enhancement of general living standards and to the expansion of basic 
capabilities of the population.60 In the Baltics, slow but powerful avenues of action 
were the reform laws: serf emancipation in 1816–19, the reforms of crown peasants 
in the 1840–60s, and the peasant laws of 1849/60 (Livland), 1856 (Estland), 1863 
(Kurland), and 1865 (Ösel). Being different in content, they, however, liberated 
peasant households step-by-step from manorial oppression and established 
peasants’ individual rights in land as private property. These initiatives, as it turned 
out, were of particular importance in averting the recurrence of subsistence crises. 
The Baltic provinces escaped the danger of hunger crises after the 1860s. Dilatory 
process of legislation and slow changes in the socioeconomic relationships and 
agricultural production could not prevent the occurrence of famine in Estland and 
Ösel in 1868-69. Ösel was the only Livonian district out of nine to suffer seriously 
and its closeness to Riga from which it could be reached easily by sea should 
have made large quantities of grain available. Excess mortality is also an indication 
of the non-functioning of the food distribution and lack of responsibility at every 
level in society. It is also typical of the last famine in the Baltics, that the need for 
aid was the greatest in marginal areas like the islands of Ösel, Hiiumaa (Dagö), 
Vormsi (Worms), Kihnu (Kühno), the Nuckö peninsula, the fishing villages near 
Lake Peipus, Ilūkste (in Kurland), etc.
The protection measures employed by the government varied in their 
effectiveness. Imperial government kept legislation and supervision in its hands 
and decrees were issued with imperial sanction. The government recognized the 
state’s interest in the sphere of food supply and, in case of emergency, direct state 
action in the area of relief. The government ordered and supervised the build-
up of local stocks. Relief infrastructure was integrated into existing governing 
structures. In order to guarantee the provision of food, it was considered essential 
to apply coercion and sanctions, but these methods were used much more eagerly 
and effectively for horizontal redistribution of local resources within the peasant 
communities than for the reallocation of food and funds from institutions and groups 
59 Vanhaute, 2011, 60.
60 Dreze & Sen, 1989, 16.
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with material capacity to the needy. In Estland and Livland, state-financed relief 
was too little and often also too late. Relief loan distribution was further hindered by 
a slow and bureaucratic system. By the 1840s, the state government had become 
reluctant to grant assistance loans. 
The official relief system entrusted a very significant role to its lowest level -- 
the local peasant community, but Baltic community authorities, as shown above, 
were unwilling to provide for the landless and cottagers.61 There is little support 
for the belief that government, while designing the system, intentionally sought the 
community authorities (i.e. the better-off) to keep assistance loans to a minimum. 
Communities in Russia, by contrast, were known for ‘over-generous’ loans to their 
members irrespective of their needs which worried different-level government 
officials.62 The government apparently wanted peasant communities (communes 
in Russia) to become as self-sufficient as possible and also protect their individual 
members against natural calamities. In Russia it is likely, as Hoch has suggested, 
that communes really afforded protection from hunger more than any improvement 
in the level of economic well-being.63 It was so due to the specific socio-economic 
arrangements, namely the household patterns and redistribution of communally 
governed peasant land. The Baltic village, by contrast, was marked by social 
polarization and such socio-economic arrangements were unknown here. Over half 
of the peasants were landless and their households had no right to land allotment. 
They did not contribute to the granaries and farmer peasants did not want to repay 
their assistance loans and face indebtedness due to extra loans. However, we 
have to bear in mind that there were also private credit relations between the local 
peasants and we cannot judge the scope of the relief solely by the institutionalized 
famine aid. 
One major defect of the Baltic local grain stock system was the inability to force 
communities that were better off to transfer their reserves to less fortunate ones 
since granary and monetary reserves were the property of the community. For 
example, by the time crisis began in 1868, 564 Couronian communities owned 
food supply capitals amounting to almost one million roubles, but in August the 
Governor had to petition the Minister of Internal Affairs for 95,000 roubles, which 
request the Imperial government satisfied in December only partly, assigning upon 
the Tsar’s approval from the state treasury a loan of 70,000 roubles.64 In Russia, 
too, the government did not dare to force one commune to lend their reserves to 
another,65 but there were also provincial monetary funds established. Such two-
tier system would have enabled to reallocate the resources within a province also 
61 For a similar phenomenon in Finland, see Häkkinen, 1992, 149–65.
62 Matsuzato, 1995, 186–8.
63 Hoch, 1998, 363.
64 Governor of Kurland to Baltic Governor-General, 9 March 1869 (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi 
Istoricheskii Arkhiv, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 527, ff. 117–35).
65 Matsuzato, 1995, 189.
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in the Baltics. In Russia, however, it was of little help, since the resources at the 
guberniia level were too small to be really useful in times of distress.66
The role of landlords in famine relief is largely overlooked in Russia. In the 
Baltic provinces, their role was based on their obligation to provide assistance 
and relief as serf owners in earlier times (‘path-dependence’) as well as on their 
predominance in rural economy. Although serfdom in Russia persisted until 1861, 
many authors assume that during the period under review provision for the Russian 
peasantry was left almost solely to communal and public institutions.67 Landlords’ 
assistance is seldom mentioned.68 In the Baltic provinces, the manorial sector 
was larger, but also in European Russia c. one-fourth of grain was produced on 
manors. In Estland and Livland, estate owners contributed to the famine relief even 
in the late 1860s, when they, on their own initiative, credited jobs, bought up grain 
stocks for sale, and gave assistance loans to individual households as well as to 
communities. 
The effectiveness of the measures taken by the manorial lords in the famine 
relief has been recently questioned by Swedish authors who studied the empirical 
evidence on Sweden from 1749 to 1859. Dribe, Olsson and Svensson used the 
impact of grain prices on demographic outcomes as a measure of the efficiency 
of the manorial system in protecting its inhabitants against economic stress. The 
researchers concluded that ‘the manorial estate seems to have been able to insure its 
inhabitants against risks of economic stress, but the protective effect was imperfect 
and only short term’.69 Regardless of different methods and sources, in principle my 
results are in accordance with their findings. However, the mortality figures should 
be also considered differentiated by socioeconomic status (landed and non-landed 
groups) and then it might occur that the manor could insure the tenants (farmers) 
against extreme events and only this was their aim. In the Estonian case, the line 
of division between tenants and farmhands, however, would be somewhat artificial 
since as long as the corvée persisted (1850-60s), the tenants owed labour duties 
to the manor and thus both the manorial lords and the tenants most probably were 
interested in the subsistence of their labour force too. Secondly, infectious diseases 
were no respecters of class boundaries in the village. Living arrangements on Baltic 
farmsteads often did not provide separation for the members of farming families 
from their live-in servants,70 whereas the cottagers often had separate buildings. 
The situation might differ in the countries where the residences and the household 
economies of the tenants, cottagers and servants were separated.
66 Robbins, 1975, 20.
67 See Kahan, 1989, 135.
68 For references see Moon, 1999, 94–5.
69 Dribe et al., 2012, 292–310.
70 Plakans, 1975, 635.
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The Russian government strongly favoured food-for-work schemes.71 In 1833, 
the State Council examined a project of relief statute. It thought that Russian 
peasants expect famine relief for free from the government as well as from the 
estate owners. The State Council suggested, in an attempt to eradicate this idea, 
public works as the most appropriate relief means. The landlords were also asked 
to credit jobs instead of providing loans in money and grain.72 It laid down general 
guidelines for relief, which in reality worked out only partially. 
Last, but not least, the role of ‘intermediaries’ between the central authorities and 
the communities (communes) should be considered. The defects of the bureaucratic 
structure have been long seen as a major factor behind the inadequate relief in 
Russia. Stocks were entrusted to the village commune under the supervision of the 
local gentry officials and zemstva. In the Baltic provinces, Baltic German landlords 
retained their control and tutelage over hunger relief since the institutions and 
offices which conducted detailed inspections of the granary reserves, oversaw the 
distribution of famine relief, and solved the complaints filed against landlords and 
communities that did not perform their duties in relation to needy peasants were all 
manned by noblemen. 
Conclusion
Famines in which death rates doubled for two years were rare in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Europe. During the period under consideration, two districts in 
southern Estonia in 1845–46 had mortality upswings close to that level. In 1868–
69, Estland and the island (district) of Ösel stand out with their high mortality figures. 
In 1868–69, in Ösel the average number of deaths per year rose over 100 per cent 
compared to average from 1859–63. Thus, official relief efforts obviously failed to 
keep people from starving and dying.
Different-level institutions did not have a ‘proper’ or ‘adequate’ share in the 
redistribution of resources within the society, since the government food supply 
policy left too much responsibility for the peasants’ provision on the shoulders 
of local communities. It was not problematic only because peasants were poor. 
Whereas in Russia this policy resulted in the ‘over-eager’ use of local resources by 
the communes, in a different socio-economic and institutional context, in the Baltics, 
it resulted in insufficient provision of landless and cottagers who accounted for 
over half of peasants. Whereas in Russia, some authors complained of inadequate 
administrative control over the collection and distribution of monetary funds and 
grain stocks, in the Baltics the system of supervision and monitoring functioned 
well in the sense that granaries were, in most places, carefully managed and 
quite properly filled, but in times of distress, different level officials and institutions 
71 Robbins, 1975, 50–2, 62; Ermolov, 1909, i, 91, 444–7; ii, 71–4.
72 Ermolov, 1909, i, 56–8.
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in charge of famine relief tried to keep assistance to the minimum. As is often 
emphasized in international famine research, societal power relations and the 
variety of coping options instead of ‘quantitative amounts of grain per capita’ largely 
determined the length and depth of crises.73 The functioning and efficiency of a 
famine relief system were strongly influenced by patterns of land ownership and 
the concrete political and social configuration of a society. 
Capitalist transformation has been one of the routes by which recurrent famine 
has been evaded or overcome.74 The Baltic example illustrates the case. The 
famines disappeared after 1860s, although the official relief system did not go 
through many changes after the early 1820s. Manorial lords’ role, however, declined. 
Market economy, rapidly advancing since the 1850s and 1860s,75 rather than the 
traditional moral economy saved people from famine in rural class societies where 
the agricultural populations were divided into farmers, cottagers, day labourers, and 
servants and where socioeconomic status and group affiliation were of considerable 
importance. In Russia, the ‘effective’ redistribution of communal resources could 
safeguard peasants from the worst for some time, but since the majority of the 
population endured a poor standard of living in the nineteenth century, it could not 
be – and, in reality it was not – a sustainable solution to the ‘famine question’. 
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Marriage and Household Structure in 
Rural Pre-Famine Finland, 1845–65
Miikka Voutilainen
Department of History & Ethnology, University of Jyväskylä
On the basis of recent findings, independent rural households formed a safeguard 
against the excess mortality during the Finnish 1860s famine. In this article, an 
analysis of deanery level longitudinal panel data shows that an increase in the 
number of unmarried adults reduced the number of households. This suggests 
that the ability to marry not only had a role in determining the household structure 
but also by increasing the within-household inequality it facilitated the economic 
hardships in the pre-famine rural Finland.
Introduction
It has been widely held that pre-industrial societies were poor and unequal in 
terms of distribution of economic assets and agricultural land. This adversity has 
typically been perceived as an important source for the persistent vulnerability to 
economic shocks that occasionally manifested in food deprivation and in famines.1 
The mediating mechanisms and causal pathways are, however, still rather 
obscure.2 According to recent findings, the prevalence of independent households 
buffered against the excess mortality experienced during the Finnish famine of the 
1860s, suggesting that a household provided a safeguard against the livelihood 
threatening crop failures and the socioeconomic stress induced by the emerging 
famine conditions.3 
Crude marriage rates and the extent of marital coverage declined substantially 
in several regions in pre-famine Finland.4 Covering the two pre-famine decades, 
this article reviews whether the famine mortality had its roots in the pre-famine 
1 Ó Gráda, 2008; Campbell & Ó Gráda, 2011. On pre-industrial yields and agricultural productivity, 
see e.g. Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton & van Leeuwen, 2015; Olsson & Svensson, 2010. 
2 See e.g. Adger, 1999; Kelly & Ó Gráda, 2014; Bengtsson & Broström, 2011.
3 Voutilainen, 2015a; Voutilainen, 2016.
4 Voutilainen, 2016.
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household formation; did the marriage-restraining preventive check increase the 
vulnerability to harvest failures in the 1860s by limiting the formation of independent 
households.
The structure of the study is as follows: the next section reviews the literature 
concerning the European marital pattern, preventive check and their macro-
economic outcomes. The third section presents evidence for the existence of West 
European marital system in Finland, the fourth section scrutinizes the question 
formally with statistical rigour, leaving it for the last section to present conclusions. 
European Marital Pattern and Economic Development
According to popular generalization, societies that exhibited pre-industrial 
population dynamics governed by births rather than deaths were economically more 
advanced and may have even experienced transition to modern economic growth 
earlier.5 The population mechanism that entailed the reaction of births to alteration 
of economic conditions is widely known in its Malthusian by-name, the preventive 
check. The preventive check has been considered playing the eminent role in 
creating the so-called (West) European marital pattern (EMP) that is characterized 
by high average age at marriage, high share of population never marrying and 
family system dominated by nuclear families.6 As births out of wedlock were rather 
scarce in the pre-1800s societies, marriages constituted the governing variable 
in the population dynamics in this kind of a system.7 The East European marital 
pattern, influentially considered by Hajnal to prevail east of a line that ranged from 
St. Petersburg to Trieste, exhibited a social pattern vice versa: large extended 
households and marrying at younger ages.8
The EMP system has been considered precipitating economic development 
through three channels. First of all, it has been considered that the EMP entailed 
relatively good socioeconomic position for women in the society. This surfaced 
in high labour force participation, widow empowerment and spousal equality.9 
Secondly, it has been suggested that the EMP increased human capital 
5 E.g. Galloway, 1988; De Moor & Van Zanden, 2010; Carmichael, De Pleijt, van Zanden & De 
Moor, 2015. 
6 Hajnal, 1965; Berkner & Mendels, 1978, 209.Carmichael et al consider that age at marriage is 
not sufficient to designate the EMP pattern. See Carmichael, De Pleijt, van Zanden & De Moor, 2015. 
The postponing of marriage is still evident in modern world in response to diminishing economic 
prospects, see e.g. Ermisch, 1999.
7 Partially the low share of births out of wedlock is spurious reflection of the pressure placed on 
the parents of the illegitimate child to marry prior to the birth. For general review see e.g. Voutilainen, 
2015b.
8 Szoltysek has argued that that the existing models of household systems in preindustrial Europe 
are far too rigid to capture the actual diversity of family patterns of the Eastern Europe. See especially 
Szoltysek, 2008.
9 De Moor & Van Zanden, 2010, 4–7; Dennison & Ogilvie, 2014, 672.
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investment.10 Through its coevolution with (or causal effect on) the labour markets, 
the late marriage and nuclear households may have led to more schooling, 
apprenticeship, servant training, and gender participation in education.11 Greif has 
also suggested that the European nuclear family fostered corporative institutions 
such as guilds, cities, and universities, which created and diffused knowledge.12 
The third mechanism through which the EMP allegedly functioned was the effect 
it had on the population growth via the preventive check: restriction of marriage 
to those who could establish an independent household hindered population 
growth and ensured long-term per capita capital accumulation. According to the 
widely-adopted narrative, this property of the preventive check alleviated pressure 
imposed by excessive population growth on scarce resources and thereby aided 
avoiding famines and other subsistence crises.
This third feature is what appears to constitute a paradox vis-á-vis the Finnish 
famine history. While the recent empirical findings quite clearly suggest that Finnish 
demographic regime was preventive check dominated, famines of some magnitude 
happened reasonably often during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.13 
Thereby it would appear that the preventive check alone was not a sufficient 
safeguard. Moring has actually shown that the Finnish family structure approached 
the West European system in the 1800s due to impoverishment and compulsory 
prolonging of marital formation.14 Concurrent with this, Dennison and Ogilvie have 
recently placed considerable scepticism on the positive implications of the EMP. 
According to them, the West European marital pattern was in no observable clear-
cut relationship with female autonomy, increased human capital investment, or 
enhanced demographic responsiveness to economic conditions.15
The idea that nuclear household could actually have been a vulnerable 
form of habitation is not novel. Previous literature has emphasized its inherent 
vulnerability to a loss of individual adult members (esp. father and/or mother).16 
Another important factor increasing the precarity of nuclear household dominated 
socioeconomic system is captured with the nuclear hardship hypothesis, according 
to which, the more widespread the nuclear family, and the more strictly the neo-
local rules of marrying and leaving parental household were applied, the more 
important collective institutions were for the security of the individual in an event of 
10 Foreman-Peck, 2011.
11 Dennison & Ogilvie, 2014, 672; De Moor & Van Zanden, 2010, 3.
12 Greif, 2006, 308–12.
13 Voutilainen, 2015b. Apart from war-related mortality surges in 1788-90 and in 1808–1809, after 
the 1740s peak mortality associated with harvest failures was experienced in 1763, 1833, 1835, 
1856 and in the 1860s.
14 Moring, 1996; Moring, 1999. Prior to the general emergence of the EMP in Western Europe, 
the nuclear family behaviour was typical among the poor – and remained so throughout the pre-
industrial era. See, inter alia: De Moor & Van Zanden, 2014, 11; Arkell, 1987.
15 Dennison & Ogilvie, 2014; Dennison & Ogilvie, 2016.
16 De Moor & Van Zanden, 2014, 23. See also Bengtsson & Broström, 2011, 121.
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economic stress.17 This means that in order to counter fluctuations in the aggregate 
economy, the existence of the EMP necessitated the establishment of a collective 
social support system as an alternative to local kin networks. Extensive social 
security was, however, widely absent on a macro level or scattered in its coverage 
in early modern world.18 This implies that nuclear household structure coupled with 
the neo-local tradition had the inherent risk of increasing the number of individuals 
who didn’t marry and who subsequently had little entitlement to economic support. 
If Finland grew poorer during the 1800s, as has been implied in several context19, 
and if the EMP was an institutional arrangement adopted in the century or so after 
the Black Death in an environment of rapidly expanding employment opportunities 
and relatively high remuneration20, it is reasonable to ask what kind of welfare 
outcomes the EMP entailed in a stagnant or even contracting economy.
Two different factors might have been at play, however: over the short term the 
nuclear household structure and neo-locality may have increased vulnerability to 
economic shocks. But over the long-term, when the economy had time to adjust, 
it is quite likely that the transforming family system stipulated a decrease in the 
population growth alleviating this emerging social inequality. The durance of the 
macro-economic problems was thereby essential for the nuclear hardships to 
manifest in full force on societal scale. One-off harvest failures were conventionally 
repelled with the short-term aid routinely implemented in the pre-industrial societies, 
whereas long-term downturns eventually started to affect population composition 
due to declining population growth. Somewhere in between laid a region where a 
perfect storm was allowed to brew, just like the one in Finland, which still loomed in 
the distance in the early 1860s.21
The Economic Base of the Finnish Household System
EMP has been traditionally connected with the labour markets. Actually, De Moor 
and van Zanden proposed the Black Death-induced labour market shock as one 
of the leading candidates explaining the initial emergence of the EMP.22 The neo-
locality was likewise connected to the functioning of the labour markets and a 
17 A person had to leave the parental household to form a new one after marrying, see e.g. Laslett, 
1988, 153. For Finnish interpretations see, inter alia: Ylikangas, 1968; Kaukiainen, 1973. 
18 See e.g. Jütte, 1996.
19 For a review see Voutilainen, 2016, 120.
20 De Moor & Van Zanden, 2014, 3.
21 Ó Gráda, (1995, 162–8) and Voutilainen (2016, 113–5) argue that when interpreting the long-
term determinants of famine escalation, the exogeneity of the pre-famine decline needs to be 
assessed. See also Geary & Stark, 2004. Rangasami (1985a, 1985b) makes a compelling case for 
understanding outbreaks of famine mortality as culminations of long social, political and economic 
processes. 
22 De Moor & Van Zanden, 2014, 2. Labour market participation after the Black Death is covered 
in Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton & van Leeuwen, 2015.
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typical convention postulated that young men and women engaged in so-called life 
cycle service; they left their parental household to work as farm hands with annual 
contracts.23
According to recent Finnish findings, however, the ability to obtain an annual 
worker post may have been hampered by various factors; freeholder peasants 
and crofters appear to have preferred their own sons over extra-household labour, 
decreasing chances of members of lower social classes to obtain labour contracts.24 
Probably even more importantly, the rural labour demand was sensitive to farmer 
incomes and thus to harvest fluctuations. As it was typical that Finnish servants 
with annual contracts were hired in late summer / early autumn, the success of 
harvest largely dictated whether farmers could afford to hire this relatively costly 
form of labour.
The existence of the nuclear family ideal and simultaneous assumption of the 
neo-locality could have given rise to substantial within-household inequality in 
the event that leaving the parental households was prolonged, either because of 
limited employment possibilities, or because marriage opportunities diminished. 
In this kind of environment the ideal of neo-locality may have been turned into 
a compulsory co-habitation. Distribution of socioeconomic power and access to 
resources in all likelihood skewed with the increased mean household size. The 
prolonged co-habitation may have worsened the socioeconomic position of those 
individuals that normally would have been assumed moving out of the parental 
household.
There were substantial spatial differences in the Finnish mean household 
sizes that persisted well into the 1900s.25 The crucial factor considered explaining 
the large households in Eastern Finland compared with the western parts of the 
country was the wide adoption of slash-and-burn cultivation in the East. Slash-and-
burn cultivation can be expected to increase mean household sizes as the poorest 
of agricultural population could scarcely obtain forest plots required and acquire 
sufficient labour force needed to undertake the labour intensive slash-and-burn 
cultivation. Cultivation of eastern and northern wildernesses induced population 
expansion in the early modern period, effectively mitigating the increase of the 
landless rural underclass in Eastern Finland. Diminution of suitable forest reserves 
23 Laslett, 1983, suggested that life-cycle labour may have provided a quasi-remedy to economic 
problems on the household level.
24 Voutilainen, 2016, 142–3.
25 Pekka Haatanen, Suomen Maalaisköyhälistö. Tutkimusten ja Kaunokirjallisuuden Valossa, 
(Helsinki, 1968), 242–3.
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and development of legislation concerning the property rights of the woodlands 
eventually erased this safety valve.26
The east-west disparity in household sizes has led to wide consensus that 
Finland was delineated into two distinct family systems. Sirén, who has provided 
the most vocal evidence for the distinction between the Western and Eastern 
Finnish family systems, has considered that as would be expected on the basis of 
the East European family model, the marriage was not a crucial factor determining 
the household formation in Eastern Finland. She therefore asserts that not only did 
not the Malthusian preventive check operate in the eastern parts of the country but 
that it did not constitute a significant factor in the formation of the family structure.27
Nevertheless, it is easy to emphasize the dominant role of cultural traits and 
social conventions in the household formation, for example Berkner and Mendels 
have pointed out that it “would be a major error to view the peasant as a helpless 
creature forced to blindly follow the dictates of an inheritance system”.28 Voutilainen 
has provided interesting evidence: the Eastern Finnish pattern of the large 
mean household size tended to co-exist with low between-household economic 
inequality and with general absence of low-income households. This means 
that the poverty that was manifest in the extensive number of small low-income 
households in the Western Finland remained “trapped” within the households in 
the East. This furthermore implies that there existed an inherent trade-off in the 
inequality structure: small mean household size meant the existence of between-
household inequality, large mean household size placed the inequality within the 
households.29
The adversity fell on those people who remained living-ins and provided labour 
for the household but simultaneously retained vulnerability to shocks that affected 
the households’ economic status and its labour demand. If the economic situation 
turned severe enough, it is likely that those members of the household that were 
considered “external” to the core-family were the first to be evicted. In the Finnish 
context this is clearly visible in the excess presentation of young adults (especially 
men) among the temporary migrants during the famine of the 1860s.30
26 Luttinen, 2012; Korhonen, 2003, 406–407. According to the traditional common law practice 
the clearance for slash-and-burn cultivation determined property right to the field (Luttinen, 2012, 
92, 98, 117. During the late-1700s, the co-called isojako land reform effectively restricted lower 
social classes’ legal right to establish slash-and-burn cultivations, see e.g. Korhonen, 2003, 407–8. 
Jutikkala, 2003, observes that isojako abolished the prospect of upward social movement for landless 
population through slash-and-burn cultivation, which had existed prior to the reform. According to 
Pulma, (1994, 24), the slash-and-burn of the landless was often first and foremost tolerated, but not 
exactly endorsed during the 1600s. Jutikkala (1957, 202) considers that able-bodied landless with 
free prospecting rights to slash-and-burn may have been economically better off than the poorest 
of the freeholders. Heikkinen (1988, 76) argues, however, that at least in the early 1800s a rural 
workman could participate in a so-called “slash-and-burn cooperative” and obtain this way, through 
labour, the right to sow to these fields. See also: Pulma, 1994, 27; Luttinen, 2012, 98.
27 Sirén, 1999, 142–3. On the basis of the local evidence, and in line with the Hajnalian divide, the 
marital age seemed to have been lower in the eastern than in the western parts of Finland. See: 
Sirén, 1999, 115–6; Moring, 2003, 84–7.
28 Berkner & Mendels, 1978, 216.
29 Voutilainen, 2015a; Voutilainen, 2016.
30 Pitkänen, 1992.
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The situation in the Finnish rural labour markets was made worse by the existing 
restrictions on free movement. The need to emigrate in search of employment 
and prospective marital partners has been stressed in importance especially when 
inheritance system and land partitioning disallowed access to land for the younger 
siblings.31 According to the Finnish poor relief laws it was however possible for 
the target parishes to deny the entrance of the migrants if it was suspected that 
the migrants were going to rely on the parish poor relief for subsistence. This kind 
of situation could easily arise if a person from an outside parish was planning to 
settle in without family or kinship that could provide support and was unable to find 
employment.32
Analysing household formation in connection to the intra-household inequality 
may yield important clues concerning the distribution and production of welfare 
in pre-industrial era. As household and farming, even at the smallest scale, were 
key contributors to individual livelihood entitlements and social connections to the 
community the socioeconomic rules that dictated individual access to them most 
likely proved important especially during crises. This puts the household formation 
to the fore of interest, determinants of which are scrutinized in the following section.
Determinants of the Finnish 
Pre-Famine Household Formation
The analysis of household structure faces immediately the debate over the 
definition of a household. Arguably the most influential and widely-adopted 
definition and classification is provided by Laslett, who considers that household 
is particularly defined through shared location, kinship and activity, incorporating 
individuals within the households, considering servants as household members 
but not drawing a parallel between a family and a household.33 De Moor and van 
Zanden define a household loosely as “a cooperative economic unit aimed at the 
fulfilment of the physical and emotional needs of its members” and interestingly is 
“characterized by certain inequalities … between generations and sexes”.34 Moring 
has emphasized, however, that static household classification system has “no 
place” in historical societies: the household had no beginning or end but was under 
31 Berkner & Mendels, 1978, 209. As has been shown in several occasions throughout the 
medieval and early modern Europe, the high fertility resulted in downward social circulation due 
to the tendency of avoiding partitioning of freeholder land, constituting the key mechanism through 
which the land inequality developed, see e.g. Bekar & Reed, 2013; Dribe & Svensson, 2008; Clark 
& Hamilton, 2006; Moring, 1999.
32 Markkola, 2007, 212–3; Uotila, 2015, 49.
33 Laslett, 1983, 23–8.
34 De Moor & Van Zanden, 2014, 3.
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a constant turmoil. Only when a house or land was divided can we actually observe 
births of new units.35
Mean household size is not a straightforward measure of the household 
complexity, even though it is tempting to draw parallels between large households 
and existence of social extensions. As was generally the rule in Northern and 
Western Europe, the Finnish freehold farms usually consisted of 5 to 10 people: 
the peasant farmer and his wife, their children, a farm-hand and/or maid, and 
sometimes members of the older generation.36 In his early analytical work, 
Burch considered that under nuclear and stem family systems, households never 
exceeded an average of ten, and while theoretical averages in the extended family 
system exceeded 20, figures this high are seldom, if ever observed in reality.37 It 
thus appears reasonable to assume that household size could scarcely exceed 
ten without some form of social extensions. Concurrent with these, Moring has 
observed the mean sizes of the extended Finnish peasant households in the 
southeast corner of the country varied between 8.1 and 10.0 from the late-1810s 
to the mid-1870s.38
The standard source providing information concerning pre-industrial Finnish 
social structure are the population tables that were compiled by the Lutheran 
priests. Under the national legislation, parish priests had to complete two separate 
statistical forms, the so-called population (census) and population change tables. 
A thorough population census listing e.g. population age structure and social class 
divisions was originally compiled every three years and from 1775 on information 
was gathered every five years. Annually compiled population change tables 
provide cause of death statistics, monthly number of vital events (births, deaths 
and marriages), and some breakdowns of these by social or marital statuses.39
The data concerning the mean household size and the size distribution of 
households is obtainable on a spatial level from these registers. The data available 
in these tables is with all likelihood based on the communion books that listed 
households and their members.40 The deanery (n=40 per year) population tables 
present a breakdown by household size: 2 or smaller, 3 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 15 and 
above 15.
The deanery data does not allow for qualitative considerations, per se. While 
the data is easy to operationalize, it leaves open source critical questions, such 
as whether we can reliably draw an inference based on the contemporary size 
35 Moring, 1999, 181. See also (Wall, 1972, 159), who warns researchers that “the attempt to trace 
the history of [household] is fraught with considerable dangers…”
36 Gadd, 2011, 129–130.
37 Burch, 1970.
38 Moring, 1999, 170, 173. See also: Sirén, 1999; Partanen, 2004.
39 Pitkänen, Mielke & Jorde, 1989, 97; Pitkänen, 1993, 27–38. 
40 See e.g. Uotila, 2014, 49–51. Various other documents such as the poll tax registers have been 
the standard source in spatially delineated studies, e.g. Moring, 1996; Moring, 1999; Sirén, 1999; 
Waris, 1999. For comparison of sources, see e.g. Voutilainen, 2016, 125–6.
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distributions without knowing the exact basis for the size classification. Then again, 
the classification reflects contemporary perceptions concerning the household 
structure, not “artificial” later compilations – in addition, in this work we merely 
drop the categorization used in previous works (i.e. nuclear household, extended 
household etc.) and focus on the sheer number of households.
The household data provided in the population tables is highly useful in 
geographical analysis. While a representative spatial collection of age at marriage 
(a standard measure of the West European marital pattern) is an impossible task 
within this study, a proxy measure can easily be obtained on a macro level: the 
number of people married.41  As the focus of this article is on those whose marital 
aspirations were either postponed or even cancelled, we focus on the un-married 
adult population. If the Finnish family structure followed the West European pattern, 
we ought to observe negative association between the number of un-married adults 
and number of households; i.e. the fewer adult married the less households were 
correspondingly formed.
To study this effect, we use the deanery level longitudinal panel covering years 
1845, 1855 and 1865.42 The dependent variable inspected is the number of household 
at year t, in a deanery i. The choice of count variable implies usage of appropriate 
regression models and due to over-dispersion, negative binomial regression was 
selected. The models were run in zero-truncated form as no deanery had zero 
number of households.43 The size of the adult population (15 years and older) 
was used as an exposure variable, denoting the theoretical maximum number of 
households (i.e. how many times the dependent event could have happened). Time 
and place specific fixed factors are taken into account through the introduction of 
year and deanery specific dummy variables. This allows controlling for various 
heterogeneities that would severely obscure any cross-sectional analysis based 
on data from any singular year.
The main interest is in the coefficient between unmarried adults and households, 
but additional control variables were also introduced. First of all, the number of farm 
workers is used. Deanery tables designate both young adults with annual labour 
contracts and unmarried sons and daughters of farmers to the same class of “farm 
workers”. It is reasonable to assume that it should exhibit negative association 
with the number of households – as long as these people remained as farm hands 
(whether through a contract or through family connection), they generally remained 
outside of marital markets and needed not establish their own households.
41 Palm, 2000, 64–6, similarly uses the marital coverage to consider that Sweden displayed 
characteristics of the East European marital system in the 1620s, with the share of married (including 
widows) at 76.5 % of over 15 year olds. According to Pitkänen (1981, 278), 33.8% of women aged 
between 20 and 24 were married in rural Finland in 1880, while for men it was 17.1%. The relation 
switched after the mid-30s though - among 35 to 39 year olds, 81.7% of all men and 76.9% of all 
women were married.
42 Jyväskylä, Provincial Archives. Deanery population tables (1845, 1855, 1865): Microcards, 70–
74, 88–92, 105–107, 109.
43 See e.g. Greene, 2000, 880–7; Osgood, 2000; Voutilainen, 2015a, 135–6.
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Secondly we introduce the number of adults living on poor relief and those 
part of the lowest social classes. The relationship between the households and 
the number adults receiving public poor relief and the number of adults belonging 
to the lower social classes (e.g. lodgers and cottiers) is ambiguous and depends 
on the effect dominance. Entitlement to public poor relief was conditional on the 
unavailability of other sources (esp. family) of support and hence the recipients 
quite likely constituted distinct households by definition. The people of the lower 
social class tended to have some form of shanty dwelling (cottiers, mäkitupalaiset) 
but especially the lodgers abundant in the Eastern Finland often lived unsettled life 
among the farmer population. The latter group may have been variably recorded 
in the population tables. As long as this convention remained unaltered within the 
deanery throughout the timeframe of analysis, the fixed effects introduced here 
take these sources of heterogeneity into account. Based on these considerations, 
Dependent variable: Number of households
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Farm workers -0.0000104 
(0.023)**
-0.0000126 
(0.006)***
-0.00000112 
(0.880)
0.00000688 
(0.353)
Poor relief 
recipients
 0.0000303 
(0.031)**
0.0000581 
(0.001)***
0.0000504 
(0.004)***
Unmarried 
adults
 
 
-0.0000167 
(0.020)**
-0.0000347 
(<0.001)***
Lower social class 0.0000395 
(0.023)**
Croft farmers 0.0000474 
(0.056)*
Freeholders 0.0000475 
(0.062)*
Constant -1.107 
(<0.001)***
-1.118 
(<0.001)***
-1.070 
(<0.001)***
-1.078 
(<0.001)***
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
P-value for likeli-
hood ratio test, 
βi = 0, ∀i
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
P-value for 
likelihood ratio 
test, α=0
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.139 0.142 0.148
N 117 117 117 117
Table 1. Zero-truncated negative binomial regression models of the number of households in 
rural Finnish deaneries, 1845–1865
Note: Time and deanery level fixed effects modelled using dummy variables. The size of the adult 
population (15 years and older) was used as an exposure variable.
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it is likely that both the poor relieved and the lowest social groups tended to live in 
independent households.44
Thirdly we introduce the number of freeholder and croft farms, which, quite 
apparently, ought to show a positive relationship to the number of households.
The results for the regression models are presented in Table 1. The diagnostics 
appear to be in order. Rejection of the dispersion restriction α=0 (p<0.001) implies 
that data exhibits over-dispersion and the Poisson model would be unsuitable.
The coefficient of main interest, that between unmarried adults and the number 
of households, is indeed negative and in the fourth model with the most elaborated 
structure highly significant. This means that the increased number of unmarried 
adults translated into fewer households. The large eastern households appear to 
coexist with low marital coverage, a feature in line with neo-local household rule.45 
This coexistence of large households and low marital coverage is not without West 
European counterparts – the pattern was most evident in the post-famine Ireland 
in the latter half of the 1800s.46
The coefficient for the farm workers is negative, but loses the significance 
after the introduction of the number of unmarried adults. This means that the farm 
workers tend to be without own households, but the effect apparently stems from 
their marital status.
The poor relief recipients appear to have formed independent households. 
The finding is interesting, but due to reasons pointed out earlier, not particularly 
surprising. In order to get public aid one had to be without other forms of aid, 
including from close family and kin, and thus it can be stated that the positive 
coefficient is (partially) a product of selection bias – you had to have an independent 
household in order to be eligible for the poor relief.
The same applies, at least partially, to the lower social classes, cottiers and 
lodgers. Their small household sizes have been recently detected in Finnish 
literature, adding to the routine finding that lower social classes tended to occupy 
their own small households.
Freeholders and crofters, as expected, increase the number of households. 
Farming livelihoods captured by these two variables were not however up for grabs 
for everyone. Access to freeholder and croft farms was greatly dictated by land 
partitioning legislation and inheritance agreements. As was the case in restricted 
44 “Independence” refers here to the household structure. Until 1865 (and in a certain form until 
the 1880s), the Finnish labour and movement legislation was marked by system of so-called legal 
guardianship, which (i) hampered free movement of labour and (ii) tied segments of the adult landless 
population (over-15s) under those with ‘legal’ occupations (e.g., farmers, traders, industrialists etc.), 
for a review see Frigren, 2016, 78–82.
45 See also Voutilainen, 2016, 127–128.
46 Guinnane, 1997; Curran, 2015, 37. It is worthwhile highlighting that Guinnane perceives the 
decline in marital coverage in Ireland greatly a voluntary process – increasing unwillingness to 
accept the burdens of marriage and a family because it was less important to satisfying the economic 
goals that marriage had once served.
“The Enormous Failure of Nature”: Famine and Society in the Nineteenth Century
78
movement of labour, here too the legislative environment influenced how an 
individual could obtain a secure livelihood.
How large an effect did remaining unmarried have on the number of households? 
At face value the coefficients appear tiny. This is merely an illusion: the response 
is in logarithms. Because of this non-linearity, no straightforward calculation (e.g. 
as in slope) can be done to illustrate the actual significance of the effect. As an 
example, a coefficient of -0.0000347 means that given a population of 26000, with 
5300 households and 7800 unmarried adults (corresponding e.g. to the deanery of 
Länsi-Raasepori in Southern Finland in 1865), a decline in the number of unmarried 
to 7500 results to an increase in the number of households to 5428.6 and results 
to a decline in the mean household size from 4.91 to 4.79, ceteris paribus. So, a 
decrease of 3.8% in the number of unmarried resulted in a decrease of 2.4% in 
the mean household size, corresponding to point-elasticity of c. 0.63, an estimate 
which is not only statistically significant but also economically important.
Conclusion
This article inspected whether remaining unmarried had an effect on the Finnish 
household structure. Previous studies have shown that Finland experienced the 
marriage reducing reaction to economic decline in the mid-1800s. This is congruent 
with the macro-level findings which have shown that crude marriage rates displayed 
a positive connection to fluctuation in real wages; i.e. the preventive check.
Recent literature has suggested that availability of households, either through 
access to cultivation or through social ties to the community they provided, 
decreased spatial famine mortality during the 1860s. This implies that the preventive 
check may actually have increased the risk of large-scale population crisis in the 
mid-1800s Finland due to increase in the intra-household inequality.
This study shows that household formation and preventive check were 
connected and inability to marry was associated with fewer households. Thereby it 
provides tentative evidence that the preventive check may actually have increased 
rural precarity in the pre-famine decades.
The regression results also show that land partitioning and rental farming had 
an expected positive effect on the household formation. This highlights that the 
legal restrictions that were in place during the era severely affected the peoples’ 
abilities to obtain livelihood security. Social conventions and legal environment 
shaped the inequality that ultimately manifested as the famine in the 1860s after a 
string of crop failures provided an external shock large enough to disintegrate the 
social and economic structures that were able to buffer against livelihood threats 
in normal harvest years. 
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A Lack of Resources, Information 
and Will: Political Aspects of 
the Finnish Crisis of 1867–68
Heidi Reese
Department of Economic & Social History, University of Helsinki 
In 1867 Finland was faced with a serious crop failure. An insufficient amount of food 
was imported and when the winter came, there was not enough grain to feed the 
hungry. Traditionally this event in Finnish history has been explained as a crisis of 
outdated agriculture and an inescapable natural and economic catastrophe. When 
examining the political aspects of the crisis, it is noticeable that the failure to import 
a sufficient amount of food was based not only on a lack of resources, but also 
on inefficient transfer and use of information and, indeed, a lack of will to help the 
hungry.
In the 1860s the Grand Duchy of Finland was a part of the Russian Empire. 
Finland formed a separate financial state from the Russian Empire that had to 
take care of its own financial operations. The department for financial affairs of 
the Senate of Finland, and its head, Johan Vilhelm Snellman, were responsible 
for finances and poor relief in Finland. The harvest reports, letters and telegrams 
of governors as well as the reports of the rapidly-developing local press provided 
Snellman with the possibility of staying informed on the food stocks and crop 
forecasts. Snellman’s political views are visible in his public writings and letters to 
the governors. All of the above are used as central source material in this article.
The Finnish Famine of 1867–8 has been cited as the last peacetime famine in Europe.1 
Certainly, the crisis – that took the lives of over 100,000 Finns – is exceptional in both 
Finnish and European history. In Finland a peacetime demographic catastrophe of 
this scale had not taken place since the seventeenth century, although crop failures 
had occurred quite regularly.2 In Europe the previous corresponding demographic 
catastrophe in terms of percentage mortality occurred in Ireland in the 1840s. In 
1 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 9. The Finnish famine of the 1860s was the 
last peacetime famine in Europe, if not taking into account the Soviet bloc. See Weiss, 2000, 175; 
Devereux, 2000, 3.
2 Soikkanen, 1991, 38–39.
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1867 the crop failures extended over large areas of Sweden and the Russian Empire 
including the Baltic Provinces, but a large-scale mortality crisis was encountered 
only in the territory of Finland.3 Earlier research has shown conclusively that due 
to a lack of stocks in granaries and the poor harvest of 1867 there was a serious 
lack of food in Finland in the autumn of 1867.4 The only viable option to meet this 
deficit would have been grain imports from abroad. In 1862 and 1865 poor harvests 
had been balanced with increased imports of grain, but in 1867 the amount of food 
imports was smaller than in the previous years.5 Why was a sufficient amount of 
grain not imported to Finland in the autumn of 1867?
Research on the 1860s crisis has emphasized the poor economic situation 
of Finland and inadequate information on crop forecasts during the summer of 
1867 as an explanation for the insufficient grain imports.6 Economic life in 1860s 
Finland was in a crisis and the economic possibilities of the merchants to carry out 
grain imports without loans from the state were slim.7 David Arnold has noted that 
the state’s response to a famine is affected not only by economic resources and 
administrative capabilities, but also by the pre-existing conventions and ideology. 
The historical understanding of famines requires alertness to its structural causes 
and its social and cultural parameters.8 Holger Weiss has emphasized that aid is 
dependent on the will and interests of the rulers. Aid is a political act and politics 
defines who receives aid and who does not.9 Since the ecological and economical 
reasons behind the food shortage of 1867 are well explained in earlier research, 
this paper focuses on the role of politics behind the inadequate food imports in 
1867. It also examines the crop forecast data that the decision makers had at hand 
during the summer of 1867. 
In terms of theoretical background, the paper utilizes the famine research of 
late 20th and early 21st century. Development economist Stephen Devereux notes 
that failures of public action should be incorporated into the causal analysis of all 
famines. Although most pre-twentieth century famines were triggered by natural 
catastrophes, the natural triggers operated in contexts where local economies 
were weak and the political will or logistical capacity of the state to intervene was 
lacking. Devereux’s idea that the failure to prevent famines can be explained by 
inadequate information, bureaucratic inertia, lack of capacity to act efficiently as 
well as lack of political will offers an interesting framework for the Finnish case.10 
3 Turpeinen, 1986, 237. See also the contributions of Ludvigsson and Lust in this volume. 
4 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 10, 20; Ikonen, 1991, 86; Pitkänen, 1991, 43.
5 Soininen, 1974, 404.
6 Turpeinen 1986, 153; Turpeinen, 1991, 51; Pitkänen 1991, 63–6; Savolainen, 1989), 35; 
Savolainen, 2006, 782–784; Myllyntaus, 2009, 78.
7 Voutilainen, 2015, 124–44.
8 Arnold, 1988, 8.
9 Weiss, 2000, 121, 169.
10 Devereux, 2000, 13, 27. 
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Economist Amartya Sen has claimed that famines are easy to prevent, if only 
the government tries to prevent them. According to Sen famines do not occur in 
democracies because elections and free media offer strong incentives to undertake 
famine prevention.11 A free press can adduce information from distant areas and 
even bring out information that might be embarrassing to the government. Free 
press and active political opposition constitute the best early-warning system for 
famines.12 Finland in the 1860s was far from a democracy, and the press was subject 
to censorship, but the seeds of political and cultural liberalism were sprouting at 
this time and interesting comparative perspectives with more modern famines can 
be seen in the Finnish case. When keeping in mind the historical context, theories 
and examples from more recent famine research offer fruitful views into the politics 
behind the Finnish food crisis.
Economic and Political Decision 
Making in Finland in the 1860s
During the 1860s Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian 
Empire. The Russian Tsar (ie. the Grand Duke of Finland), had the decisive power, 
but Finland was autonomous in the sense that it had to finance and execute its own 
financial operations. Finnish central government during the period of autonomy 
was dualistic, and incorporated the Senate in Finland as well as Minister Secretary 
of State and a Committee for Finnish Affairs in St. Petersburg. In addition to the 
Senate and governance in Russia, a separate power was the Governor-General 
who represented the Russian Tsar in Finland. As Häkkinen and Forsberg have 
observed, the Finnish Senate, under the control of the Governor General, “managed 
Finland’s economic and legal matters, and if Finland did not make any financial 
claims on the Russian imperial Treasury, it was not in the Tsar’s interests to limit 
this autonomy”.13 By the 1860s the Senate had taken de facto control of Finland’s 
internal affairs, including foreign trade and economic policy.
In 1809 when Finland, had shifted from Swedish rule and become a Grand 
Duchy within the Russian Empire, Tsar Alexander I of the Russian Empire, had 
convened the four Estates of Finland to the Diet of Porvoo. In principle the Diet had 
power over legislation under the ultimate authority of the Tsar. In practice the Diet 
was not convened between 1809 and 1863, because the Russian government had 
not wanted any meetings of the Estates in the Empire. This further emphasized the 
shift of practical power to the civil servants, working under the Senate’s control. 
11 Sen, 1999, 51–2.
12 Sen, 1999, 181.
13 Häkkinen & Forsberg, 2015, 100. 
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The Senate could technically manage the economy and rule the citizens without the 
Diet, but the postponement of new legislation and tax reforms stalled the society.14 
In the 1860s Finland consisted of eight provinces, each with their own provincial 
administration. The Finnish provincial governments were subordinate both to the 
Senate and to the Governor-General. The governors of the provinces had to balance 
the expectations of both the Senate and the Governor-General, which often proved 
challenging.15 The standing of the governors was dualistic also in the sense that 
they were representatives of the central government in the provinces, but also 
representatives of the people to the central government. In the early nineteenth 
century in particular, the governors had an important role in passing information 
from the provinces to the central administration. In the 1860s, due to new channels 
of information, this aspect of the governors’ role diminished in importance. Their 
role in adjusting the expectations of the government in Helsinki with the needs of 
the provinces became stronger.16 
In the event of a crop failure the Senate’s head of financial affairs was ultimately 
responsible for taking care of the consequences.17 The Finnish philosopher, 
journalist and Fennoman Johan Vilhelm Snellman became a senator as well as 
the Senate’s head of financial affairs in July 1863 and maintained his position 
until the spring of 1868.18 In addition to Snellman, the Governor-General Nikolai 
Adlerberg and the provincial governors of the provinces also bore responsibility 
for relief actions in the summer and autumn of 1867.19 Snellman’s importance 
was emphasized by the fact that Adlerberg was on a leave of absence for three 
months in the autumn of 1867 and came back to office in mid-October.20 After his 
return Adlerberg took more responsibility over the famine prevention and Snellman 
stepped aside.21 Snellman’s career as a senator and head of financial affairs of 
the senate ended in the spring of 1868 at the request of Adlerberg.22 Although the 
official reason for Snellman’s resignation were differences of opinion related to the 
building of a railway between Helsinki and St. Petersburg, earlier research has 
14 Tiihonen & Tiihonen, 1983, 270; Kuusterä & Tarkka, 2011, 180; Tiihonen, 2012, 51; Newby & 
Myllyntaus, 2015, 146.
15 Westerlund, 1996, 351. 
16 Westerlund 1996,  371–2.
17 Turpeinen 1986, 148; Savolainen 1989, 21, 61–2; Savolainen, 2005b, 16.
18 Heikkinen & Tiihonen, 2009, 370–1; Snellman’s public writings [Samlade Arbeten] and his 
correspondence with governors and other officials during the famine years have been edited and 
published as a series of books, which have been used as source material for this article [hereafter 
Snellman SA].
19 Häkkinen, 1991a, 130–1.
20 Oulun Wiikko-Sanomia, 27 Jul. 1867; Hufvudstadsbladet, 21 Oct.1867. Adlerberg’s leave was 
health related. See Tapio, 27 Jul. 1867. 
21 Turpeinen, 1991, 55.
22 Savolainen, 1989, 63.
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suggested that disagreements in relation to handling the food crises were the real 
reason behind his departure.23 
The breakthrough of economic and political liberalism in Finland during the 
1850s and 1860s also set the context for political decision-making at the time. 
Trade freedom, convening of the Diet and freedom of press were advocated. The 
two main political movements of the time – the Fennomans and the Liberals – 
were on opposite sides in the debates around language politics and relations with 
Russia and Sweden, but in matters concerning political and economic freedom they 
both advocated a reform. New newspapers were established and they became an 
arena for economic policy discussions. These events in Finland were connected 
to general European developments, marked by the emergence of economic and 
political liberalism.24 Democratization of the society has usually been seen as 
a factor that prevents famines, yet the Finnish crisis arose at a time when such 
changes were just beginning.25
Snellman’s Economic and Aid Policy
Snellman’s standing as the head of financial affairs of the Senate gave him an 
opportunity to realise aid politics that he had been proposing in his writings since 
the 1840s.26 His primary objective as the head of financial affairs was to balance the 
economy of Finland.27 Again to quote Häkkinen and Forsberg: “Snellman believed 
that economic independence was [essential for] political state independence, and 
accordingly his policies during the famine can be seen as prioritizing the longer-
term development of the nation before individuals or regions”.28 For years Snellman 
had been criticizing the old model of aid politics, where the crown would take a loan 
and then lend money to merchants for grain imports, which they would then sell 
to the common people with credit. For example in 1862 a loan that was originally 
meant for a monetary reform in Finland was used for this purpose. There was 
even need for an additional loan from Bank of Finland and from bankers in St. 
Petersburg to finance grain imports in 1862.29 
Snellman claimed that the involvement of the state in the grain trade had caused 
the traders to import large amounts of grain that was then passed out to the people 
with no worries of payback. Snellman had decided to abandon this structure, the 
23 Heikkinen & Tiihonen, 2009, 371; Kuusterä & Tarkka, 2011, 238; Tiihonen, 2012, 53–4.
24 Heikkinen & Kuusterä, 2007, 30; Heikkinen & Tiihonen, 2009, 349. 
25 See, e.g.: Sen 1999; Ó Gráda, 1999.
26 Savolainen, 1989, 21. 
27 Kuusterä, 1989, 97.
28 Häkkinen & Forsberg, 2015, 107. See also Heikkinen, Heinonen, Kuusterä & Pekkarinen, 2000, 81. 
29 Heikkinen & Tiihonen, 2009, 439–41.
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state could take no more loans and the damaging system had to end.30 Until the 
end of the summer 1867 the Senate refrained from taking foreign debt and from 
lending money to merchants for grain imports.31 When efforts for a state loan to 
finance grain imports began in September, a failure of crops had already been 
experienced not only in Finland but also  large areas of the Russian Empire as well 
as Sweden. The import of grain was made difficult by high prices as well as lack 
of supply.32 
Central to Snellman’s policy was also the idea of refraining from gratuitous aid. 
Self-sufficiency and frugality were encouraged, as outlined by Snellman in two 
unpublished writings in 1866. In these writings, Snellman criticized the way in which 
people in large swathes of the country still believed that the crown would help them 
when in need. This mindset, Snellman believed, was destructive and had made 
the common people unable to help themselves through hard work and saving. 
Snellman even criticized meetings that were held in the municipalities to find out 
how much help was needed. The common people needed to understand that the 
crown had no more money and that they therefore needed to work harder, save 
more and take better care of their personal economy – and keep in mind that God 
would help by blessing honest endeavours to help oneself and others. Aid that was 
given too early made the people slow to help themselves. Snellman also accused 
the common people of having lavish spending habits, specifically that they bought 
large amounts of foreign fabrics, coffee, cigarettes and sugar and also drank most 
of the spirits.33 Referring to the inability of the people to save, Snellman wrote: “It 
is harsh to say this, but those many bad years are largely the people’s own fault”.34 
Snellman was certainly not alone in holding these opinions. The conception 
that the personal features of the poor people were to blame for their poverty 
was rather prominent in Finnish public discussion in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Helping a person would just sustain the bad features that had created poverty.35 
The idea that generous help would destroy the morality of the people and postpone 
the destruction into the future was also common in Great Britain during the Irish 
Famine of the 1840s.36 Assistant Secretary to the Treasury of the United Kingdom 
Charles Edward Trevelyan did not see problems with the economic policy he led, 
but pointed to Irish customs as part of the explanation for the famine.37 
Since gratuitous aid was not an option, relief needed to be obtained through 
work. According to Snellman the experience of all countries had shown that 
30 Savolainen, 2005a, 22.
31 Häkkinen, 1992, 153; Häkkinen, 1999, 114–5.
32 Pihkala, 1970, 147–8; Turpeinen, 1986, 237; Hirvonen, 2013, 62–3.
33 SA XI.2, 1194–8, 1201–5.
34 SA XI.2, 1197. Author’s own translation.
35 Pulma, 1994, 58.
36 Ó Gráda 1999, 6.
37 Sen 1999, 174–5. 
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aid without compensation was a wasted effort.38 The employment policy would 
support the economy of Finland, build the people’s morality and prevent begging.39 
This emphasis on hard work was visible in Snellman’s enthusiasm for supporting 
small-scale home industries, such as weaving simple fabrics. In his letter to the 
governors in July 1867 Snellman noted that since agriculture did not offer work for 
the people for the entire year, forms of home industries would provide employment 
and income for the people during the winter. Snellman was hoping that the Finnish 
merchants would take responsibility over the export of these products, in addition 
to the material and production costs, so that the producers would get monetary 
reward towards the finished products.40 If sincere, Snellman’s expectations were 
certainly unrealistic, and too much responsibility was given to merchants who 
were generally, understandably, unwilling to take big financial risks in the prevailing 
situation. Although it became clear during the summer and autumn of 1867 that 
there would be no market for these products, this activity was continued until the 
end of 1867.41 
Another form of aid that gained a lot of publicity was spreading information on 
emergency or surrogate foods. Emergency food – such as bark bread– was not 
unknown to the Finnish people even before the crisis of the 1860s. In northern 
Finland in particular, people had to resort to bark bread quite regularly.42 In July 
1867, Snellman advised the governors to spread information on emergency food 
such as mushroom and moss.43 The governors seem to have reacted to this form 
of aid rather positively and provided Snellman with information on developments 
with the emergency food education in their provinces during summer 1867.44 Even 
the press seems to have taken a positive attitude towards this form of aid. The 
press published information on emergency food actively and presented it as an 
alternative for grain: “Nobody will need to die of hunger under the threat of failure 
of crops this year – as far as we know – as long as we make a quarrel against 
our entrenched idleness and inefficiency and begin to collect all the food that the 
nature abundantly offers.”45 
Snellman’s writings during the famine years have been seen as an attempt to 
prevent passivity in the Finnish population. Rumours of a loan for grain imports 
could have made the people passive, so the rules had to be set straight. In this 
38 SA VIII, 75.
39 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 44; SA VIII, 67–76; SA XI.2,1201.
40 SA XI.2, 1260–2; SA XI.1, 310–2.
41 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 44.
42 Häkkinen, 1991b, 99; Ikonen, 1991, 82.
43 National Archives of Finland [KA], Ministry of Finance Archive [VVA], DA117: Communication to 
the Governors of Vaasa, Oulu, Hämeenlinna, Mikkeli, and the acting governor of Kuopio, relating to 
the use of mushrooms and other substitute foodstuffs. 31 Jul. 1867. 
44 SA XI.2, 1263–7, 1287–9; 1295–7.
45 Oulun Wiikko-Sanomia, 17 Aug. 1867. Author’s own translation.
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sense the publicity has been seen as advancing common goals in fighting famine.46 
This kind of interpretation seems to be based on the ruler’s conception that the 
people and their laziness were at the core of the problem. Snellman’s writings 
could also be seen as use of power and an attempt to calm the people in the face 
of a threatening crisis. Especially when considering that efforts for a foreign loan 
only began in September 1867, and not much was done during the summer.
It is interesting to note that although similarities can be found in Snellman’s 
writings and the ideas behind the British politics during the Irish famine, the 
historiography of these two famines is very different. Finnish historians have until 
very recently been rather understanding towards the decision makers of the time 
whereas British officials have been condemned more harshly in the historiography 
of the Irish famine. The status of Finland as a part of Russia creates an interesting 
question in this aspect. In the earlier half on the 19th century Finns had received aid 
from the Tsar, at least when it was in the empire’s strategic interests.47 In the 1860s 
Finland already had its own economic policy and Finnish officials were responsible 
for the aid policy. Bureaucratic inertia between the different echelons of power as 
well as the willingness to please superiors and foster the economic power and 
independence of Finland could explain some of the actions. The Russian officials 
were generally pleased if Finland did not cause economic strain.48 
Because the Finnish decision makers were responsible for the aid politics it 
is quite understandable that the crisis has a very different meaning in the Finnish 
historical narrative than the Irish history writing of the 1840s.49 It is interesting 
to ponder in what measure the apolitical historiography of the Finnish famine is 
actually a consequense of delibarate national identity construction of the Fennoman 
politicians and historians of the late nineteenth century. Henrik Forsberg has rather 
aptly pointed how the process to naturalize the famine began in Finnish public 
discussion soon after the crisis. Both the Finnish and Swedish speaking elites of 
Finland shared the idea that the famine had been an unfortunate outcome of poor 
weather. The naturalization and depolitication of the 1860s Finnish Famine (i.e. 
emphasising the frost as a main reason) suited the Finnish elite very well. Frost 
was politcally neutral and did not challenge the political elite or the power relations 
in the society. It was also equally feared by all members of rural communities 
and thus bridged rural class differences. Concentrating on the frost also suited 
nationalist ideas by creating a link between contemporary events and the nation’s 
mythical forefathers’ struggles in the hard climate. In the national historiographies 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the question of culpability was 
often left unaddressed. If anyone was to be blamed, it was those who had become 
too accustomed to a comfortable lifestyle and who had not learned to adjust their 
46 Turpeinen, 1986, 161; Savolainen, 1989, 34. 
47 Turpeinen, 1991, 30, 57.
48 Kuusterä,1992, 71.
49 Newby & Myllyntaus, 2015, 148–9.
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spending accordingly. As unfortunate as the famine was, it was also a reminder 
that one should not rely on handouts from the Tsar.50 
Information on Crop Forecasts
In the 1860s Finnish people got most of their nutrition from grain. The two most 
important grains in Finland were barley and rye.51 According to estimates made in 
the 1860s the annual requirement of grain per person was about two barrels.52 The 
population of Finland in the 1860s was about 1.8 million, so according to this rather 
rough estimation about 3.6 million barrels of grain would have been sufficient to 
feed the population of Finland.
Figures 1. and 2. show the rye and barley crops in barrels in Finland’s eight 
provinces in a three year period from 1865 to 1867.  The combined yearly crop of 
rye and barley in Finland was roughly 2.5 million barrels in 1865, 3 million barrels in 
1866 and only 1.7 million barrels in 1867.53 It is noticeable that the rye crop of 1867 
was considerably smaller than the previous year in most provinces. According to 
the rough estimate presented above, the crop of 1867 would have been enough to 
feed only half of Finland’s population. The situation was worsened by the fact that 
the crops of previous years were insufficient as well.54
50 Forsberg, 2017.
51 Ikonen, 1991, 81
52 SVT II:1, 4; SVT II:2, 8. N.B. 1 barrel = 1,6489 hectolitres (SVT II:1, 24).
53 SVT II:1, Litt. B. & SVT II:2, Litt B.
54 Voutilainen, 2015, 124–44.
Figure 1. Rye crop in Finland 1865–1867, 1 000 of barrels
SVT II:1, Litt. B.; SVT II:2, Litt B.
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Since grain had such an important place in the nutrition of Finns, the information 
on crop expectations during the summer months was crucial. Because of Finland’s 
poor infrastructure, imports for the winter needed to be agreed early so that they 
could be carried out before the ports iced over at the end of the year. Earlier research 
has noted that the information on crop forecasts during the summer and autumn of 
1867 was insufficient.55 It has been said that the Senate did not waver in its efforts 
to begin grain imports, once it was clear that night frosts in early September had 
ruined the crop in large parts of the country.56 This claim can be questioned by the 
fact that early September is a perfectly normal time for night frosts to occur in large 
parts of Finland. The cold spring and summer of 1867 meant that sowing was done 
later than usual which meant later harvest – and higher risk of night frost during the 
period of growth.57 
During the 1860s the governors were still a very important source of information 
for the Senate. Governors provided Snellman with information on crop expectations 
through their private letters as well as official reports and telegrams. In the 1860s 
governors sent three official reports on crop expectations to the Senate’s finance 
department during the growth season.58 The second report, sent in August, was 
particularly important, since it gave a somewhat reliable forecast of the yearly crop 
expectations, yet left some time for organizing grain imports before the winter, 
if needed. I have collected the data on barley and rye crop expectations from 
the second reports of the governors from all of Finland’s eight provinces from a 
55 Turpeinen, 1986, 150, 153; Turpeinen 1991, 51; Pitkänen, 1991, 63–4; Savolainen, 2006, 782–4.
56 Pitkänen, 1991, 63–4. 
57 Hirvonen, 2013, 70; Häkkinen & Forsberg, 2015, 106–7; Newby & Myllyntaus, 2015, 151.
58 Johanson, 1924, 58.
Figure 2. Barley crop in Finland 1865–1867, 1 000 of barrels
SVT II:1, Litt. B.; SVT II:2, Litt B.
Heidi Reese
93
three-year period 1865–1867. From this data I have calculated the median for 
crop expectations for each province (Figures 3. and 4.). The information from the 
province of Viipuri is unfortunately missing from 1865 and 1866.59
In August 1867 the governors’ reports estimated either an average or below 
average rye crop. Although some individual districts were expecting a failure of 
crops, the median of each province is either below average or average. Compared 
to the previous year, 1866, the expectations were slightly lower in all other provinces 
except Turku-Pori. The estimates were reasonably accurate, although the actual 
crop of 1867 was below 1866 in all of the provinces. In comparison with 1865, most 
provinces were expecting a similar or a smaller crop. Two provinces, Kuopio and 
Mikkeli, were expecting a slightly better rye crop in 1867 than in 1865. In Mikkeli 
the crop of 1867, although quite poor, was actually slightly better than in 1865, but 
in Kuopio the rye crop of 1867 was below 1865. As a summary of the rye crop 
expectations in 1867 it can be said that although the expectations were slightly too 
positive in some provinces, they did not give hope for a good crop.60 
59 For more detailed information see Hirvonen, 2013, attachment 4.
60 See figures 1 & 3. 
Figure 3. Rye crop expectations, second reports of the governors, 1865– 1867 median, 
(1=failure of crops, 2=under average, 3=average crop, 4=above average, 5=good crop) 
Hirvonen 2013, attachment 4.
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In a quick glance the governors’ official reports on barley crop expectations 
would seem to give reason to expect an average crop corresponding to previous 
years.61 When looking into the actual crop harvested, it is clear that the crop of 1867 
was much below previous years. The barley crop was especially poor in the three 
northernmost provinces – Oulu, Vaasa and Kuopio – where it also had significant 
importance as a crop.62 When evaluating the information of the governors’ reports, 
it is important to note that several governors reminded Snellman in their reports 
of the threat that a possible frost caused to the barley crop. If frost would not 
ruin the crop, only then was an average yield expected.63 The threat of frost was 
also mentioned in the governors’ private letters to Snellman, as well as in the 
newspapers, and can very well be seen as general knowledge at the time.64 
Unfortunately the governors’ fears were realised as a night frost in early 
September 1867 ruined the barley crop in large parts of Finland. Night frosts at 
this time of year were rather typical in many parts of Finland, but because of the 
unusually cold spring of 1867 the crop did not have enough time to mature during 
the summer of 1867 making it more vulnerable to a night frost in September. It has 
also been noted that unlike in Ireland where the phytophthora infestans had been 
previously unknown – the main reason for the crop failure in Finland, the frost, was 
61 See figure 4.
62 See figures 2. and 4.
63 Suomalainen Wirallinen Lehti, 30 Jul, 2 Aug. 1867. KA, VVA: Valtiovaraintoimituskunnan kirjediaari 
KD51/183 (1867); Senaatin talousosaston kirjediaari KD45/158 (1867); Valtiovaraintoimituskunnan 
kirjediaari KD32/134 (1867).
64 SA XI.2, 1248; Meurman, 1892, 32–3; Helsingfors Dagblad, 24 Aug. 1867.
Figure 4. Barley crop expectations, second reports of the governors, 1865– 1867 median 
(1=failure of crops, 2=under average, 3=average crop, 4= above average, 5=good crop
Hirvonen 2013, attachment 4.
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a common phenomenon.65 Although Snellman may have acted rapidly once he 
heard about the damage caused by the frost, it is impossible to claim that the frost 
– and the crop failure that followed – should have been a surprise to anyone.
The importance of official reports is somewhat diminished by the fact that 
Snellman as well as others had questioned the reliability of these reports.66 The 
route of official reports from the local officers in the different districts of each 
province to the governors and finally to the senate could take weeks. Thus it is clear 
that the official reports did not always contain the most up-to-date information. In 
the 1860s the telegram network that had been developed since the 1850s offered 
possibilities for quicker exchange of information between the senate and provincial 
offices as well as grain merchants.67 In early August 1862, during a previous crop 
failure, Senator Axel Ludvig Born used the telegram system to inquire about the 
grain expectations from the governors. In mid August, after receiving information 
from the provinces, Born started organizing grain imports by asking the governors 
to contact local merchants. A few days later some merchants were informed that 
the Senate had decided to offer them a loan for nine months without interest.68 
Even J.V. Snellman commented on the government’s efficient use of this new 
technology in an article published in 1862: “One must acknowledge that the quick 
actions of the government have been possible because of the telegram.”69 In 1867 
similar telegrams between Snellman and the governors can be found only after 
the night frosts of early September. The possibilities for receiving more up-to-date 
information through the telegram were available also in 1867, but it seems that this 
technology was not used to its fullest. 
Snellman also claimed that the governors’ reports were unreliable, since the 
local officers had a tendency to underestimate the crop expectations.70 In his letter 
to Snellman, the governor of Turku-Pori, C.M. Creuz, tried to defend the estimations 
of local officers of his province to Snellman. It was not easy to forecast likely crop 
yields and the governor was assured that most of the local officers were doing 
their best to fulfil their reporting duties.71 From the governors’ letters it is obvious 
that Snellman did not spare criticism if he felt that the governors were too lenient 
with the aid policy. Governors had to explain to Snellman that they had not in any 
way encouraged requests for aid.72 In August 1867, Creutz described his worries 
to Snellman: 
65 Häkkinen & Forsberg, 2015, 106–7; Newby & Myllyntaus, 2015, 151.
66 Kuujo, 1948, 19–20; SA XI.1, 9; Uusi Suometar, 17 Aug. 1877.
67 Peltonen, 1983), 19.
68 KA, VVA: Hl 1 (List of the measures undertaken by the Royal Senate from the start of July 1862).
69 SA XI.1, 7. Author’s own translation.
70 SA XI.2, 1203, 1268.
71 SA XI.2, 1268–9.
72 SA XI.2, 952–3, 1267–8, 1304–5.
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-- I have never been one of them, who accepts the patronage under which the government 
has kept the Finnish people for decades and which has created the reluctance and 
inability in the people to take care of their own affairs. Instead I have criticized it, and 
nobody could be happier than me that the system has been changed. Still, it should 
be noted that all sudden changes from a system to its opposite are dangerous and this 
change is taking place at a time when there has been many difficult years in a row, and 
I can only hope, that the change would be gradual and that the support from the state 
would not stop completely at once.73
There were also some personal differences between the governors in their 
communications with Snellman, which gives reason to question their ability to 
present the best interest of the people of the provinces. In the autumn of 1867 the 
governors of the provinces of Kuopio and of Turku and Pori seemed genuinely 
worried in their letters to Snellman whereas Theodor Sebastian Thilén, the governor 
of the province of Mikkeli demonstrated an exceptional lack of empathy towards the 
people in his letter to Snellman: “I hope that the harsh starvation will teach many 
things. And if it will not, it does not matter if a few dozen slackers die of hunger.”74 
In addition to the governors, the local press provided information on the crop 
expectations and threatening food crisis. In the 1860s the press was still rather 
constricted. Although the distribution of newspapers was growing, the group 
of people that read newspapers was still socially very restricted.75 During the 
autonomy the Finnish press was also restricted by Russian censorship laws.76 The 
Diet of 1865 implemented the act on freedom of the press in Finland, but since 
the Russian officials believed that the freedom of the press in Finland could not 
differ from the rest of the Empire, censorship was introduced again in May 1867.77 
Despite these restrictions the newspapers had already for several years reported 
on the unfortunate situation of Finland. In the summer of 1867 several newspapers 
referred directly to the threat of famine.78 Although the press did report on the poor 
food supply in the country, it did not directly hold the government responsible or 
express requests for aid from the government.79 
Snellman was very critical towards the reports of the press on the famine. He 
constantly criticized the press for its complaints and inadequate information.80 In 
his published writings from 1866 and 1867 Snellman even tried to calm the people 
rather than allowing the press to stoke fears of famine. Snellman praised the local 
73 SA XI.2, 1268. Author’s own translation.
74 SA XI.2, 1301. Author’s own translation.
75 Häkkinen, 1991b, 105.
76 Tommila, 1982, 7; Nieminen, 2006, 100.
77 Heikkinen & Tiihonen, 2009, 356.
78 Helsingfors Dagblad, 15 Jun., 17 Aug., 27 Aug. 1867; Ilmarinen, 2 Aug. 1867; Oulun Wiikko-
Sanomia, 10 Aug. 1867.
79 Hirvonen, 2013, 105–10.
80 SA XI.1, 316–8, 892–3; SA XI.2, 932.
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papers of northern Finland for the fact that they had not exaggerated the situation 
and for this reason the correspondents of Oulu and Kuopio provinces had offered 
their stories for the newspapers of Southern Finland.81
Although Snellman was worried that the local officers and press had a tendency 
to underestimate the crop expectations and exaggerate the misery following crop 
failure, research of other famines has shown examples of the opposite. Amartya 
Sen has described the Great Leap Famine of the mid-twentieth century in China 
as a situation where the lack of free press led the government to become a victim 
of its own propaganda. The local civil servants gave overly positive reports of 
the local situation in hopes of gaining popularity in Beijing.82 There is not enough 
proof to make a corresponding claim of the Finnish case, but when examining the 
communication between Snellman and the governors as well as Snellman’s attitude 
towards the reports of the press, it does not seem impossible that such problems 
could have occurred at some level in Finland. When looking into the technical 
developments in communications in the 1860s the claim that there was not enough 
information does not seem tenable. Based on Snellman’s writings it seems rather 
clear that Snellman was not interested in receiving more information on the needs 
of the provinces. The administration did not use all channels of information to their 
fullest extent. 
Conclusions 
According to Stephen Devereux the failure to prevent famines is explained by 
insufficient information, bureaucratic inertia, lack of capacity to act efficiently as 
well as lack of political will.83 In the case of Finland in the autumn of 1867 all of 
these explanatory factors can be found. The food crisis is explained by a lack of 
resources, a lack of political will to help the hungry as well as inadequate use of 
information. 
Previous research has emphasized the importance of poor financial resources 
as a significant factor in explaining the hunger crisis of 1867–1868. It is indisputable 
that financial resources to prevent the food crisis were poor. However, the famine 
research of the new millennium has proved that economic distress does not always 
lead to a famine. Concentrating merely on economic factors offers a simplified 
explanation and creates a depolarised picture of the famine.
Refraining from gratuitous aid was the guideline of J.V. Snellman’s relief policies 
during the summer of 1867. The people were encouraged to help themselves and 
be frugal. In the summer of 1867 the relief actions concentrated on collection of 
emergency food and the development of handicraft activities. Since the problems 
81 SA XI.1, 316–8; SA, XI.2, 1201–5.
82 Sen, 1999, 180–1. 
83 Devereux, 2000, 27.
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behind these forms of aid were well visible already in the summer, the activities can 
be seen as a means to calm the people in a threatening situation, more than true 
attempts to help. In the internal correspondence of Snellman and the governors the 
fear of  an impending catastrophe is much more visible than in Snellman’s published 
writings.
However, Snellman was not alone with his ideas of the destructive consequences 
of generous and gratuitous aid. The idea, that the poor were themselves 
responsible for their inferior standing was common in the mid-nineteenth-century 
public discussion in Finland. In the 1860s the society also accepted inequality and 
the state was not actively held responsible.84 Although Snellman was accountable 
for the chosen politics, his strict politics did receive support. Social historian 
Christopher Lloyd has emphasized that the actions of a person are caused not 
only individually, but also socially. Attempts to explain actions should also include 
analysis of the society and its structures.85 The failure to help the hungry was 
based not solely on the individual decisions that were made, but also on wider 
structural factors. The unequal society and undemocratic governance of the 1860s 
allowed a situation where the rulers could execute politics that did not serve the 
best interest of the masses.
A key factor in the context of this crisis was the lack of a political counter force 
to the government. The press reported diligently on the threatening food crisis, but 
did not actively hold the government responsible. Censorship laws that came in to 
effect in the end of May 1867 restricted the freedom of the press. It is still rather 
probable that the press was mainly restricted by social and economic factors. The 
proportion of the population of Finland reading the newspapers was very small in 
the 1860’s. The press did not represent the poor.
The poor did not have a means for resistance in the 1860s, but it does not 
mean that the political features of this crisis could not be evaluated. The apolitical 
historical picture of the crisis represents the view that the decision makers of the 
time had. The actions of the central decision makers were based on strong political 
views. Even political consequences can be seen, since Snellman did have to resign 
from his position in the spring of 1868. It is notable that only rather recently have 
Snellman’s actions related to the famine been brought up as an explanatory factor 
behind the resignation in mainstream historiography. The historiography of the 
1860s has until very recently had very little room for questioning the solidarity of 
the elite towards their less fortunate countrymen and women. It seems that the lack 
of counterforce to the government’s politics was not only visible in the politics and 
press of the time, but also in the Finnish public discussion decades after the event. 
The information that the decision makers had at hand was also rather 
inadequate. The reports sent by the governors did not give hope for a good crop, 
but the somewhat positive reports in August may have misled the Senate. It is also 
84 Soikkanen, 1991, 28.
85 Lloyd, 1986, 162–3.
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possible that the willingnes to please the superiors could have led the governors 
to some modesty in their requests. It is clear that Snellman did not appreciate 
repetitive requests of aid from the provinces. Snellman would also have had 
possibilities to supplement the information from the reports of the newspapers. 
Also the telegram offered possibilities for a more timely exchange of information, 
but this means was not used efficiently. It seems that it was just as much a case 
of inadequate information as well as inadequate use of the information that was 
available. Most famines take a long time to develop86 and this also seems to have 
been the case in Finland in the 1860s. The Finnish case represents a phenomenon 
which persists even today. Although the information of an impending food crisis is 
in the air for months or even years, this does not guarantee a reaction.87 
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Televising the Famine: 
An Audiovisual Representation of the 
Famine in Northern Sweden, 1867–18681
David Ludvigsson
Department of History, Linköping University
In the 1970s, historical documentarists Olle Häger and Hans Villius at the Swedish 
Broadcasting Corporation made both a documentary and a dramatic television 
production about the famine years of the 1860s. The productions indicate that 
a class perspective dominated popular culture at the time. Yet, not least the 
documentary (“Ett satans år,” [One Year of Satan] 1977) is evidence of how media 
producers sought to communicate seriously about famine in the past, at the same 
time relating to contemporary issues.
Introduction
How have memories of famine been used in popular culture? In some cases, 
famine memories seem simply too painful to be even mentioned. Jun Jing, trying 
to track memories of the great famine of 1959 to 1961 in a Chinese village found 
that still decades later people found it very difficult to talk about. He suggests many 
survivors bore a sense of guilt,2 which may help explain why there is sometimes a 
lack of memorial culture surrounding historical famines. By contrast, other famines 
have become important themes in popular culture as well as elements in political 
agitation. In the cases of Ireland or Ukraine, memories of famine have laid the 
foundation for resistance activities against a perceived oppressor.
The Irish famine, in particular, has led to many stories, poetry, prose, art works, 
films, and monuments. But it is certainly not pre-given exactly what famine memories 
will survive. The streams of Irish migrants fleeing the famine to the USA created 
strong narratives, whereas other voices such as those fleeing to Canada have been 
1 The chapter draws on Ludvigsson, 2003.
2 Jing, 2001. See also Pernin, 2014.
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heard less often.3 As has been argued by Jason King, the Irish famine orphans 
adopted by French-Canadian families became inscribed in Irish and Canadian 
consciousness, yet to a large extent this was thanks to John Francis Maguire’s 
popular book The Irish in America (1868).4 The well-known song “Skibbereen” tells 
of the sorrowful state of Ireland in the 1840s, but ends on a vengeful note,5 thus 
emphasizing a political aspect of the famine. Both “Skibbereen” and Maguire’s book 
are examples of how cultural products influence memories of famine. The meaning 
and memory of the Irish famine remain contested.6 In Ireland the famine continues 
to evoke memories of suffering, whereas in North America monuments erected 
to commemorate the same famine contain a sense of optimism, of building a new 
life.7 Even in the case of Ireland, as Emily Mark-FitzGerald has argued, there was 
for a long time a relative absence of commemorative activities. Mark-FitzGerald 
suggests that this lack of commemoration was due to the famine’s “lack of central 
characters, linear narrative, heroic episodes or key dates”.8 Yet, she suggests radio 
and television documentaries and dramas helped keep famine history alive in 
popular consciousness.
Mark-FitzGerald’s conclusion is an interesting and important one, and for two 
reasons. First, she points out the power of modern mass media to influence historical 
memory. A number of scholars have argued that many people learn history from 
television and film, Gary Edgerton even going so far as to claim that “television 
is the principal means by which most people learn about history today”.9 While 
the media landscape is constantly changing, and radio and television may already 
have passed their high peak years, mass media undoubtedly influence historical 
memory including memories of famine. Second, Mark-FitzGerald suggests that 
the Irish famine commemoration was muted until relatively recently because of 
its lack of certain characteristics. It is well known that uses of history in popular 
culture are influenced by cultural logics such as popular television conventions. 
These conventions can be, for example, that it should be possible for subjects to 
be represented visually, that narratives offer objects for identification, and that they 
follow the dramatic unities of time, space and action. There is a continuous need 
to investigate how historic famines are shaped or transformed when turned into 
cultural media formats such as television.
3 McGowan, 2014.
4 King, 2012, 128–33.
5 Falc’her-Poyroux, 2014.
6 Newby & Myllyntaus, 2015, 157–8. 
7 Mark-FitzGerald, 2013; Goek, 2013.
8 Mark-FitzGerald, 2012, 146.
9 Edgerton, 2001, 1.
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Televising the Famine of 1867–1868
In this chapter, I shall discuss an audiovisual representation of a historical famine, 
namely Ett satans år [One Year of Satan], a documentary made by historian-
filmmakers Olle Häger and Hans Villius for SVT, i.e. the Swedish Broadcasting 
Corporation, in 1977.10 The documentary deals with the famine of 1867-68, which 
affected large areas of northern Europe including Sweden. I will use this film as a 
case study to explore popular representations of famine.
10 Ett satans år was first broadcast on December 28, 1977. It has since been re-broadcast by 
SVT several times, and was made available for purchase on DVD in 2007 (the DVD title is 1000 år. 
En svensk historia. Ett satans år is on the DVD as an additional film). At the time of publication, Ett 
satans år, and several other 1970s documentaries by Häger and Villius, are available online. See 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GN2nDkRINsk [accessed 20. Jan 2017]. Research copies are 
also available for consultation at the Kungliga Biblioteket / National Library of Sweden.
Map 1. The traditional regions 
and districts of Sweden. Taken 
from Nelson, 1988, p. 176 
(appendix 1). Reproduced with 
kind permission of Professor 
Marie C. Nelson.
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Before discussing the film, a few things must be said about the famine that 
struck Sweden and Finland in the late 1860s, and which has been considered the 
last major famine in northern Europe to arise from natural or climatic triggers. Also, 
a word is needed on the society in which it happened. As the film deals only with 
northern Sweden and not Finland, the context presented here is about Sweden. 
Briefly, Sweden at this time was a poor country but also a society in transition. 
The population was growing rapidly. It was still mostly a pre-industrial agricultural 
country, yet new industries were expanding. In the northern parts of the country 
lumbering and saw-mills attracted workers and even caused a worker migration 
from the south to the north, thus offering an alternative to emigration. From 1851 to 
1930 an estimated 1.2 million Swedes emigrated, mostly to North America, which 
means a fifth of the population (and most of them young people) left the country. 
Emigration peaked during the famine years in the late 1860s. In spiritual terms, 
the church still held people’s souls in a tight grip. Politically, a number of important 
reforms were gradually changing the country, a major parliament reform taking 
place in 1865/66, but the vote was still restricted on the basis of gender, wealth and 
income.11
Historically, famine was a recurring phenomenon in northern Europe during the 
early modern period. The famine of 1695-97 struck hard in Scandinavia, Finland, 
and the Baltic region, causing particularly high mortality in northern Sweden and 
Finland.12 With regard to the 1860s in Sweden, harvests were bad during several 
years but 1867 was the most difficult, and it remains the coldest year ever recorded 
in Sweden. Different names have applied to it in different regions, for example 
the Lichen Year referring to lichen being used as food in this year of starvation. 
Northern Sweden certainly went through a major crisis, yet modern research has 
suggested that the relief efforts were largely successful. In the words of Marie C. 
Nelson, who investigated the famine in the district of Norrbotten, “deaths due to 
starvation related diseases were not numerous, and deaths due directly to starvation 
a myth”.13 Peasants survived yet lived in misery and destitution, many baking bread 
of bark, lichen, and straw. While conditions were bad in both countries, the famine 
left a much higher death toll in Finland than in Sweden.14
The memory of the famine years lived on, especially in the northern parts of 
the country. Further, famine or scarcity of food has been a recurring theme in 
novels about nineteenth-century Swedish peasants, such as Vilhelm Moberg’s 
11 On Sweden during the late nineteenth century, and specifically on Swedish migration to North 
America, see Runblom & Norman, 1976. On northward migration, see Vikström, 2003.
12 Lappalainen, 2012; Jutikkala, 1955, 48-63. In Finland, for example, it is estimated that over a 
quarter of the population perished. Muroma, 1991, 180.   
13 Nelson, 1988, 174. Donald Harman Akenson has challenged this assertion, however, in his 
comparative study of Irish and Swedish emigration to North America. He writes: “to take [Nelson’s] 
study area of Norrbotten, it is hard to see how a crude death rate from 17.9 in 1866 to 27.0 per 
thousand in 1868 did not involve some emaciated or fever-twisted bodies.” Akenson, 2011, 142. 
14 See, e.g. Pitkänen, 1992.
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epic Utvandrarna [The Emigrants] (1949)15, Linnéa Fjällstedt’s Hungerpesten 
[Hunger Plague] (1975), and Bernhard Nordh’s Nybyggare vid Bäversjön [Settlers 
on Beaver Lake] (1946), which plays out in 1867 and 1868.16 In Sara Lidman’s Din 
tjänare hör (1977), peasants in the 1870s cannot stand to talk about the famine 
of the previous decade.17 One of the first Swedish realist children’s books, Laura 
Fitinghoff’s Barnen från Frostmofjället [Children of the Moor] (1907), also set in 
1867, tells the story of seven children whose parents have starved to death and 
who now wander southwards in search of food and human compassion. The book 
was popular for decades and has been turned into a feature film (1945) and more 
recently into a theatre play (2011).18 Starving peasants make up the crucial starting 
15 Utvandrarna (“The Emigrants”), a tale of agrarian hardship in, and emigration from, Småland, 
was made into a successful film (1971), directed by Jan Troell and featuring Max von Sydow and Liv 
Ullman in starring roles. A sequel, Nybyggarna (“The New Land”), also based on Moberg’s writing, 
was released in 1972. 
16 On the hard life in the north of Sweden where food was often scarce, see also the novels by 
Torgny Lindgren, and the documentary works by Lilian Ryd.
17 Lidman, 1977, 59–60.
18 The film was made available for purchase on DVD in 2007 and 2011. When the book was 
published again in 2011, related teaching materials were made freely available on-line by the 
Swedish Institute for Children’s Books. See Runsten, 2011.
Figure 1. “The Distribution of Emergency Meal in Norrland”, a sardonic portrayal of the 1867 relief 
effort in Sweden, taken from Fäderneslandet 14 December 1867, and reproduced in Ett satans 
år. By implication is that, by the time aid has trickled down from the state officials and wealthy 
farmers, only a small amount is left for the genuinely needy. Via Wikipedia commons (accessed 
1 March 2017). [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/46/Emergency_help_
image_F%C3%A4derneslandet_1867.jpg]  
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point also in Sven Nykvist’s Oscar-nominated feature film The Oxen (1991).19 Thus, 
fictionalized stories of famine have persisted in Swedish culture. Yet while there 
are starving people in the works mentioned, there are few deaths. Memories of the 
famine did not result in any extensive memorializing rituals in Sweden. While not 
unknown, the famine years never reached the status of a key event in narratives 
about Sweden,20 and thus have begun to fade in the memories of people even in 
the north.
The historian-filmmakers who took on the issue of the famine in Sweden, 
Olle Häger (1935-2014) and Hans Villius (1923-2012), were academically trained 
historians who both left university to work for the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation, 
first making radio programmes and then, from the mid-1960s, historical television. 
Forming a team in 1967, they would work together for over thirty years, making 
more than two hundred historical documentaries, a few drama-documentaries, 
and writing several books in the process. Being trained historians, all through their 
careers they narrated stories about the past with great expertise. In theoretical 
terms, while making historical documentaries will always involve a process of 
negotiating between competing considerations, cognitive considerations played an 
important part in their filmmaking process; by the term cognitive considerations 
I mean the filmmaker’s efforts to discover and communicate knowledge.21 As a 
consequence of their decades-long production of historical programming, often 
made in the expository mode,22 the names of Häger & Villius became perceived 
by the Swedish television audience as a guarantee of high quality programming, 
and the characteristic narrator voice of Villius became known as the “voice of 
history” in Sweden. Villius himself once told the anecdote of overhearing someone 
say “that must be Hans Villius, because when just ordering a herring sandwich 
it sounded like the outbreak of the Second World War”.23 It should be added that 
no commercial television channels were present in the Swedish media landscape 
until in the late 1980s. Thus, in the period covered by this chapter, public service 
television had a very strong position in the Swedish media landscape, and its 
historical programming reached very broad segments of the population.
Widely appreciated, the history production by Häger and Villius comes out of 
a specific production context. The public service channel where they worked in 
the 1970s, TV2, was known for politically radical programming. Both conservative 
and social democratic politicians criticized several programmes for having left-wing 
19 The famine year was reintroduced in Sweden in early 2016, when Finnish writer Aki Ollikainen’s 
novel Nälkävuosi (2012) was translated into Swedish as Nödåret [The Year of Hunger]. It is entitled 
White Hunger in English-speaking markets. 
20 Cf. Newby, 2014.
21 In Ludvigsson, 2003, I discuss the work of Häger and Villius in terms of aesthetic considerations, 
moral considerations, and cognitive considerations.
22 On the various modes of documentary film, see Nichols, 2001.
23 Ludvigsson, 2003, 122.
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tendencies, an indication of the radical atmosphere at TV2.24 The productions by 
Häger and Villius reflect some of that radicalism. Typically, they tended to focus 
on experiences of the working population, thus seeing history from below. This 
perspective comes through when the producers designed their project about the 
famine year of 1867. Interestingly, they connected the project to the on-going 
debate on developmental assistance policy. In the description for the project, 
communicating with bosses at TV2, they wrote that 1867 was:
The last year that Sweden was a developing country.
 In this year we saw […] a possibility to get at and shed light upon the current 
problems of aid to developing countries. This is about our own background. And here 
[in Sweden’s past] we found the same arguments that one hears today, arguments 
about our lazy, ignorant, and wasteful ancestors.25
Clearly, the producers were critical of those moralizing against the poor. Häger 
and Villius started planning for the famine project years before shooting the 
film. In 1974 they contacted university historians for advice. Not much research 
had previously been done on the famine.26 This caused them to search through 
primary source materials such as court records and newspapers themselves. 
They researched the programmes themselves in the spring of 1976, also seeking 
assistance from one of the staff members at Skellefteå Museum. After the 
research phase they wrote scripts, filmed during the winter and then did editing 
work during 1977. The project resulted in the documentary film Ett satans år but 
also in a docudrama, Isgraven [The Ice Grave], and a book on the famine. Häger 
and Villius made the documentary, whereas Häger made the docudrama together 
with filmmaker Carl Torell.
The creative process of the documentary can be partly reconstructed.  In an 
early draft there are twelve paragraphs summarizing what happened during the 
famine and which form a rough outline. Among the content-focused paragraphs 
are: poor Sweden; crop failure in successive years; summer’s hope; those forced 
to leave the village; speculators; the first night of frost; fund-raising begins; starving 
people etc. The draft shows the starting point of the filmmakers was not a particular 
story, nor a heroic or tragic individual, but a fairly structural, general account 
about a society struck by famine. The filmmakers wanted to transmit knowledge 
of importance, or in principal terms, they were strongly influenced by cognitive 
considerations. Ett satans år follows the early outline as set out above, although not 
24 On the radicalism of Swedish public service television, see Thurén, 1997.
25 Sveriges Radio Dokumentarkivet (Stockholm), T21, F1, 31, Ett satans år. Manus, CD, 
Produktionsbeskrivning.
26 In their book, Häger, Villius and Torell list works they had benefitted from during their research, 
but most of these works deal with the famine mostly in passing. See Häger, Villius & Torell, 1978.
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all of its details. The finished 44-minute programme consists of thirty sequences, 
which I have divided here into ten segments (A–J):
A. Sequences 1–2. Opening words and the tale of Erik Gideonsson.
B. Sequences 3–5. The hard winter of 1867. Re-enactment introduces Nils
 Petter Wallgren.
C. Sequences 6–7. The wintry forest land. Photograph from 1867 proves the 
 late spring.
D. Sequences 8–11. The short spring. Re-enactment shows a peasant at work. 
 Re-enacted stills show Nils Petter Wallgren looking for work. Wealthy farms 
 portrayed.
E. Sequences 12–16. Saw-summer. The sawmill industry, its workers and 
 owners. Nils Petter Wallgren works at a lumberyard.
F. Sequences 17–18. Robber economy in the forests. Re-enactment stills, story 
 of timber theft.
G. Sequences 19–21. Railroads and emigration. Nils Petter Wallgren dreams of 
 America.
H. Sequences 22–24. Autumn of hunger. The tale of Josefina Eliasson. 
 Re-enactment of people trying to find food in the forest.
I. Sequences 25–29. Relief work. Aid is gathered and distributed. Letter from 
 bishop is quoted.
J. Sequence 30. Nils Petter Wallgren works, falls sick, is transported home, 
 and dies. Re-enactment. Credits roll.
The programme follows a chronological cycle of the famine year, the annual 
cycle thus providing a linear narrative. But when compared with the early outline it 
becomes clear that certain elements were added to the programme along the way. 
First, there are two authentic witness accounts, one of them (A) illustrating the hard 
winter and the other (H) the terrible first night of frost.27 These accounts are told 
in first person voices and add both presence and detail. Not least, and although 
they are very factual, by being read in an intense tone the eyewitness accounts 
communicate some of the horrors that people will have felt during the famine. 
The dramatic sound track is contrasted by still imagery of a landscape that seems 
deserted by humans. Second, the story of a young boy, Nils Petter Wallgren, has 
been added and is told bit by bit through the programme. This story was not part of 
the early draft but is an example of how the filmmakers transformed the abstract past 
into an engaging, concrete story about human beings, thus evoking identification 
amongst the viewers. In effect, Wallgren becomes one of those central characters 
that may, as Emily Mark-FitzGerald suggests, be a prerequisite to permit a famine-
related narrative to become an attractive part of popular culture. Further, by telling 
27 These eyewitness accounts are preserved in the ethnographic collections of Nordiska muséet 
in Stockholm.
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the story of Wallgren through re-enactments, it provided images with people in 
them. This will have been a key issue, because television norms demand that 
subjects are covered both through words and images. This is often a difficult norm 
to handle in historical television, because there are rarely authentic images of past 
events or people, unless the subjects have been rich and / or famous. In fact, there 
is a strong tendency for historical television to portray issues that have gathered 
a wealth of archival pictures, such as the Second World War which was widely 
documented by cameramen accompanying the troops. Similarly, royal families have 
always attracted photographers as well as painters and cameramen. For example, 
a very large share of the old film archive at SVT contains film depicting the Swedish 
royal family, which makes it easy to make historical television about the royals.28 By 
contrast, few professional photographers were active in Sweden in the 1860s, and 
few of their photographs circulated or entered media archives.29 Häger and Villius 
found very few historic images that in a direct way could represent the famine year, 
one of them a photograph taken in early June 1867 showing there was still snow on 
the ground. But none of these images depicted the starving poor or the harsh living 
28 Ludvigsson, 2003, 74–5, 274.
29 Rittsel, 2008. 
Figure 2. The ship “Föreningen” is launched in Härnösand in northern Sweden, early June 1867. 
The photograph was used in Ett satans år. The narrator points out that while it should be summer, 
snow is still on the ground and people in the foreground have on winter clothing “because it is still 
winter-time”. Thus, while the photograph does not directly show the famine, it is used as a visual 
source that demonstrates the cause for the coming failure of crops. Photo Courtesy of Länsmuseet 
Västernorrland.
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conditions of the north. Therefore, in order to live up to the aesthetic norms of the 
time,30 the filmmakers had to create imagery that could function as a substitute for 
missing authentic imagery showing the famine.
Two strategies were used to create the important new imagery. One was to 
shoot images of wide, snow-covered forests and of log cabins and other historic 
environments that could be taken to be from the 1860s. These images propose 
to the audience that this is what it looked like, although the viewers are of course 
expected to realize that the filming had taken place much later. In Ett satans 
år, voice-over narration was used to give a special sense to the images it was 
covering, claiming it took weeks and months to get messages about starvation to 
pass through the vast land. Further, the sound track featured the sound of (a cold) 
wind, and the dramatic music of Finnish composer Jean Sibelius, which also help 
to load these images with the sense of urgency and threatening nature.
The second strategy was adopting re-enactments. Bill Nichols has criticized 
documentaries for adopting re-enactments of historically based events, arguing 
they “trade documentary authenticity for fictional identification”.31 However, in Ett 
satans år re-enactments were used in very specific ways. First, re-enactments 
in the documentary do not feature dialogue, but instead voice-over narration is 
used over these images, thus maintaining a distance between the audience and 
the people featuring in the re-enacted scenes. Second, the acts performed in 
re-enacted scenes were of typical work in the old, rural society, such as cutting 
down a tree or ploughing and sowing, and the actors clearly know their task. Thus, 
there is a very strong effort to achieve authenticity in the way the re-enactments 
were set up. The element of identification is more obvious only in a couple of 
close-up re-enacted scenes, in particular when the camera pans over the bleak 
faces of churchgoers, the narrator reading from a pastoral letter that the poor 
have “thoughtlessly squandered the rich profits of summer” (I). At this point, the 
audience is led to identify with the parishioners who received the message from 
the bishop, feeling indignation in response to the moralizing, authoritarian voice 
from this church leader.
In the case of the Wallgren story, the element of identification is stronger. 
Wallgren is first introduced in a colour film re-enactment scene, when a number of 
people are seen slaughtering a pig in front of a small cabin, snow on the ground 
(B). The camera zooms in on a tall, thin boy standing a little to the side, the narrator 
saying this is Nils Petter Wallgren and there are court records describing him; 
“this is how we have imagined him to be”, and “we will meet him again during the 
year”. The image freezes to a black-and-white photograph, the narrator adding that 
within the year the boy will be dead. When Wallgren appears again, he features in 
30 In the 1990s, the on-screen presenter appeared in historical programming thus offering a new 
solution to the problem of how to provide imagery when covering topics that had not resulted in 
authentic pictures. Another creative solution, used by Ken Burns, Marianne Söderberg and other 
documentarists but not by Häger & Villius, is to zoom in on words in hand-written letters.
31 Nichols, 1991, 250.
David Ludvigsson
113
black-and-white photographs, representing not only himself but also clearly being 
the representative of the faceless and nameless poor. Thus, he is seen on the 
road looking for work (D) as well as working in a lumberyard (E). At one point, the 
narrator says Wallgren dreamt of going to America, the image showing the boy 
reading a romantic story of American Indians (G). This dream cannot be verified 
in written sources about Wallgren, but seeing him as a representative of the poor, 
famine-stricken population there can be no doubt some of that population shared 
dreams of migrating to America. Ultimately, after the narrator informs that he had 
to work hard and was beaten by the employer, images show Wallgren lying down 
looking sick (J):
He laid down very sick for 35 days. Nobody cared about him. Snow came through a 
broken window. He had gangrene in both his feet, bedsores on his right hip, a wound 
four inches long, and the iliac crest was bare to the bone. He was completely emaciated. 
In the middle of February 1868, Nils Petter Wallgren’s mother came wandering to Sikeå 
to fetch him […] Two weeks after his home-coming, on 29 February 1868, Nils Petter 
Wallgren died. He died from negligence and typhoid caused by hunger. A pauper, a 
name among all the nameless, one year of Satan.
Sources prove there is a reliable basis for the account. Wallgren was sick for 35 
days, his mother came to take him home, he died on 29 February 1868, witnesses 
testified there was a broken window near the boy’s sickbed, a doctor used the 
word “negligence”, and Wallgren himself testified his employer had beaten him.32 
His fate is important in a cognitive sense as it helps the audience to understand 
the unknown lives of the poor. Yet, interestingly enough, historical sources indicate 
the story could have been told differently. Clearly, the filmmakers have read the 
sources in a selective way. According to the court records, there were other people 
sleeping in the same room as the boy, indicating others shared the same living 
conditions. Second, sources state Wallgren visited his parents’ home shortly before 
he fell ill. Because these pieces of information are withheld from the audience, it 
leaves the impression that he was alone in the world. Offering images of a sad 
young boy created an atmosphere of loneliness and vulnerability, instead of the 
feeling of solidarity that could have resulted from images of relatives or working 
companions surrounding him. Third, and particularly important, the narrator fails 
to mention that the employer and his wife were sentenced by the court to pay the 
considerable sum of one hundred riksdaler for the negligence of the sick boy. This 
information suggests that society punished employers who treated the poor as 
badly as Wallgren was treated. By suppressing it, the filmmakers simplified the 
story of Wallgren’s suffering and created a morally indignant tale about poor people 
who lacked rights. Through Wallgren, we get to see injustices but not how society 
at the time attempted, at least in part, to redress the balance.
32 Sveriges Radio Dokumentarkivet (Stockholm), T21, F1, 30, Ett satans år. 1867, XYZ, copies (21 
pages) of court records.
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There are other examples indicating that moral and dramatic considerations 
sometimes won out over more balanced cognitive considerations. According to the 
narrator, the ruling classes did not handle the relief as one may have hoped:
Finally even the authorities understood […] that a real famine winter was approaching. 
[…] Charity cleared the conscience of the rich […] there was both private and state 
relief. But much never got there in time [before the sea became ice]. Only half of the 
money was used for grain. The rest remained in Stockholm. […] Somewhere far away 
it had been decided in detail how the relief was to be used […] when the Tåsjö people 
asked for permission to mix bark and straw in the bread, the authorities said no. It 
should be fir lichen, for that had been decided. And so the old and feeble had to plod 
out into the forest to collect fir lichen […] the relief was left for weeks and months in 
Kramfors and Härnösand before it was collected and distributed.
As noted above, at the time the documentary was made no thorough historic 
research had been done on the 1860s famine in northern Sweden and thus the 
filmmakers will have found it difficult to estimate how well the relief met with the 
needs.33 Still, it is striking that dealing with the relief efforts, Ett satans år focuses 
on the problems rather than on what was accomplished. The narrator uses a host 
of verbs that signal passivity, such as the food was “left” for months before being 
distributed, and money “remained” in Stockholm. And finally “even” the authorities 
understood what was happening. Further, distribution was connected with 
apparently foolish stipulations. The overall effect of the account is the impression 
that while nature sent the bad crops, the authorities caused the famine. Again, 
this interpretation builds on a simplified view of relief efforts. For one thing, as the 
narrator notes in passing, famine relief came from both private and state sources, 
and if in some cases the use of bark or straw in bread was prohibited, then that 
was probably a localized stipulation by a particular relief organization. Just as the 
example of the bishop’s letter mentioned earlier, it adds to the overall interpretation 
that the authorities did a bad job, thus serving the moral function of increasing the 
viewer’s indignation.
Finally, we should highlight a few interesting language issues. The narrator 
uses the concepts of “upper class” and “working class”. While the concept of class 
was commonly used in Sweden in the 1970s, it was a politically loaded term that 
indicates the filmmakers saw conflicting interests within society. Further, when 
commenting on the evolving lumber industry of the north, the narrator talks of 
“squires” with “money in bulging leather cases”, “speculators” and “forest thieves”. 
Taken together, in the Swedish source language these words build up a story of 
brutal capitalism that adds to the filmmakers’ interpretation of the famine-stricken 
society as one deeply divided, where the rich felt little compassion for the poor and 
where authorities did not take the necessary responsibility.
33 Nelson concluded that the relief was a success. Nelson, 1988, 82 (table 5.2). See also Newby, 
2017, in this volume. 
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Concluding Discussion
Ett satans år is an example of how television producers sought to communicate 
seriously about historic incidences of famine. As we have seen, the filmmakers 
took careful cognitive considerations, both by doing extensive research and by 
including descriptive and analytical elements in the programme. But there is also 
evidence of their taking aesthetic and moral considerations. Already the original 
choice of subject was motivated by contemporary problems of aid, and in the 
documentary both the negative depiction of the authorities and the simplification 
of the Wallgren story are proof that famine history was in fact politicized. The film’s 
indignant version of the boy’s fate is based on political morals as much as on 
historical fact, and the famine is represented as largely the result of the absence 
of political action.
The tendency to offer empathetic portrayals of the poor and emphasize the 
greediness of the rich can be perceived as a signifier of the film’s radical 1970s 
context. During these same years, there was a movement among workers in 
Sweden to investigate and tell the story of their workplaces from a “view from 
below” perspective.34 Also, the increased popularity of genealogy and local 
heritage groups added to the tendency of ordinary citizens offering historical 
interpretations, and very often they sided with their poor ancestors against their 
supposed oppressors.35 In some ways, this was a demonstration of the consensus-
oriented master narrative of Sweden being challenged by alternative, especially 
leftist narratives.36 The famine of the 1860s can be interpreted as historical content 
that lent itself to conflict-oriented narratives about Sweden’s past.
The results confirm studies that have argued that historical documentaries tend 
to portray those parts of collective memory that are felt to be relevant at a given 
time, thus negotiating a “useable” past.37 Yet it should be noted that while the 1970s 
was a radical period, not all Swedes appreciated the radical programming of the 
public service broadcaster.38 When it comes to the political perspective championed 
in Ett satans år it is not certainly one of restoration, but could be seen as one 
operating to argue in favour of a more radical position. It is history from below and 
an expression of a radical public service channel in the radical 1970s.39 While Ett 
satans år was not the most provocative of historical programmes to be produced 
34 Alzén, 2011.
35 Edquist, 2009. For an analysis of the public historical debates in Sweden in the 1970s, see 
Zander, 2001.
36 Wiklund, 2006. See also Johansson, 2001, who discusses competing interpretations of the 
Ådalen events in 1931, i.e. a famous incident in Swedish history when military troops opened fire on 
demonstrators.
37 Edgerton, 2001, 8.
38 Cf. Ludvigsson, 2003, 100–1.
39 Ludvigsson, 2003, 363.
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at SVT in that decade it should be seen as one of those public service productions 
that challenged the ruling power by championing a perspective of class conflict.40
When compared with the filmmakers’ book on the famine, which tells of the 
famine year in a matter-of-fact way, the analysis confirms that conventions of the 
television medium influenced how the famine was represented. Dramatic music 
and sound effects like a cold wind blowing were added to the sound track. The 
filmmakers struggled to create images that could represent the famine year and the 
addition of the Wallgren story provided an individual for the viewers to identify with. 
Wallgren, who was represented in a large number of photographs, was not even 
mentioned in the book. Thus, they shaped the famine to fit the medium. Through 
the careful selection of facts, images and stories, the addition of music and sound 
effects, and the occasional intensity on the part of the narrator, memories of the 
famine were put to use as television entertainment.
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Criminality and the Finnish 
Famine of 1866–68
Miikka Vuorela
Institute of Criminology and Legal Policy, University of Helsinki
The article examines criminality and the use of the criminal justice system during 
the Finnish famine of 1866–1868. The main research objective of the study is 
to provide insight on how and why famine affects crime. To provide background 
for the examination, a description of the trends in crime and crime control during 
the years 1842–1890 is presented. The latter half of the century and the nascent 
urbanisation of Finland brought about a considerable increase in the number of 
criminal convictions for minor crimes but the convictions for serious crimes were on 
a downward trend. The crime trend was interrupted by the famine when property 
crime rates quadrupled. Interestingly, the levels of recorded violence and homicides 
remained stable or even reduced slightly. In order to provide explanations for the 
phenomenon, theories of modern criminology are used in conjunction with an 
analysis of individual, structural and cultural factors affecting hidden crime. The 
conclusion of the analysis is that the reduction of violence is most likely a statistical 
illusion caused by a multitude of factors discouraging the exposure of violent crimes. 
After the famine, the downward trend of serious crimes halted and stabilised to a 
level slightly higher than before.
Introduction
The historical justice statistics of the Nordic countries are well known for their quality 
and quantity.1 The collection of Finnish justice statistics began in 1839 when the 
Emperor of Russia ordered the Procurator of Finland to observe the administration 
of justice in the Grand Duchy. The Procurator’s office was relieved of this duty in 
1891 when the Justice Commission took over the statistical work.2 The Procurator’s 
statistics have not been available for research until recently, mainly because they 
1 von Hofer, 2011, 33–4.
2 Lappi-Seppälä, 2013, 698.
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were only published as hand-written manuscripts.3 The criminal justice sections 
of the Procurator’s reports were published in 2014, compiled for the first time 
into a single dataset. The statistics include time series on criminal convictions, 
punishments and the prison population during the years 1842–1890.4 The data 
is for the most part unused in previous research, and thus has the potential to 
yield valuable findings. Comparable justice statistics are available only in Sweden, 
thanks to the pioneering work of Hanns von Hofer.5
Historical criminology opens new perspectives on the development of the current 
criminal justice system. Observing the past sheds new light on the challenges 
faced by society and the judiciary in different times. It may also facilitate the critical 
evaluation of society and the criminal justice system. In the context of the Finnish 
famine of 1866–1868 (hereinafter referred to as the Finnish famine), the historical 
analysis of crime and punishment gives an opportunity to learn from the mistakes 
made during the famine. The investigation should also yield vital information on 
human behaviour in times of crisis, and on society’s responses to it. Three essential 
questions come to mind. How did the famine influence criminality? How did the 
criminal justice system react? What caused the changes in crime and punishment?
The focus in this article is on describing and explaining crime trends attributable 
to the Finnish famine. Understanding the scope of the changes in criminality 
requires familiarity with the legal reality of the time. It is therefore relevant to begin 
the study with a statistical overview of the use of the Finnish criminal justice system 
during the 19th century, and after that to concentrate on the Finnish famine. The 
main objective of the study is to apply theories of modern criminology in an attempt 
to explain crime trends during the famine. The analysis focuses on the effects of 
poverty, hunger and vagrancy. Research literature concerning absolute poverty is 
scarce, which probably reflects the good economic standing of the Western world.6 
The article continues with a statistical overview of the administration of justice in 
Finland in the 19th century (section 2), followed by a short description of societal 
circumstances before and during the famine (section 3). The selected theories of 
modern criminology are presented in section 4, and are applied in the analysis 
of crime trends during the famine. The analysis in the fifth section is extended to 
individual, structural and cultural factors in an attempt to provide an explanation of 
how the famine affected criminality in reality. The concluding section summarises 
the objectives and results of the study.
3 The manuscripts are in old Swedish, with a complex handwriting style that was typical of the 
time.
4 Vuorela, 2014.
5 von Hofer, 2011.
6 It could be said that absolute poverty is practically non-existent in postmodern Western 
countries, and that reported poverty is relative to other people. This would explain why there are so 
few studies concerning the effect of absolute poverty on crime.
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The Reliability of the Data
Given that the earliest publications in the Procurator’s report series are almost two 
hundred years old, the question of reliability needs to be addressed before the data 
is used in research. It is viewed both positively7 and negatively8 in the early studies. 
Two studies were conducted in 2014, based on different statistical methods of time-
series analysis. Von Hofer and Lappi-Seppälä used regressive time-series analysis 
and concluded that there appeared to be no significant quality errors in the data.9 
I subsequently supplemented the quality check with a Durbin-Watson test analysis 
and concluded that there were no statistical errors that would prevent the use of 
the data in research. In addition, I crosschecked the homicide statistics with the 
homicide data of the National Research Institute of Legal Policy (Finland), which is 
based on parish cause-of-death statistics.10 None of these analyses revealed any 
problems of statistical reliability in the data.
Certain restrictions must nevertheless be taken into account, most notably that 
the criminal statistics only depict crimes investigated by the courts. Statistics of 
police-reported crimes have been kept only since 1927. Consequently, the issue of 
hidden criminality is a major factor in the Procurator’s statistics. The court statistics 
are not a valid source of information on total criminality but they do provide reliable 
data on the number of criminal convictions in general courts. It is generally assumed 
that these statistics are increasingly reliable, the more serious the crime, and thus 
may be helpful in identifying the real trends in more serious (violent) crime.11
The main function of the historical justice statistics is to facilitate observation 
of how the criminal justice system is used in different eras. Conviction statistics 
may not accurately measure total criminality, but they do reveal the kind of crimes 
that ended up in the criminal courts. This information may then be used in drawing 
conclusions about society’s reactions to different types of crime. It can be assumed 
that the courts were more likely to be involved in serious crimes than in petty 
crimes. On the other hand, the punishment and prison statistics provide accurate 
and reliable information on the use of sanctions. These statistics were collected 
directly from responsible officials and there is no problem of “hidden punishments” 
in the data. The incarceration statistics are based on the prisons’ bookkeeping, and 
the courts reported the punishment statistics.
7 Baranovski, 1850.
8 Verkko, 1931.
9 von Hofer & Lappi-Seppälä, 2014, 173–4.
10 Vuorela, 2014, 11–4.
11 The same limitation was noted by Mc Mahon in his analysis of homicide rates during the Irish 
famine. (Mc Mahon, 2014, 23, endnote 68.)
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Crime Trends
The statistics refer to cities and rural communities based on the criminal’s place of 
residence. Urban dwellers appear to have been much more criminally active than 
people living in rural communities: in 1842–1890 the average number of criminal 
convictions per 1,000 population was 5.2 in the countryside and 32.6 in the cities 
(see Figure 1, which shows the trends in urban and rural areas, and the whole 
country). All of the statistics presented in this article are from the lower courts: 
military courts and courts of appeal are excluded from the analysis.
The statistics also classify crimes as serious or petty based on the sanction set 
in the law. Petty crimes were punishable only by fines and the law did not allow for 
incarceration or corporal punishment. The levels of convictions for serious crimes 
remained stable throughout the century. However, the proportion of petty crimes 
increased notably from the 1860s onwards, especially in the cities: the majority of 
convictions in urban areas were for petty crimes. By the end of the century, breaches 
of economic or police regulations were the most common types of offence in the 
whole country, and most of them were committed in the cities. These breaches 
constituted over half of the total convictions in urban areas in 1890, compared with 
less than ten per cent in 1842. Table 1 shows the increased frequency of the said 
offences in cities compared to total convictions.
year % of all convictions
1842 9.17
1865 25.67
1890 50.31
Figure 1. Criminal convictions, 1842–1890 (/1,000 population)
Table 1. Breach of economic or police regulations, proportions of all convictions in cities
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Given the nature and frequency of petty crimes in the total statistics, it is 
necessary to examine serious crimes separately. Such crimes are at the core of 
criminal law, and include theft, assault, robbery and homicide. The term “serious” 
indicates the seriousness of the type of offence compared to other offences. 
Hence assault, which is categorised as a serious crime, included both normal and 
aggravated forms of assault. Figure 2 depicts the absolute number of convictions 
for serious crimes in urban and rural areas, and in the whole country.
The number of convictions for serious crimes is marked by a slight increase 
during the period attributable to the increase in the urban population (and crime). 
The Finnish famine caused the drastic increase in serious crime during the 1860s. 
The change was not permanent, and conviction numbers returned to their original 
level (compared to the population). The statistics also point to a significant crime 
trend: the number of convictions for serious crimes decreased until the famine. 
Figure 3 depicts the decreasing numbers of convictions for certain types of serious 
crime per 1,000 population.
Figure 2. The total number of criminal convictions for serious crimes, 1842–1890
Figure 3. Convictions for serious crimes targeting life, health and property, and all sexual 
crimes, 1842–1890 (/1,000 population)
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The number of convictions for sexual crimes decreased during the century, 
and the famine did not disturb this trend. Convictions for both violent and property-
related crimes decreased up until the famine, after which the levels stabilised. 
The decrease in the number of sexual crimes was attributable to cultural changes 
in sexual morals. A large majority of the convictions for sexual crimes related to 
intercourse outside marriage (fornication), and the numbers decreased by the year 
1890 to less that 20 per cent of the 1840s level. Homicide levels, on the other hand, 
remained  high12 during the whole century.
The crime trends at the end of the century are linked to the changes in societal 
control and public morality. The nascent urbanisation provided an opportunity for 
the effective surveillance of citizens, which increased the risk of arrest. The new 
surveillance did not reach sparsely populated rural areas, where the total number 
of criminal convictions remained stable during the whole period. Changes in public 
morality, on the other hand, are reflected in crimes against morality, which fall 
outside the scope of the criminal law: swearing and breaches of the Sabbath, for 
example, were among the most common crimes up until 1883, when they were 
removed from the statistics.13 It is unknown whether the courts ceased to convict 
people for these crimes or whether they were merely transferred to a category such 
as other breaches of general law. The aforementioned example of fornication also 
hints at the withdrawal of moralistic criminal law. The decline in such convictions 
gave way to sentencing for offences involving alcohol or the disturbance of public 
order.14
The Finnish Famine of 1866–1868
Social Policy
The purpose of social policy is to improve the quality of life of members of the 
society, especially the underprivileged. From a criminological perspective, social 
exclusion and economic hardship increase the risk of criminality.15 Therefore, 
improving the social status of the low-income population is considered an effective 
method of crime prevention: in the words of Franz von Liszt, “a good social policy 
is the best criminal policy”. Given the close connection between social policy and 
criminality, it is natural to begin this analysis of crime trends during the Finnish 
famine with an overview of the social-welfare system.
When Finland became an autonomous state in 1809 it was an underdeveloped 
agrarian society, and the only expanding population group was the poor farmer 
12 Verkko, 1931.
13 Vuorela, 2014, 70.
14 For a more detailed account of the changes, see Vuorela, 2014.
15 Lehti, Sirén, Aaltonen, Danielsson & Kivivuori, 2012, 80–81.
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class. The accelerating growth caused an excess-population problem because 
fewer new farms were being established. The landless also faced difficulties 
in earning a living as the oversupply of labour caused a decline in wages. The 
population overspill combined with consecutive years of poor harvests resulted in 
several periods of famine during the first half of the century.16 At the same time, 
mass unemployment forced many families onto the streets.17 The government 
enacted new legislation in an attempt to relieve the situation. However, neither 
the begging act of 1817 (kerjuujulistus in Finnish) nor the social-welfare reform 
of 1852 (including the alms statute [vaivaishoitoasetus] and the statute on legal 
protection [asetus laillisesta suojelusta]) succeeded in reducing poverty.18 Society’s 
responsibility for its citizens’ livelihood was still a new phenomenon in nineteenth-
century Finland.
The social-welfare statute of 1852 has been described as Finland’s first attempt 
to create a general welfare system for all its citizens, turning the alms system into 
a juridical institution with a built-in appeal process. Public welfare was further 
strengthened in 1865 when responsibility for the system was transferred from the 
parishes to the newly established municipalities.19 The system of legal protection 
was also largely dismantled in the same year with the enacting of new labour and 
vagrancy laws.20 As of 1852, all rural residents were required to own or rent land 
(“legal protection”), or to work as hired hands. The new statutes of 1865 permitted 
the landless rural population to move to urban areas to work in factories and for 
retailers. The cities did not have the same kind of social-welfare system as the 
rural communities, and the reform increased the individual’s responsibility for 
his/her livelihood.21 The statute of occupations (elinkeinoasetus) that expanded 
occupational freedom further emphasised the right to provide for oneself and the 
responsibility to look after oneself.22
The year 1865 also brought changes in the national alcohol policy as the new 
spirits statute prohibited home distillation and granted exclusive distillation rights 
to factory producers. These restrictions were rooted in the reformatory ideas of 
public education promoted in the elementary schools, advocating an alcohol-free 
lifestyle. Several political and ideological movements intent on ridding society of 
the vices associated with alcohol strongly supported the prohibition of distillation 
on moral grounds. The Temperance Society and the Laestadian revival movement 
were among those campaigning against the distillation and consumption of spirits. 
16 van Aerschot, 1996, 48–9.
17 Toikko, 2005, 41–2.
18 van Aerschot, 1996, 51–53, 130.
19 van Aerschot, 1996, 74–80.
20 In the statute of 1865, the system of legal protection only applied to landless people who lived 
an ill-mannered life. (van Aerschot 1996, 60.)
21 Toikko, 2005, 43 –46.
22 Kekkonen, 1987, 198–201.
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The spirits statute of 1865 did not have the desired effect, and it was reformed 
many times in the following two decades. It was only after the statute of 1885 that 
the consumption of strong spirits began to decrease.23
The Great Hunger Years
The multiple years of poor harvests in the early 1860s culminated in serious crop 
failures in 1862 and 1865. Famine-relief attempts and the distribution to farmers 
of sown crops stored for use in emergency situations had left communal granaries 
empty, and no replenishment was forthcoming as the bad weather in continental 
Europe caused a fall-off in grain imports. Consequently, the crop failure of 1867 
quickly turned a difficult situation into a complete catastrophe. Crop reserves ran 
out early in 1868 in large parts of the country. Hunger afflicted the poor, whereas 
members of the small upper class were initially spared the discomfort: While tens of 
thousands of people starved to death, sales of luxury products increased.24 Typhoid 
fever followed in the wake of the famine: it is estimated that 500,000 people were 
afflicted in 1868 when, according to parish registers, the deaths of over 57,000 
people were related to the disease. However, it is currently assumed that most of 
these deaths were attributable to starvation.25
The municipal social-welfare systems could not care for the poor, and thousands 
of families had to leave their homes to live as beggars on the streets.26 The normal 
annual mortality rate in the mid-19th century was approximately 50,000 people, but 
almost 150,000 people died in 1868 – a tenth of the population. Mortality rates were 
as high as 40 per cent in the worst affected areas of the country. Contemporary 
descriptions refer to dullness and indifference caused by the constant presence of 
death and hunger.27 According to Väinö Laajala from Perho for example, the death 
of oneself or one’s family was not feared for death was considered a relief from the 
suffering.28 Senator V. A. Normén noted in his report that need and poverty had 
made people’s attitudes “more than harsh to the sick and more than cold to their 
neighbours”.29 Meurman reported in his study that the urban population mocked 
the distress of the countryside, and that the provincial mind was “colder than an 
autumn night”.30
The areas spared from the crop failure of 1862 and 1865 were in a better position 
than so-called starvation-ridden Finland, which suffered from mass unemployment 
23 Tuominen, 1979, 113–121.
24 Ikonen, 1991, 84–9.
25 Turpeinen, 1986, 137–142.
26 Pitkänen, 1991a, 38.
27 Pitkänen, 1991b, 207–10. 
28 Pitkänen, 1991b, 209.
29 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 52. Author’s own translation.
30 Meurman, 1892, 58.
Miikka Vuorela
127
among the landless population in addition to the famine. Official efforts at crisis 
control were initially confined to the prevention of begging. Handouts were prohibited 
and people in need were ordered to report to workrooms or private farms - for work 
that did not exist. The local governments in the areas that did not suffer the worst 
began spreading the rumour that they had, in fact, had an even worse crop failure 
than other parts of the country, the motive being to prevent the poor from migrating 
to better-off areas.31 The social inequality culminated during the famine and it was 
manifested as a reluctance or inability to help the poor. As the crisis persisted the 
indifferent attitude towards the starving turned to one of control and blame when 
the fever epidemic began to affect the rich.32 The poor people, in turn, started to 
mistrust their masters and the officials.33 The population was split in two, the rich 
loathing the poor and the poor suffering their fate in silence.34
Contemporary descriptions portray death as becoming a natural part of 
everyday life to the extent that it started to have serious negative effects on mental 
health. “Softer feelings” were said to have passed only to leave a feeling of eternal 
suffering and dullness. Religious rituals associated with death such as the blessing 
and burial of the deceased were often passed over due to a lack of interest or 
strength. According to some of the narratives, many families starved to death 
because their neighbours did not believe they had run out of food.35 As Meurman 
notes, people had to disregard the suffering of others to protect their own sanity 
and to “close doors and gates before the hungry hordes”.36
The famine led to the exploitation of the poor and of debtors. The forced 
sale of small estates offered easy pickings for the rich, but also attracted the 
condemnation of farmers. The only people more despised than those prospering 
from the compulsory auctions were the traders exploiting the high prices of grain 
crops. Abusing the plight of others quickly became a taboo that subdued such 
business practices slightly.37 It was thought that those engaging in the malpractices 
would face the terrible revenge of fate, and contemporary descriptions even imply 
that the revenge often materialised.38 Mistrust of the exploiters could be seen as 
an expression of solidarity, a force for opposing the above-mentioned indifference. 
Solidarity was also evident in feelings of compassion towards the poor folk of one’s 
own community, whereas non-resident beggars were shunned.39
31 Pitkänen 1991a, 69–72.
32 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 31–2.
33 Häkkinen, 1991a, 203; Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 49.
34 Meurman, 1892, 58–63.
35 Pitkänen, 1991b, 209–213.
36 Meurman, 1892, 58.
37 Häkkinen, 1991b, 242-4.
38 Häkkinen 1991b, 202–3; Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 49-50.
39 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 49.
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The market economy and the outsiders (of the community) have faced similar 
attitudes during other famines of the world as well. Social and political crises 
have been caused by the export of food from famine-afflicted areas at least in 
Bangladesh (1974), Ethiopia (1973), China (1906) and Ireland (1840s). According to 
Sen, the export of food during a famine may be a natural characteristic of the market, 
despite the public viewing the practice as unethical.40 Sen has also reported the 
famines in Bengal (1943), Ethiopia, Sahel (1960s) and Bangladesh mostly affected 
certain minorities rather than the population in its entirety. The Ethiopian famine, 
for example, placed the hardest strain on the pastoral and nomadic communities 
of the country. These people had previously been able to secure their livelihood by 
trading animals for grain with the farmers but the rising market price of grain during 
the famine subdued the practice.41 Likewise, the Finnish famine mainly affected the 
inhabitants of the famine-stricken parts of the country and the landless population 
in general. 
Trends in Crime and Punishment
Crime
The Procurator’s statistics reveal the crime trends during the famine. Figure 4 
shows the changes in criminality in four of the most serious types of offence.42
The most substantial change was in convictions for property crimes, which 
quadrupled in four years: there were as many convictions for theft in 1868 as in 
the previous two years combined. A similar trend is also evident in occupational 
crimes and fraud, but there was no increase in convictions for other crimes. In 
fact, the number of convictions for violent crimes (including homicide, assault and 
 
40 Sen, 1982, 160–2.
41 Sen, 1982, 52–153.
42 For more detailed information on the crime classification, see Vuorela, 2014.
Figure 4. Criminal convictions for homicide, assault, and sexual and property crimes, 1865–
1871 (/1,000 population)
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infanticide) were at their lowest ever level in 1868: there were 100 fewer convictions 
for assault than in the previous year, and 250 fewer than in the previous 13 years on 
average. A similar decrease is evident in infanticide and, to some extent, homicide. 
Interestingly, each year of crop failure (1862, 1865 and 1867) was followed by 
a year of very low homicide rates. For the sake of comparison, McMahon has 
noted the rate of reported homicide incidents doubled during the Irish famine.43 
The difference could perhaps be partly explained by data validity as the Irish data 
includes reported homicides while the Finnish statistics consist of court convictions. 
However, the reasons behind the disparity in crime trends need to be explained in 
further comparative research.
The numbers of convictions for sexual crimes and fornication also decreased, 
in the latter case to half of the 1867 level. All in all, there was a statistical decrease 
in criminality in the following major types of crime: homicide, infanticide, assault, 
fornication, breaches of the peace (e.g. trespassing), defamation, intoxication, and 
crimes against justice and public officials. Around half of the convictions in 1868 
were for crimes that were on the decrease, and the only increases in convictions 
were for property and occupational crimes and fraud. The famine had no effect 
on the numbers of convictions for the least serious crimes. Excluding the general 
groups “other breaches of general law” and “breaches of economic or police 
regulations” the decrease involved two thirds of all crimes. When the decrease in 
population attributable to the famine is taken into account, there were on average 
3.06 crimes (that were on the decrease) per 1,000 population during the preceding 
ten years, compared with 2.28 in 1868. The ten-year average for property crimes 
was 0.5 per 1,000 population, compared with 1.43 in 1868. Both the increase in 
property crimes and the decrease in other crimes were thus real and significant 
changes in statistical criminality, not illusions attributable to the rapid decrease in 
the population.
Punishment
The Finnish famine halted the development of the criminal justice system. A partial 
reform in 1866 outlawed corporal punishment, significantly restricted the use of 
the death penalty44 and introduced a progressive penal scale. The reformation 
that came into effect in 1870 was humane and represented an ideology of leniency 
in criminal policy, which was further developed in the criminal code of 1889.45 
The objective of the project was to abolish the death penalty and to remove the 
humiliation associated with the punishments, and to strive for repentance and 
atonement.46 The reformation reflected the fall of the class society that enabled the 
43 Mc Mahon, 2014, ch. 2
44 The reform reduced the use of the death penalty by more than half. See Vuorela, 2014, 36–7.
45 Kekkonen, 1992, 265–6.
46 Lappi-Seppälä, 1982, 126–30.
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sharing of legislative and judicial power among the middle and lower classes.47 The 
reformatory committee had started its task as early as 1814 but repeatedly faced 
stern ideological opposition.48 After the political climate began to recover from 
the Russian oppression in the 1860s, the reformatory work was continued with 
renewed vigour.49 The public discussion on penal policy choices was heated and the 
advocates of a conservative penal system dominated the public opinions until the 
early 1860s after which the political attitudes changed quickly. The legislation was 
eventually drafted in 1865 according to the reformist views. Due to disagreements 
on the enactment of the statutes they only came into force on January 1st 1870.50 
Therefore the reforms were not yet operative during the famine, but one might 
assume they had some effect during the transitional period. It would seem from 
the statistics that the reforms were not taken into consideration, however. Figure 5 
depicts the most frequently used types of punishment, excluding fines. (Note that 
plain incarceration became common only after 1870.) 
A total of 1,314 people were sentenced to corporal punishment in 1868, 
compared with an average of 350 in the preceding 25 years. This phenomenon 
was attributable to the increase in property crimes. According to the law, a thief was 
sentenced to a fine, corporal punishment or death depending on the particulars of 
the offence. A fine could also be converted to corporal punishment, one lashing 
with a whip settling three thalers of the fine.51 The amount of the fine was calculated 
by multiplying the value of the stolen property: a theft of ten thalers, for example, 
would warrant a fine of thirty thalers.52
47 Kekkonen & Ylikangas, 1982, 62.
48 Blomstedt, 1964, 425–30.
49 The highest legislative authority in Finland, the riksdag of the estates, was prohibited from 
operating during 1809–1863, preventing all political reforms. 
50 Blomstedt, 1964, 437–93. See also Lappi-Seppälä, 1982, 122–30.
51 Rangaistus caari V:1–2. Note that the laws in the 1734 codification were named “caari”, literally 
translated as an arch. Rangaistus caari would  translate into “penalty arch”.
52 Pahategoin caari (“crime arch”) XL:1.
Figure 5. The most common types of punishment, excluding fines, 1865–1871
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Fine conversions explain the sharp increase in the use of corporal punishment. 
Many people could not pay their fines due to their poverty so the fines were converted 
to corporal punishment. It was possible to convert the fine to a prison sentence but 
that would probably have been too costly for the state to make it a viable option. It 
was cheaper and more effective to sentence the thief to a few lashes of the whip 
than to offer a bed and a free meal at the county prison. Nevertheless, it seems 
that sentencing practices during the famine did not conform to the spirit of the 
reformation statute or the new ideologies of the criminal justice system, the scarcity 
of resources forcing the courts to administer justice with a stern hand. Interestingly, 
this development demonstrates how the legal system reacts in a time of crisis and 
how its ideals can quickly change.
Incarceration
The famine had a strong influence on the use of incarceration. However, the 
available information on the prison population is very limited and does not allow 
a thorough analysis.53 This sub-section only covers the county prisons because 
the famine had no effect on the prison population in correctional facilities and 
penitentiaries. The county prisons were not intended to enforce prison sentences 
and only a small percentage of the inmates had, in fact, been sentenced to prison.54 
Figure 6 indicates the total numbers of prisoners in country prisons during the years 
1865–1871. The increase was mainly among fugitives and vagrants. Vagrants were 
persons who did not fulfil their duty of service, in other words who did not have a 
job or a permanent residence, and were sent to prisons for general labour without 
a criminal sentence.55 Given the increased numbers of beggars and drifters, it is 
hardly surprising that more vagrants ended up in prison. 
53 For more detailed information on the prison system, see Vuorela, 2014. See also Lappi-Seppälä, 
1982, 106–12.
54 Vuorela 2014, 48–9.
55 Ståhlberg, 1893, 1–3, 190. There is slight terminological inconsistency as there was also a type 
of punishment called general labour.
Figure 6. Annual population in county prisons, 1865–1871
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Explaining Crime Trends
Prelude
The following analysis of crime trends is restricted to the increasing trend in property 
crime and the decreasing trend in violent crime, a limitation that largely relates to 
data reliability. The risk of exposure to serious violent crime was relatively high and 
the perpetrators were most likely to be prosecuted and sentenced.56 Consequently, 
recorded violent crime is a comparatively reliable measure of total violent crime in 
normal conditions. A further reason for the restriction is that violent crime is among 
the most thoroughly researched areas of criminology, and there is an abundance 
of comparative research material on the chosen crime types.
Before turning to modern criminology I will make a few general observations 
about historical criminology. First, times of crisis comparable to the Finnish famine 
have been studied in the Soviet Union, specifically covering war, famine and the 
economic oppression of Lenin (New Economic Policy). According to these early 
studies, war caused an increase in violence and property crimes whereas both 
famine and the New Economic Policy brought an increase in property crimes but 
not in violence.57 In the case of Finland, Paasikivi and Tulenheimo compared the 
price of rye with the occurrence of theft. Both of them concluded that people stole 
simply because they were hungry during the hard times, explaining to some extent 
the increasing trend in property crime during the famine.58
Second, the Finnish famine was a time of national crisis and its effects were 
generally comparable to those of war. Both phenomena are disastrous to society 
and lead to a shortage of supplies. The following presentation of crime trends 
during the famine starts with an account of theories explaining wartime trends. 
The analytical focus then turns to traditional explanations of crime in the context of 
Finnish historical criminology, and theories of modern criminology (anomie theory 
and the theory of social control). Given the nature of the phenomenon it is not 
necessary to examine individual theories of crime: it is not plausible, for example, 
to assume that the three-year period of high property crime was attributable to 
genetic factors.
War
The effect of war on crime has been studied comprehensively and two very different 
theories have emerged. It is argued on the one hand that war corrupts public 
56 Specifically concerning the validity of violent crime in the Procurator’s statistics, see Verkko, 
1931, 55.
57 Shelley, 1979, 391–6.
58 Jaakkola, 1978, 99–103.
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morality, and on the other that it strengthens it.59 It is concluded in a Nordic study 
focusing on the effects of the Second World War that the strengthening influence 
seems to be a myth that is used in war propaganda. Property and occupational 
crimes in particular increased during the War. The high amount of theft and black 
marketing imply a decline in respect for justice rather than improved common 
morality. It is notable that the increasing crime trend was common to all the Nordic 
countries despite the fact that no hostile force occupied Finland or Sweden.60
The 1930s was a period of peace and prosperity in Finland. The crime level 
had stabilised by the end of the decade and the numbers of both violent and 
property crimes were decreasing.61 Then the War changed everything. The levels 
of violent crime reduced sharply, in fact, but increased quickly after the end of the 
Continuation War. It is probable that the police did not register violence among 
18–29-year-old men while they were stationed at the front. The trend in property 
crimes was the reverse: the levels were high during the War, but quickly returned 
to normal when it ended. Jaakkola concludes that the War led to an increase in all 
crime in Finland, regardless of the type.62 The trend was similar in all the Nordic 
countries.63
The Second World War also brought an increase in female criminality. The 
majority of women’s crimes were against martial law and rationing regulations. 
However, even ordinary criminality increased and the longer the War went on, the 
more assaults, adultery and theft the women committed. By 1943, female assaults 
had quadrupled from the levels in 1938. Adultery, which in particular could be viewed 
as a moral crime, increased six-and-a-half-fold during the War.64 This development 
of female criminality contradicts traditional explanations that fluctuations in violent 
crime are attributable to changes in male violence.65
As Archer and Gartner note, the Second World War led to increased violence in 
countries that were not directly involved. The increasing trend was not dependent 
on the outcome of the War or the economic hardship it caused, but according to 
Archer and Gartner the most influential factor was the change in public morality 
it brought about. War concretised and justified the use of violence as a means of 
conflict resolution, and attitudes became more lenient and favourable.66 Landau and 
Pfeffermann support this finding, noting that the number of homicides in Israel was 
59 Takala, 1987, 7.
60 Tham, 1987a, 306–7.
61 Jaakkola, 1987, 41.
62 Jaakkola, 1987, 52–4.
63 See the following chapters in Takala & Tham, 1987: Madsen, 1987, 116; Christiansen, 1987, 37; 
Tham, 1987b, 214; Wijk, 1987, 265.
64 Roos & Takala, 1987, 83–6.
65 Ylikangas, 1988, 137.
66 Archer & Gartner, 1984, 74–5; Archer & Gartner, 1976.
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directly proportional to the number of deaths in military conflicts in the country.67 
Lehti applies Archer and Gartner’s hypothesis to the Finnish Civil War and the 
Estonian Independence War, and concludes that civil wars influence homicides 
indirectly. Most post-war perpetrators of violence were young men who were not 
involved in the battles, but adopted an attitude idealising violence from their older 
companions.68 Moreover, according to Hannula, the recession after the Finnish 
Civil War caused a significant increase in property crime.69 In sum, armed conflict 
is likely to lead to an overall increase in criminality.
Poverty
Perhaps the most traditional criminological theory is that relative poverty (income 
inequality) leads to an increase in violent crime. Poverty relative to the surrounding 
community is a sign of social failure in the individual that easily leads to asocial 
behaviour. According to the theory, the absolute degree of poverty is not important 
in that poverty should be understood as a cultural phenomenon linked to a certain 
time and place.70 The anomie theory explains the influence of relative poverty in 
positing that the social pressure it causes leads to crime. The behaviour of individuals 
in a society is driven by the pursuit of so-called normal ideals of, happiness and 
the accumulation of wealth, for example. However, given that society has limited 
resources, it is not possible for everyone to achieve these ideals.71 Humans have 
evolved an ability to sense their position in a social group that has fostered more 
effective co-operation. However, relatively poor individuals may feel they have 
failed to “keep up with the Joneses”, which causes frustration and may even lead 
to criminal activity.72
In the context of Finnish historical crime trends, Ylikangas claims that the 
oversupply of available labour and the consequent decline in real wages largely 
explained the violent outbursts of the puukkojunkkaris (“knife-fighters”) of Southern 
Ostrobothnia. Another factor was the downward mobility in which people who 
became poorer descended to a lower social class. Together these two phenomena 
indicated an increase in income inequality, and caused a sharp increase in violent 
crime.73 It should be noted that both of them intensified during the famine. 
However, a large majority of the population belonged to the poor farmer class at 
the time of the Finnish famine and the effects of the crisis targeted them in a similar 
manner. Clearly, changes in income inequality do not explain the problem and it is 
67 Landau & Pfeffermann, 1988, 500. See also Lappi-Seppälä & Lehti, 2014, 187.
68 Lehti, 2000, 234–40, 319.
69 Hannula, 2004, 299, 468–9.
70 Taft,1966, 19.
71 Merton, 1938. See also Kivivuori, 2013, 147–50.
72 Kivivuori 2013, 175.
73 Ylikangas, 1976, 255–84.
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therefore necessary to discuss absolute poverty. The criminological research on 
absolute poverty thus far is insufficient, and there is no prevailing consensus on 
its effects on crime. It is concluded in some studies that poverty does influence 
criminality, but there is major disagreement on the direction of the effect. Some 
authors argue that absolute poverty increases violence74 whereas others claim it 
actually reduces the incidence75.
Pridemore claims that the wrong indicators of poverty have been used in earlier 
studies, the results of which thus cannot be considered valid. He developed a 
new measure of poverty he thought was more reliable, and used it to explain the 
interactions among poverty, income inequality and violence. He concludes that 
poverty increases homicides whereas income inequality does not affect the levels of 
violent crime.76 According to Pridemore’s hypothesis, the increased poverty during 
the famine should also have led to an increase in violence.77 Traditional anomie 
theory also implies that the culmination of income inequality (demonstrated by the 
high sales of luxury products and a starving population) would increase violent 
crime. Although much of the poverty during the famine was absolute, the influence 
of income inequality should not be ruled out. It may be that had the internal income 
inequality of the farmer class evened out, the level of violence may have decreased 
as a consequence. 
Social Control
According to the theory of social control, the criminal tendencies of an individual are 
connected to his/her social relationships: existing social relationships create social 
bonds and social control that suppress criminal activity, whereas their absence 
predicts a higher risk of committing a crime. Unofficial social control is exerted 
in the family, at work and at home. It is known, for instance, that criminal activity 
is more rare among individuals the longer they have lived in their hometown.78 
According to Ylikangas, the period of high levels of violent crime in Finland ended 
with the decline in status of the violent lower classes, when the unofficial social 
control of the other classes began to take effect.79 The theory of social control 
is useful in explaining crime trends during the famine. The shortage of supplies 
forced tens of thousands of refugees to turn to vagrancy, and the recession caused 
mass unemployment. Additionally, the high mortality rates reduced the number of 
social relationships and destabilised social bonds.
74 Bailey, 1984; Patterson, 1991; Hsieh & Pugh 1993; Pridemore, 2011.
75 Messner, 1982; Krahn, Hartnagel & Gartnell, 1986.
76 Pridemore 2011, 754–61.
77 See also Hsieh and Pugh 1993, 198.
78 Kivivuori 2013, 186–7, 197–200.
79 Ylikangas 1976, 293–4.
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Crutchfield, Geerken and Gove examined the effects of migration on urban 
criminality. They found that individual mobility explained many different types of 
offence, and was the most effective factor in explaining property crimes. Anomie 
(frustration), in turn, was a major cause of violent crime, but only explained a 
small proportion of property crimes.80 The theory of social control thus seems to 
be effective in explaining property crimes and anomie theory in explaining violent 
crime. This conclusion is disputed in the field of criminology, and Hartnagel, for 
example, claims that migration has a significant effect on violent crime.81 
Alcohol
Alcohol consumption has traditionally been an explanatory factor in violent crime, 
especially in early Finnish criminology. Modern statistics reveal that, on average, 
60 per cent of assaults in Finland are committed under the influence of alcohol, 
and even this is considered an underestimation.82 Likewise, over 80 per cent of 
homicides are committed by intoxicated individuals.83 The correlation between 
alcohol consumption and violence appears to be clear, and it could help to explain 
crime trends during the Finnish famine. According to the Procurator’s statistics, 
in 1868 convictions for intoxication dropped by 50 per cent in rural areas. Home 
distillation was also prohibited in 1865, not that the food shortage would have even 
allowed it. Alcohol consumption also decreased in the whole country during the 
famine.84
Is there a causal relationship between alcohol consumption and violence? If 
there is, the arrival of strong spirits in Finland in the 17th and 18th centuries should 
have caused a tide of violence. However, as Ylikangas notes, that there appear to 
have been no significant changes in the levels of violent crime that would support 
causality between alcohol and violence.85 He concluded that alcohol did not cause 
violence but only acted as a catalyst, and that both high alcohol consumption 
and violence originated from the source he refers to as “Finnish forest lunacy” 
(metsähöperyys).86
The catalyst effect implies that alcohol does not cause violence or even influence 
the long-term trends. However, changes in alcohol consumption may cause shifts 
in violence in the short term. The theory is based on the hypothesis that some 
catalyst will eventually appear and trigger the violent action, of which alcohol is only 
one, albeit effective. The theory is closely connected to the theory of social control. 
80 Crutchfield, Geerken, & Gove, 1982.
81 Hartnagel, 1997, 393–6.
82 Lehti, Sirén, Aaltonen, Danielsson & Kivivuori, 2013, 83–4, 87. Verkko gives a similar number 
concerning violent crime in the 1920s. See Verkko, 1949.
83 Lehti & Kivivuori, 2012, 35.
84 von Hofer & Lappi-Seppälä, 2014, 180.
85 Ylikangas, 1988, 156. On the other hand, see Lehti, 2000, 228–31.
86 Ylikangas, 1988, 174–5.
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Alcohol consumption complicates the forming of meaningful relationships, thereby 
weakening social control, and loosening social bonds could expose individuals to 
problem drinking. Both violence and alcohol consumption could also be attributable 
to individual factors, especially low self-control87. However, alcohol is not a cause 
of crime, it merely eases the decision to commit a crime (acts as a catalyst).88 
Given the short-term effect of alcohol on violence and the low alcohol consumption 
during the famine, the amount of violent crime should have decreased.
Crime Trends – Concluding Remarks
Four criminological theories of the causes of crime have been examined. The 
next step is to establish what theories of national crisis, poverty, social control and 
alcohol consumption would predict with regard to crime trends during the famine. 
To begin with crisis theory, it seems that war generally has an accelerating effect 
on criminality. War and famine have similar effects on society as a whole: fear, 
uncertainty, shortage and misery follow in the wake of both war and famine. The 
majority of war studies described above would predict an increase in all kinds of 
crime during a famine. However, war does have the distinctive effect of making the 
use of violence an acceptable means of conflict resolution. It is not likely that the 
famine would have had a similar effect. This observation reduces the comparability 
of crime during war and famine.
The Finnish famine resulted in a period of absolute deprivation that income 
inequality in itself does not adequately explain. It is likely that the prevalence of 
absolute poverty during the famine would have caused high rates of homicide and 
violent crime, but no such trend is visible in the statistics. The effect of absolute 
poverty on property crime is uncertain. According to one previous study, there is 
only a weak correlation between poverty and numbers of robberies.89 Nevertheless, 
it is obvious that most people would be prepared to steal when facing starvation and 
potential death.90 Furthermore, such thefts are commonly perceived as justified.91 It 
stands to reason that absolute poverty during the famine would lead to an increase 
in the amount of property crime provided that other people had anything worth 
stealing.
The number of vagrants, beggars and unemployed people multiplied during 
the famine, which meant an increase in the mobility of individuals. The landless 
population drifted from town to town in search of food and employment. Social 
relationships also became fragile due to the high mortality rates. Given these two 
phenomena, the theory of social control would predict an increase in criminality 
87 Kivivuori, 2013, 105.
88 Kivivuori, 2013, 211–3.
89 Hsieh & Pugh, 1993.
90 Jaakkola, 1978.
91 Taft 1966, 19.
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during the famine: low social control effectively explains property crimes, and such 
control was exceptionally weak at the time.
Alcohol consumption is commonly linked with violent crime even though there is 
no causal relationship between the two. Nevertheless, alcohol consumption has an 
obvious short-term effect on violence. The normal yearly alcohol consumption was 
approximately five litres per person during the 1860s–70s, as opposed to under 
a litre in 1868.92 Sentences related to intoxication also decreased from 0.667 per 
1,000 population in 1865 to 0.471 in 1868 (approximately 30 per cent). The reason 
is obvious: the available crops were used for food and could not be distilled into 
alcohol. The decreased consumption should predict a decrease in the amount of 
homicide and violent crime.
In sum, according to predictions based on modern criminological theories, the 
Finnish famine should have caused a major increase in criminality, especially in 
property crime. The statistical data concerning the multiplied rates of property 
crime are thus in line with the explanations. The reason for the fewer sentences for 
homicide and violent crime is nevertheless unclear. The only factor hinting at a real 
decrease in violence is the low alcohol consumption, whereas the other theories 
point in the other direction. The problem can only be solved if account is taken of the 
restrictions of the data. Court sentencing statistics do not give reliable information 
on real crime levels, and may not even reflect the trends in exposed criminality. It 
is therefore necessary to expose the hidden criminality through broader analyses 
of the effects of famine.
Explaining Hidden Criminality
Phrasing the Question
Even if the court-sentence statistics do not portray the real crime rates, they do 
demonstrate the reactions of society to crime. Hence, the changes in the statistics 
reflect the changes in the composition of crime investigated by the courts rather 
than criminality in itself. An analysis of hidden criminality is thus required before 
conclusions on crime trends can be drawn. Criminologists nowadays tend to 
investigate hidden criminality using empirical methods such as victim surveys. 
Such methods are not suited to historical research, and there is a lack of available 
empirical data from the 19th century. However, it would be possible to use the court 
statistics as a basis on which to build possible scenarios of crime in reality.
Any explanation of hidden criminality requires a wide-ranging analysis of 
the factors that affect criminality in general. The rest of this section charts the 
developments in societal behaviour on three major levels. The aim on the individual 
level is to reveal the changes in the actions and motivations of members of the 
92 von Hofer & Lappi-Seppälä, 2014, 180.
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population. Structural explanations, on the other hand, focus on the functional 
component of society, whereas cultural explanations relate to how people and 
society thought on a more general level. The main objective of the following 
interpretations is to identify factors that could shed light on the actual crime trends 
during the Finnish famine. These interpretations could then be generalised in terms 
of describing and explaining crime trends during other times of national crisis.
Sentiment
Assuming that the decrease in convictions for violent crime reflects actual crime 
levels, it is a surprising finding. In the search for individual explanations of crime, 
educational and evolutionary theories should be dismissed given the limitations 
discussed above. However, it is worth noting that an individual’s readiness to commit 
or tolerate crimes fluctuate suddenly. Taft, for example, describes “morally upright 
people” who, despite their sublimity, are willing to steal to fend off starvation93. As 
noted above, people began to feel indifferent towards death during times of famine: 
respect for human life turns to numbness, which is apt to increase the propensity 
for violence. As Pitkänen observes on the basis of contemporary descriptions, 
the high mortality rates reduced the value of human life.94 The “inflation of the 
value of life” also lowered the threshold to commit homicide. Such changes in 
attitude should have led to an increase in homicide rates even though the statistics 
testify otherwise. Homicide figures are generally considered to be among the most 
accurate justice statistics, so this explanation does not appear to be very plausible.
On the other hand, the mobility of the unemployed and the starving, as well 
as the high mortality rates reduced the number of social relationships, and the 
surviving relationships thus became relatively more important. Contrary to the above 
assumption, the value of life should, in fact, have increased, and the indifferent 
attitude towards death should not negatively affect the appreciation of life. This 
kind of sentimentality would also have led to a reduction in violence. The credibility 
of this theory is strengthened by the fact that the moral legitimation of violence is 
a major prerequisite for its perpetration. Few people are willing to commit a violent 
crime without harbouring a sense of internal justification. Placing a high value on 
life would have made the legitimation of violence harder, which in turn would have 
decreased the levels of violent crime.95
A similar phenomenon is reflected in the strengthening of a sense of responsibility 
and solidarity in a community. The crisis brought people closer together because 
everyone was in the same boat – hungry and suffering. The setting reflects 
Foucault’s theory of the influence of prisons on the morals of the working classes, 
his rationale being that the real purpose of prisons was to brand the criminal lower 
93 Taft, 1966, 19.
94 Pitkänen, 1991b, 209.
95 Eisner, 2014, 93.
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classes as abnormal, creating in the working classes a need to stand out from 
prisoners and criminals to prove their superiority. The best way of standing out 
was through diligence and honesty at work.96 In the same way, the poor peasants 
of the 1860s wanted to stand out from the loathed exploiters of their poverty. This 
stronger internal solidarity subdued violent outbursts among the farmers, and 
because violence is usually prevalent among lower-class men, the subduing effect 
was significant.97
The described change in public sentiment would have had an effect not only on 
violence but also on the catalysts. From a historical perspective, defamation has 
been a notable trigger of violence related to the consumption of alcohol.98 A simple 
experiment using convictions for defamation will serve to exemplify this hypothesis. 
It should be kept in mind that the data does not make it possible to reach a reliable 
conclusion, but it is nevertheless worth finding out if the statistics comply with the 
hypothesis. The offence of defamation was called slander (“parjaus”) in the 19th 
century, and indeed the trend seems to be in line with the solidarity hypothesis 
(Fig. 7): there were 16-per-cent fewer convictions for slander in 1868 than in the 
preceding and following three years, on average. A comparison of the number of 
convictions in 1868 with the average number of convictions per year in 1842–1890 
reveals a 59-per-cent reduction. It is likely, however, that the statistical changes 
reflect shifts in the inclination to report an offence rather than actual changes in 
criminality. 
96 Foucault, 1980.
97 On the socio-economic status of violent criminals in present-day Finland, see Lehti, Sirén, 
Aaltonen, Danielsson & Kivivuori 2013, 80–3. On historical violence, see Ylikangas, 1988, 137.
98 Ylikangas, 1988.
Figure 7. Convictions for slander in 1865–1871 (/1,000 population)
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The cohesion argument requires a wider context to effectively explain the 
increase in property crimes. If solidarity strengthened as suggested, why did 
people still steal so much from one another? Here is one possible scenario. The 
proneness to violence and provocation among the poor farming community that 
resided permanently in the area related to the higher level of solidarity.99 Meanwhile, 
landless vagrants and beggars were prepared to steal to ease their suffering. 
Consequently, the increase in the number of property crimes was attributable to 
the drifters, whereas violence was subdued among the local population. It should 
be pointed out that the theory of social control is effective specifically in explaining 
property crimes, and is the theory that best explains the effect of vagrancy on 
crime. It therefore supports the scenario described above.
Opportunity and the Risk of Arrest
What if the criminal statistics do not reflect the development of crime in practice? 
Statistics covering homicide and serious violent crime are usually reliable, but not 
necessarily in times of crisis: they may not indicate, or even echo the real trends. 
In other words, the court statistics validly demonstrate the number of convictions 
but do not cast light on the development of crime outside the courts. In practice, 
the varying portfolio of crimes reaching the courts depends, for instance, on the 
risk of arrest and the opportunities that arise for criminal action. It is evident that 
the government was powerless to contain the hunger crisis, and the failed social-
security system was just one example of the chaos brought about by the famine. 
Death by starvation was common in rural communities, and the mortality rate could 
be measured in tens in percentage terms.100 Given the normality of death it would 
have been easy to mask a homicide as a natural death. The ease of concealment 
offered numerous opportunities to commit homicide unnoticed, such as by letting 
an unwanted child starve to death.
The low risk of arrest for homicide may have been tempting for larger families 
struggling to feed their children. It could have crossed the minds of numerous 
parents to kill a newly born child if they did not have enough food to feed their 
other children. No one would have questioned the death of a child when half of 
the town’s population was on the brink of starvation. The statistics on infanticide 
convictions supports this theory: 25-per-cent fewer convictions were recorded in 
1868 compared with the average number during the previous five years. As Verkko 
points out, however, the proportion of exposed infanticides was low even before the 
famine, so the significance of the statistics should not be exaggerated.101 The low 
risk of arrest was not restricted to infanticide and also applied to homicide, although 
99 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 49.
100  Pitkänen 1991b, 209.
101  Verkko, 1931.
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not to assault. It may be that, as argued below, the risk of being sentenced for 
assault was lower during the famine for cultural reasons.
On the institutional level, the errors in the justice statistics may simply have been 
attributable to the scarcity of resources. The annual processing capacity of the 
courts and other justice authorities was limited, therefore the difference between 
court-sentenced and actual criminality is bigger than normal during periods of high 
crime rates. The statistics give solid support to this argument: the proportion of 
serious crimes of all criminal convictions in rural areas during the first half of the 
1860s was approximately 9.5 per cent, compared with 24 per cent in 1968. The 
relative increase is attributable to an increase in convictions for property crimes 
whereas the total number of convictions increased only slightly.
The number of criminal convictions in 1868 was approximately the same as 
in the previous years, but an abnormally high proportion of them were for serious 
crimes. The changes in criminality on the statistical level would therefore seem to 
have been an illusion caused by the functioning of the courts: they focused their 
limited resources on serious crimes and ignored some of the less serious criminality. 
It should be acknowledged at this point that the risk of exposure to serious violent 
crime is traditionally thought to be relatively high, and is thus relatively reliably 
visible in the official statistics. If violence did increase, the courts did not investigate 
it. This could have been attributable to cultural factors that had a general impact on 
society, such as changes in penal values.102
Changes in Penal Values and Other Cultural Factors
The court system was probably able to function relatively normally during the 
famine. The judiciary belonged to the rich population groups that were not directly 
affected by the crisis and did not have to adjust their lifestyle during the winter of 
hunger.103 It may be that the famine complicated the court proceedings in one way 
or another, but the number of cases they handled remained on the same level 
as in previous years. It is assumed in the following that the courts were able to 
function without major disruptions. The question that remains is why the increased 
violence was not reflected in the courts. The explanation may be connected to 
the changes in penal values, or conversely the value structure of the society. It 
concerns a change in society’s tolerance of crime, which could have raised the 
threshold of reporting a crime to the police, or on the institutional level in the way 
the authorities reacted to different types of criminality. What is important is that 
the change occurred in the values and outlooks of the people, rather than in the 
criminality or the criminal legislation.
102  See Christie, 1968. The concept of penal values refers to the experienced seriousness or 
“value” of different crimes and penalties in the society relative to the dominant value structure. For 
example, if the value of health increases, the penal values of assault and corporal punishment also 
increase.
103  Ikonen, 1991, 89; Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 31–2; Meurman, 1892, 58.
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Let us exemplify such a change in the penal values and consider a small 
rural community in which the famine has caused high child-mortality rates. The 
townspeople are being tormented by the cold weather of the late winter, constant 
hunger and a shortage of essential food. The staple food in almost every household 
is bark bread, containing equal amounts of grain and pine bark. Two crimes 
are committed at the same time in the town, one assault and one theft. Which 
victim is more likely to report the crime to the local police chief, and whose need 
for legal redress is greater? It is likely that the victim of the theft will report the 
crime because the value of property (comprising at the time mainly food and the 
necessary farm equipment to produce it) during a famine is higher than the value of 
physical integrity. One might also wonder which crime the police chief is more likely 
to take seriously. When more than two thirds of the community’s population have 
succumbed to hunger and disease, a simple assault does not seem very important.
Economic hardship causes the value of property to increase relative to other 
objects of legal protection. This was emphasised during the famine because the 
crisis led to a decrease in the value of life and health. The importance of the object 
of the crime directly affects the likelihood of its being reported to and investigated 
by the authorities. The preceding example highlighted the threshold of reporting an 
offence when the object of the crime was not considered very valuable. The same 
phenomenon is common today in that people do not report relatively harmless 
crimes to the police, for example, because they feel the potential legal redress 
is not worth the effort of going through with the reporting and the subsequent 
process of litigation. Similarly, the reporting of an ordinary assault may have been 
viewed as humiliating during the famine. As Ylikangas notes, since the 16th century 
at least Finns have been characterised as people with low self-esteem and a 
pronounced sense of honour. Violence was viewed as an acceptable means of 
conflict resolution in cases of defamation, for example. The typical Finnish man did 
not report an insult to the Lord of the manor, but rather used his fists to right the 
wrong.104 Verkko, on the other hand, refers to the “dark-natured” Finnish man (in 
the 19th century) who endured the wrongs he faced with silent bitterness that easily 
erupted later in a disproportionate act of violence – especially when intoxicated.105 
Both of these accounts of the Finnish national character describe people for whom 
resorting to the authorities is not a natural way of resolving conflicts. In my view, 
both descriptions support the notion that people would generally have considered 
the reporting of an assault inappropriate during the famine.
Changes in the penal values also guide the allocation of the limited resources 
of the criminal justice system. These resources are used, above all, to prevent 
and punish the most serious crimes. The system constitutes a segmented sieve, 
the last level of which is the court. Given the scarcity of resources, only the most 
serious cases pass through the whole sieve and end up in the courts. Changes 
104  Ylikangas, 1988, 173–5.
105  Verkko, 1936, 225–6.
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in priority among the objects of legal protection could thus cause a change in 
society’s reaction to different types of crime. Property crimes easily passed through 
the system during the famine because the value of property had increased, which 
is why the number of convictions for violence decreased and the court statistics 
became less reliable as an indicator of actual crime levels. Nevertheless, the 
statistics provide the strongest evidence for the validity of the hypothesis. If the 
relative seriousness of property crimes increased compared to other crimes during 
the famine, the average seriousness of property crimes would have decreased in 
the courts. One could calculate the average seriousness of a theft by dividing the 
total amount of property lost via crimes by the number of convictions for theft (Fig. 
8). The result clearly indicates that the property crimes investigated by the courts 
were significantly less serious in 1868 than during the preceding and subsequent 
years. This observation supports the theory of changes in the penal values.
Sociologist Norbert Elias’ theory of the civilising process also supports the 
hypothesis positing an increase in violent crime during the famine. By way of a 
context-bound summary, it is suggested that humankind creates norms that 
subdue natural behaviour. Together these norms constitute the civilisation on which 
the society is built, which in turn exerts social control to ensure that its members 
obey the rules. The stricter the society’s control, the more effectively is the natural 
aggression of individuals contained. If the society is weakened the subdued 
aggression emerges, causing violence. This weakening process is referred 
to as decivilisation.106 The theory has been used as a theoretical framework in 
criminological studies in which it is observed that homicide and violence are less 
prevalent in a strong central state with strict social norms.107 Finnish researcher 
Ylikangas criticised the use of the theory in explaining criminality, but in my opinion 
106  Elias, 1978; see especially, 191–2, 322.
107  See e.g. Eisner, 2014; Eisner, 2001.
Figure 8. The average value of property lost via theft, old Finnish marks, 1865–1871
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the later applications, especially as described by Eisner and Pinker, effectively take 
the criticisms into consideration.108
The Finnish famine brought about decivilisation as the social norms weakened. 
Official social control slackened because the resources did not suffice to meet 
the increased demands. Society could not spend as much time and energy in 
monitoring and controlling people as before the famine. As the binding effect of 
the social norms weakened, individual aggression and violence increased. Elias 
also emphasises the effect of trade-related reliance on other people in subduing 
violence:109 the absolute poverty during the famine brought the majority of trade 
to a halt, thus causing a surge in violence. The downward mobility mentioned 
by Ylikangas accelerated among the upper classes during the famine as people 
became poorer, and at the same time the violent lower classes grew in numbers.
According to Pinker, the civilising process did not reduce violence but only 
transferred it from the upper to the lower classes.110 Pinker’s interpretation refutes 
Ylikangas’s criticism of the argument that there was no reduction in violence among 
the lower classes despite the process.111 At this point it does not matter whether the 
civilising process reduced violence or transferred it to the lower classes because 
both possibilities predict a similar crime trend during the famine. The upper classes 
were not directly affected and thus did not go through the process of decivilisation 
that would have brought back violence among their ranks. Meanwhile, the poor 
grew quickly in numbers due to unemployment and food shortages, which together 
with the weakening social norms probably provoked an increase in violence. 
Hence, both alternative interpretations of the civilising process support the idea of 
an increasing trend in violent crime.
Lappi-Seppälä and Lehti studied the effects of cultural factors on homicide. In 
the context of the Finnish famine the most significant of these factors were social 
trust and what Hofstede refers to as long-term orientation. Long-term (as opposed 
to short-term) orientation here means that the members of a community place 
more emphasis on the future than on the present, and both long-term orientation 
and social trust reduce homicide rates.112 The famine produced the feeling among 
the people that death was the only escape from their suffering. This kind of outlook 
reflects a short-term rather than a long-term orientation, and predicts increased 
homicide rates. Social trust is a more complicated phenomenon: on the one hand 
the internal solidarity among communities probably strengthens social trust, but 
on the other the large numbers of vagrants and beggars with their criminal activity 
probably weaken trust, pointing towards increased homicide rates. 
108  Ylikangas, 1999, 21–9.
109  Elias, 1978, 322.
110  Pinker, 2012, 85. On the other hand, see Eisner, 2008, 290.
111  Ylikangas 1999, 27.
112  Lappi-Seppälä & Lehti, 2014, 185–7.
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Conclusion
The composition of crimes investigated by the courts changed notably during the 
19th century. The number of convictions for core crimes decreased up until the 
Finnish famine of 1866–1868, after which the downward trend ended and the 
number stabilised on a level slightly higher than before the famine. The criminal 
control of public morality was slowly eroded during the century, and prosecutions 
for fornication, breach of the Sabbath and swearing, for example, gradually 
disappeared from the courts. Finland’s emergent urbanisation produced new kinds 
of petty crime, the amount of which increased significantly during the century. 
The majority of such crimes were “breaches of economic or police regulations”. 
The urbanisation trend facilitated the effective monitoring of the population, which 
accounts for the relatively high crime levels in the cities compared to the rural 
communities. Urbanisation did not develop very quickly, however, and the majority 
of people were still living in the countryside at the end of the century.
The Finnish famine of 1866–1868 brought about an abnormal crime trend that 
is clearly visible in the court statistics. The number of property crimes drastically 
increased whereas there was a decrease in convictions for homicide and assault. 
I have compared two competing theoretical streams explaining how the real crime 
levels changed and why. Traditional criminological theories incorporating historical 
and modern explanations predict that famine leads to an increase in all kinds of 
crime. However, the court statistics only show the increase in property crimes. A 
few explanations focusing mainly on individual factors support the statistical data. 
Although theories supporting the idea of increased violence outnumber these 
explanations, individual factors may have helped to contain violent crime to some 
extent.
A more plausible alternative, however, is that the violence increased but the 
perpetrators did not end up in the courts. Criminological theories along with the 
theory of the civilising process and the cultural explanations drafted in this article 
support such a notion. Nevertheless, the question arises as to why the increased 
violence is not visible in the court statistics. The most likely reasoning concerns 
the changes in society’s functioning and in the general culture. The interpretations 
presented in the article do not give definitive explanations of how real crime levels 
changed during the famine, but they do shed light on the grey area that tends to 
surround historical criminality. It would be interesting to compare the criminality of 
the famine in Finland to the crime trends in other European countries, and the topic 
would definitely call for further comparative research. In conclusion, the Finnish 
famine probably led to an increase in both property and violent crimes, but the 
criminal justice system did not react to the surge in violence.
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Considering Famine in the Late 
Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire: 
A Comparative Framework and Overview
Özge Ertem*
Koç University’s Research Center for Anatolian Civilizations (ANAMED)
This article analyzes the Ottoman famines of the 1870s – that killed tens of 
thousands of people in Anatolia due to starvation and disease – from a global 
comparative perspective. It focuses on two famines in particular that struck the 
central and eastern provinces of the empire in 1873-75 and 1879-1881 (just 
following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78), respectively. They were triggered 
by climatic causes, yet their devastating effects were also a product of the global 
and domestic economic and political environment of the decade. Local, imperial 
and global man-made reasons exacerbated the severe impacts of nature and 
climate. The article addresses these famines as significant traumatic disasters, the 
memories of which were overshadowed by later catastrophic events in Ottoman 
history and historiography, and which have been almost invisible in European and 
global famine historiography of the nineteenth century. It summarizes the political-
economic environment of the decade, attempts to investigate Ottoman famines in a 
global historical context and outline a comparative research agenda for an Ottoman 
history of famine and empire in the late nineteenth century.
(…)I have found, in many places, many persons who did not so much as know that 
there was a famine in Asia Minor, who had no knowledge of it before, who were not 
aware that a struggle against death from starvation had been going on in Asia Minor 
for the last twenty months, and that the whole population of that country had been 
decimated, enfeebled by disease, and so scattered and dispersed, that the whole of its 
social system had been utterly disorganized.1
* This article has been prepared at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) at Harvard 
University during the post-doc fellowship term (2015–2016), funded by TUBITAK (The Scientific 
and Technological Research Council of Turkey) 2219 Program. I would like to thank editor Andrew 
G. Newby and the reviewers for their significant critique and inputs on the article, and Seçil Yılmaz, 
Michael Raskin, Paula Garbarino and Fatih Artvinli for their invaluable support, feedback and 
comments. This article is derived from my doctoral dissertation completed at the European University 
Institute (EUI) in Florence (2012). I dedicate it to my supervisor Professor Anthony Molho to whom I 
am indebted for teaching me the significance of scales and trans-communal, trans-national, world-
historical perspectives. 
1 Whitaker, 1875, 15–6. See Ertem, 2015, 17–27 for a critical analysis of the meeting report. 
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Edgar Whitaker, the British proprietor and editor of the Istanbul-based English-
French language newspaper Levant Herald, addressed the crowd composed of 
British and several other European businessmen, diplomats, statesmen and 
merchants at Willis’s Rooms in London with the above sentences on June 24, 
1875. It was the meeting of the Asia Minor Famine Relief Fund established with 
the purpose of collecting relief subscriptions from the British public for the starving 
population in the central Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The members 
of the auxiliary committee seemed to listen with the self-confidence and pride of 
just having “saved” the starving Indians from the pangs of hunger during the famine 
in Bihar and Bengal in 1873-74.2 Then was the turn of the starving Ottomans. One 
year earlier, in May 1874, A.A. Low, a prominent member and the previous president 
of the New York Chamber of Commerce, had responded to a toast for commerce 
at the annual dinner of the organization in New York, saying that commerce’s virtue 
lay in its ability to bring human societies together. “From populous provinces of 
India and from Asia Minor, wo[e]ful tales are brought us of wide-spread famine,” he 
stated; yet it was by “virtue of commerce” that the people of those countries were 
being saved from starvation. He had praised the railways, and electric wires which 
permitted “neither land nor water, however lofty or deep, to arrest the work that 
makes of one great family all the nations of the earth.”3
Railways and electric wires did not always necessarily save people and relieve 
suffering as claimed by the British and American merchants, businessmen and 
administrators at the time. As Mike Davis has discussed thoroughly, throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were used also for exactly opposite 
interests or the interests of a privileged few as well.4 Yet, the same technology has 
also generated historical evidence about the connected elements of modern human 
experiences of people living within a “coeval modernity.”5 Famines in different 
parts of the world in the nineteenth century have been significant events mutually 
shaping this modernity, and thus they offer us insights into diverse interrelated 
imperial hi(stories) of the modern world.
This article analyzes the Ottoman famines of the 1870s that killed tens of 
thousands of people in Anatolia due to starvation and disease, from a global 
2 Unlike the catastrophic death of millions during the next famine in India in 1876–79 under strict 
British laissez-faire policies—which had not occurred yet by the time of the above mentioned 
meeting—the efficient famine intervention policies of the colonial British administration during the 
previous famine in Bihar and Bengal in 1873–74 had proved successful. Davis, 2000, 36.
3 New York Times, 8 May 1874.
4 The same means would soon be used for exporting grain from India to London while millions in 
India were dying of hunger. Asian and African perception(s) of “imperial glory” were different from 
those of the British colonial masters. Davis, 2001, 7. Not just food and welfare—and not always to 
the appropriate  destination— but also guns and violence have been transported and disseminated 
through these networks. 
5 Harry D. Harootunian, a prominent historian of inter-war Japan, describes “coeval modernity” as 
shared by global actors in the same temporality against linear understandings of modernization that 
scaled and measured countries based on their levels of development and progress in that linearity. 
See Harootunian, 2002. 
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comparative perspective. It focuses on two famines in particular that struck the 
central and eastern provinces of the empire in 1873-75 and 1879-1881 (just 
following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78), respectively.6 They were triggered 
by climatic causes, yet their devastating effects were also a product of the global 
and domestic economic and political environment of the decade. Local, imperial 
and global man-made reasons combined with the heavy impacts of nature and 
climate. The article addresses these famines as significant traumatic disasters, 
whose memories were overshadowed by later catastrophic events in Ottoman 
history and historiography, and which have been almost invisible in European and 
global famine historiography of the nineteenth century. It summarizes the political-
economic environment of the decade, attempts to investigate Ottoman famines 
in a global historical context and outline a comparative research agenda for an 
Ottoman history of famine and empire in the late nineteenth century. 
The 1870s: Famine and Empire in Dire Straits
While European and global famine historiography were not interested in Ottoman 
famines of the nineteenth century, the historiography of the Ottoman Empire 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has, for the most part, told 
either variations of an elite-bureaucrat-led modernization story, or rising religious/
ethnic tensions, wars, decline and dissolution. The few studies on famines in 
Ottoman historiography made significant contributions in Turkish, especially by 
drawing attention to rich archival materials.7 However, they also treated the topic 
usually from the perspective of state institution(s), employing solely logistical and 
administrative-chronological approaches. Due to the emphasis put on Ottoman 
successes, and the paucity of historical sources on ordinary people’s voices, the 
political-ideological dimensions of the famines, and local perspectives were mostly 
overlooked. There is still a lot of room for research on the political, environmental, 
social, cultural, and psychological dimensions of the famines. Today, however, 
encouraged by the emerging field of Ottoman environmental history, future studies 
on the comparative socio-cultural and political impact of famines can find a more 
solid background.8
6 According to contemporary records, in the first famine no fewer than 100,000 people, and in the 
second famine no fewer than 10,000 people, lost their lives. 
7 Among these studies, the only monograph in Turkish on famines in the nineteenth century is 
Erler, 2010. For a general bibliography on the subject, see Ertem, 2012a.  
8 Mikhail, 2011; White, 2011; Ayalon, 2015; Dursun, 2007); Tanielian, 2012; Gratien, 2015; Pitts, 
2016; Pehlivan, 2016. For the recent situation of the field of Ottoman environmental history, see 
Mikhail, 2012. Recently, Zafer Karademir made an important contribution to early modern Ottoman 
famine history with his work  on famines of  the 16th and 17th centuries. See Karademir, 2014). See 
also Ottoman History Podcast (OHP), ‘Silent violence in the late Ottoman period’, Özge Ertem, 
Graham Pitts and Chris Gratien <http://www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com/2014/08/famine-ottoman-
empire-lebanon-anatolia.html> (visited 8 Jan. 2014). 
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Famines in the Ottoman Empire are smaller scale famines, compared with the 
other great famines of the nineteenth century, but the intensity of their impacts on 
the daily life of local populations was similar. Both famines in central and eastern 
provinces were triggered by harsh droughts followed by extremely cold winter 
conditions. Yet, the general environment of political and economic crisis of that 
decade played a crucial role.9 Class mattered extensively, and although there was 
general impoverishment across all classes, religions, and sects during the famines, 
local merchants and grain-holders in particular localities profited from the situation. 
Usually, poor peasants and townspeople paid the highest price.
The central Anatolian famine started with the drought in the summer of 1873. 
Following the exhaustion of all supplies—including the grain saved as seed after 
the 1873 round of taxation —during the extremely cold winter of 1874-75, the 
disaster reached intolerable levels in isolated villages. The center was the province 
of Angora [Ankara] but it effected a region covering an area of about 40,000 square 
miles.10 In his tour in the region, Cesarea [Kayseri] station missionary Wilson 
Farnsworth observed that in the whole district, the inhabitants had fled searching 
for food, and leaving behind their starved.Their flocks and herds had perished, 
their fields and vineyards were ruined and they had burned their own houses for 
fuel, he observed.11 The collection of the autumn tax in 1873, which had occurred 
despite previous warnings from locals about the expected bad harvest, had left the 
peasants with few resources when winter arrived.12 In Ankara and Konya, due to 
contemporary records, 40 per cent of all herds died, and each and every community, 
especially the poor Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were effected. Around 
100,000 people alone died because of diseases related to hunger.13 Once winter 
was over and roads were opened, villagers had no choice but walk for hours at first 
to neighbouring villages. However, the neighbouring villages were as devastated 
as theirs. Then they started walking to cities without any calories to subsist them. 
Many people died on the road. Roads, towns, and cities as far afield as Istanbul filled 
with famine refugees. British businessmen, merchants, journalists, and Protestant 
American missionaries each established separate relief commissions both in 
Istanbul and the Anatolian provinces. The Ottoman government also established 
its own commission.14 However, most people seem to have died during the winter 
and early spring of 1874, before there was any awareness of the true magnitude 
of the disaster, and any official efficient relief organization corresponding to it.The 
9 In his classical work, Roderic H. Davison calls the years 1871-5 a “period of chaos.” Davison, 
1963, 301–5.
10 Farnsworth, 1904, 56.
11 Levant Herald, 29 Jul. 1874 (in The Famine in Asia Minor, 1989, 56).
12 Ottoman state’s taxation practices in the provinces did not exclude the use of force as Nadir 
Özbek has shown. Özbek, 2009.
13 Naumann, 1893 (in Kuniholm, 1990).
14 Erler has written in detail in Turkish about the Ottoman government’s and local officials’ famine 
relief initiatives, committees, and actions. Erler, 2010, 193–202. 
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total number of casualties of starvation, hunger, and disease was estimated to be 
around 100,000-150,000.15 
Ottoman Provisioning Policies
In order to discuss the continuities and discontinuities in official famine relief 
policies in the 1870s, one needs to remember earlier provisioning policies. The 
administrative measures the Ottoman government took against earlier famines 
were in keeping with the provisionist legal and moral tradition that survived until 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, which required the state intervene 
to control prices in each phase of the production, trade, transportation, and 
distribution of grains. The rationale behind regulatory policies of provisioning, as 
Seven Ağır underlined, was “redistribution of grain in order to ensure an affordable 
and abundant supply in the cities”. Price controls such as price ceilings (narh) 
were “justified by a rhetoric of welfare, that identified public good with ensuring the 
subsistence of all.”16 Rhoads Murphey summarized the pattern of  early modern 
15 Naumann, 1893 (in Kuniholm, 1990); Quataert, 1968. 
16 Ağır, 2009, 202.  
Figure 1. The Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century (the provinces of 
Hidjaz, Yemen and Western Tripoli are not shown). Map courtesy of the Houshamadyan 
Association. Accessed 1 Mar. 2017 via http://www.houshamadyan.org/en/mapottomanempire.html
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Ottoman measures in response to crop failures in the following manner: “[...] partial 
rebates or full waivers of taxes [while] in times of prosperity it sought to compensate 
for temporary and local shortages by enforcement of resource sharing between 
better-off and less fortunate districts.”17 In her Ph.D. dissertation, Ağır argued 
convincingly that increasing international competition, political, and financial losses 
in wars and the narrowing of the grain supply zone in the Ottoman Empire in the late 
eighteenth century paved the way for “a shift of focus in political economy… away 
from a moral ideology that emphasized welfare and justice towards an ideology that 
emphasized wealth and development in the grain sector.”18 While the establishment 
of a central Grain Administration [Zahire Nezareti] in Istanbul in 1793 may give 
one the impression that grain provisioning for the capital city was becoming more 
centralized, regularized, and protectionist, the centralizing attempt in fact, took place 
simultaneously with “a more flexible attitude towards price controls.”19The Grain 
Administration was abolished in 1839. Bilateral free trade agreements between the 
Ottoman Empire and foreign powers in 1838-41 led to a further loosening of state 
control over the grain trade. Bilateral commercial agreements upheld the principle 
of free trade in relation to the major European powers, beginning with the Anglo-
British Treaty of 1838. Thus, they led to the end of state monopolies in trade and 
provided easy, open access to Ottoman markets for British merchants.20 At the 
same time, local merchants were still bound by rules that limited their mobility in 
trade transactions. Eventually, along with the abolishment of the internal custom 
dues on local trade in 1874, prospects for local merchants engaged in grain in 
Anatolian towns improved. Grain merchants began to act relatively more flexibly 
once freed from state control on their mobility.
Despite these relaxations, due to the absence of railways until the late 1880s 
and the uneven commercialization of agriculture in the Anatolian provinces, a 
small number of local notable families continued to dominate grain trade in several 
towns. Grain hoarding and consequent class conflicts deepened in the countryside 
during both famines, yet the former’s impact remained local and regional.21 Only 
after the 1890s did the once famine-stricken regions of central Anatolia become 
the breadbaskets of the capital city. Unlike the relationship between India and 
London, before 1890, the amount of Anatolian grain consumed in Istanbul was low; 
it amounted to only 2 per cent of all Anatolian grain in 1889.22 Thus, while London 
consumed Indian grain during the famine in India, it was not Anatolian grain that 
17 Murphey, 1988, 218. 
18 Ağır, 2009, 203; Güran, 1984–5, 27-41.
19 Ağır, 2009, 117. See also Salzmann, 1993.
20 See Kütükoğlu, 1976. 
21 Local perceptions of corruption, tyranny, justice and moral economy could transform into 
significant expressions and actions of discontent and resistance to grain hoarders and state officials. 
For an excellent example of  local points of view on state intervention  and local perceptions of 
justice in an Ottoman Balkan province in the 1840s, see Kırlı, 2015. 
22 Quataert, 1993.
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fed the imperial center in Istanbul. As Pamuk noted, only after the establishment 
of the Anatolian railroad that linked Eskişehir, Konya and Ankara to Istanbul, “as 
many as 400.000 tons of cereals were being shipped annually on the railroad” in 
the 1890s.23
One cannot discern a clear-cut departure from a provisionist ‘ancien-regime’ 
in state famine relief of the late nineteenth century. As Mehmet Genç underlines, 
long-established provisionist practices and customs were not abandoned wholly 
in the provisioning of food and basic requirements for subsistence.24 The relief 
policies the Ottoman government implemented to address agricultural distress and 
famine in 1873-75 still included some of the older measures, such as strict bans 
on exports and black-marketing. During both famines, the state organized relief 
initiatives, loosened its taxation policies and ordered tax remissions for particular 
periods of time until peasants could get better yields from the fields in 1875 and in 
1881, respectively. They were temporary solutions. Sometimes the policy brought 
short-term relief; usually, however, it was not sufficient and daily survival of the poor 
was still at stake. The outcomes and influences of these policies were neither even 
nor coherent, but varied due to local circumstances, the role of local intermediaries 
in their implementation, the hegemony of grain-holders in a region and the financial 
and political strains that the country faced at the time. The sources of those strains 
were both local and global. Climate, socio-spatial geographies of vulnerability, 
regional political-economic dynamics, political inaction and infrastructural problems 
combined with the international political-economic context that imposed its harsh 
conditions on the Ottoman government. The droughts transformed to catastrophes 
within this context. The Ottoman polity was an actor in the world of modern 
empires, and the quiet famines in isolated villages in Ottoman Anatolia in 1870s 
were strongly related to the developments in the world around them in the same 
temporality. During the famines, the non-colonial Ottoman imperial realm—with all 
its particularities intact—shared a lot with both the “colonizers” and the “colonized” 
of the nineteenth century, despite being technically neither.25
23 Pamuk, 1987, 104.  
24 Genç, 2000; Yıldırım, 2002. 
25 In his article (Gölbaşı, 2011), Edip Gölbaşı demonstrates the problems of overemphasizing 
the ‘colonialism debate’ in the Ottoman context and instead focuses on modern state practices, 
elements of social control, and Ottoman understandings of citizenship to define and discuss the 
particularities of Ottoman imperialism in the nineteenth century. Regarding Ottoman particularities, 
Thomas Kuhn’s study (Kuhn, 2007) of Ottoman policies in Yemenin the late nineteenth century 
suggests that “in marked contrast to the example of Britain, Ottoman politics of difference were not 
meant to separate those who came under the purview of an official nationalism from those who did 
not.” Therefore, in a political-institutional sense, the Ottomans did not establish their policies on the 
basis of “colonial difference,” but on political “negotiation” and “integration” because of their own 
survival needs. 
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Politics and Economy – 
Context, Comparison and Historiography
Until the publication of a special section of the journal Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa and the Middle East in 2007, analysis of the British and Ottoman 
Empires within the same historical and analytical framework had been confined 
to studies of the early modern era.26 The articles in the volume were significant 
contributions to the historiography of empires in the nineteenth century. They 
helped interrogate the historiographical problems embedded in the perception 
that “the two empires [British and Ottoman] inhabited what were for all intents and 
purposes quite different realms of temporality.”27 Khoury and Kennedy underline 
that the above conviction, which had its origins in European works of the nineteenth 
century and earlier, functioned to make a distinction between “progressive, liberal 
and modern” states and societies vis-a-vis the “static, oppressive, and archaic” 
ones. The articles in the above-mentioned volume challenged these assumptions 
and pointed to the need of putting the two empires into the same analytical 
framework of comparison: 
Both empires ruled vast territories that were inhabited by peoples of widely different 
faith, customs, ethnicities, and more; both made accomodations to these differences 
even as they sought to erase them; both advanced a universalizing mission while 
acknowledging its limits; both asserted authoritarian powers and conceded local 
autonomy.28
However, the emphasis Peter Gray places on Ireland’s and India’s differences 
in order to escape from “crude analytical models” of colonialism is valid for the 
Ottoman context as well.29 In a similar vein, in their quest to historicize studies in 
Ottoman history that have used comparison as a tool since the 1990s, Alan Mikhail 
and Christine Phillou underline that the particularities of the Ottoman Empire 
should not be overlooked for comparison’s sake. Instead, referring to Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam’s useful concept, they suggest doing “connected histories” which 
preserve the specifities of each historical experience while showing the connections 
and “struggle, tension, mutuality and contestation” in the space “between”:
The Ottoman Empire was an elaborate and changing power formation where the 
structures and mentalities of empire met more abstract ideologies of early modern 
26 Khoury and Kennedy, 2007. For a significant analysis of literature on comparative political 
history of the early modern Ottoman Empire, see Salzmann, 1998. The ‘Mediterranean’ became 
also a prominent category of analysis for the early modern Ottoman world thanks to the notable 
work by the Ottoman historian, Faruk Tabak (Tabak, 2008). For the early history of the Ottomans 
within “the larger story of medieval Asia Minor,” thus in the history of the broader world surrounding 
them and having a counterpart in the Iberian peninsula, see Kafadar, 1995.
27 Khoury and Kennedy, 2007, 234.
28 Khoury and Kennedy, 2007, 234.
29 Gray, 2006, 193. 
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sovereignty, then nationalism and the exigencies of imperial rivalry, and then colonialist 
contestation. It is in the interaction among all of these forces that the dynamism of this 
empire takes center stage.30
The decade of the 1870s was one of the most difficult periods for both the 
Ottoman state and its subjects, making evident the interplay and contestation of 
such forces both in the global and in the local arenas. The two famines took place 
at a time of  Ottoman preoccupation with the survival of empire / state in a decade 
of imperialist rivalry and internal economic and political turmoil. In 1876, following 
the fiscal bankruptcy of the Ottoman state, social and political uprisings in Bosnia 
and Bulgaria, and consequent protests of Muslim religious school (medrese) 
students in Istanbul, Sultan Abdülaziz was dethroned by a pro-constitutional and 
pro-parliamentary government faction. It was only a year after the agricultural yields 
in central Anatolia had started to improve and the previous famine disaster was 
on its way out. The opposition promoted liberal and Islamic patriotic discourses 
denouncing the financial and political weaknesses of the state, and the increasing 
financial and political intervention of foreign powers in the affairs of the Empire by 
way of the turmoil in the Balkans. After Abdülaziz, Murad V ascended the throne 
for only three months until being replaced by Sultan Abdülhamid II. The latter was 
enthroned by the liberal faction in 1876, on the condition that he would order the 
promulgation of the first Ottoman constitution and opening of a parliament. The 
constitution was promulgated the same year, and parliament was opened in 1877. 
However, Sultan Abdülhamid II dissolved it once the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-
78 started.31 Subsequently, he would rule the country without a parliament for more 
than thirty years.
Looking at the Ottoman state under Sultan Abdülhamid II’s rule (1876-1909) in 
the context of world changes, and taking issue with those perspectives which either 
orientalized the empire as the “Terrible Turk” and “Oriental Despot” or glorified it, 
Selim Deringil, a noteable historian of the late Ottoman Empire and Abdülhamid 
era, defines the period with the legitimacy crisis of the Ottoman state. Since the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century, likewise their contemporaries in Europe, the 
Ottoman rulers and administrators had developed reforms and policies aimed at 
political, fiscal, judicial, and military centralization of the Ottoman state. In 1839, the 
Tanzimat-ı Hayriye or the Gülhane Reform Edict set the stage for the establishment 
of a modern state apparatus in the Ottoman Empire. The Edict prepared by the 
Minister of Foreign affairs Mustafa Reşid Pasha in 1839, promised reform in four 
main areas: it guaranteed the lives, honour and property of all Ottoman subjects, 
and promised the equality of all subjects before the law, thereby introducing an 
egalitarian concept of “Ottoman” citizenship. In addition, it promised a centralized 
and rationalized military conscription system as well as the establishment of a 
30 Mikhail & Phillou, 2012, 743–4. 
31 Somel, 2003, lx–Ixi. 
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new, centralized tax system to replace the old system of tax-farming.32As Deringil 
stated, the modern state with its “mass schooling, a postal service, railways, 
lighthouses, clock towers, lifeboats, museums, censuses, and birth certificates, 
passports, as well as parliaments, bureaucracies, and armies was only constituted 
in the Ottoman Empire after the Reform Edict of 1839.”33 These developments all 
paved the way for an intense bureaucratization and centralization of the state in 
the Ottoman lands. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire shared the same ambitions as 
other empires in seeking centralized political, administrative, military power, state 
fiscality and economic growth; the “inseparable features of nineteenth century 
historical environments.”34
After the Crimean War (1853-56), the challenges brought by global change on 
both the rulers and the ruled became even more tangible:
[…]just as the state was permeating levels of society it had never reached before, making 
unprecedented demands on its people, it created new strains on society, leading to what 
Jurgen Habermas has called a “legitimacy crisis” or “legitimation deficit.” Nor was this 
legitimacy crisis confined to the relationship of the Ottoman center with its own society. 
In the international arena also, the Ottomans found themselves increasingly obliged to 
assert and reassert their legitimate right to existence as a recognized member of the 
Concert of Europe, as recognized after the Treaty of Paris which ended the Crimean 
War in 1856.35
The legitimacy crisis in question was situated both in the political/ideological and 
the economic realm/sphere. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions (ABCFM) Protestant missionary accounts, reports, correspondences, 
diaries, and the British consulate archives have been some of the most crucial 
sources showing the political implications of the crisis during the famines in 
Ottoman Anatolia.36 These global actors provided famine relief to thousands of 
Turkish, Armenian, Kurdish, Greek, Jewish, Syriac, Nestorian, Arab, and Chaldean 
communities in central and eastern provinces. During the famine years, the ABCFM 
missionaries and the British consuls stationed in Asia Minor tried to fill the void 
left by the Ottoman state in many provinces by way of relief networks, which in 
many instances became influential. They helped save thousands from starvation 
in central and eastern provinces and Mosul. Yet, in addition to humanitarian 
purposes, the missions had their own religious and political agendas. In accounting 
for  both famines, they produced discourses about the Ottoman Empire that were 
embedded in particular ideologies and regimes of government. The missionaries 
32 Zürcher, 2002, 7. In 1842, the old system of tax-farming was reapplied due to the difficulties of 
maintaining the system of centralized tax-collection. 
33 Deringil, 1999, 9–10.
34 İslamoğlu & Purdue, 2009, 112. 
35 Deringil, 1999, 9–10. 
36 Ertem, 2012b.
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laid stronger emphasis on the decay of “Mohammedanism” and “Islam”, whereas 
British relief agents pointed to corruption and the lack of railways, reform, laissez-
faire economics, and overall faith in trade and science. Individual accounts written 
by missionaries and consuls were  much more nuanced and complex, yet, as 
institutional representatives, they had the motive of increasing their religious 
and political influence in Asia Minor by claims on moral, political, economic, and 
religious superiority.
The British and foreign language press also took the famines as occasions to 
condemn the Ottoman Empire for being a “corrupt despotism,” a backward polity 
with bad government. In Istanbul, Edgar Whitaker’s Levant Herald blamed the 
local Ottoman authorities for “entirely ignoring the inexorable laws of supply and 
demand,” by forcing “the importers to sell their grain at unremunerative rates.” The 
paper went on to state: “The laws of economy triumphed, the door was opened 
to famine, and starvation stalked in.”37British actors continued to underline the 
“corruption” of the Ottoman government and its misrule as the real cause of the 
famine. Likewise, the Shaghai-based North China Herald condemned the Chinese 
government’s intervention in the “natural laws of supply and demand,” during the 
Chinese famine (1876-79).38A decade earlier, the London-based British press had 
used similar discourses to “humiliate the Russian Empire” and condemn “Russian 
rule and indifference” during the Finnish Famine in the 1860s: “The Finns were 
presented as a people who had endured ‘the most cruel sufferings in the defence 
of national independence’ during the Russian-Swedish war of 1808-9, a people 
for whom the ‘burden’ of Russian rule was ‘too heavy to be any longer endured.’”39 
Such publications and official voices identified Ottomans, Chinese, Russians and 
Indians pretty much by the same words. 
Not surprisingly, the British short-term and long-term policies regarding famine 
and government in India were considered in British accounts to be the best 
example of government. They saw laissez-faire economies and free trade to be 
the real, modern path to development and reform in the famine-stricken regions 
of Asia Minor, in accordance with British policies in India. They advised the same 
path  for China. This belief also served their own political interests: famine relief 
and charity gave the British consuls and the American Protestant missionaries the 
grounds on which to challenge the legitimacy of the Ottoman government during 
both famines. They were effective in the majority of famine localities; but their role 
became more crucial in places where the Ottoman government intervened late, or 
where governors applied coercive taxation policies and policing, such as Mutasarrıf 
[District Governor] İbrahim Kamil Pasha in Erzurum during the second famine.40
37 Levant Herald, 23 Apr. 1874 (in The Famine in Asia Minor, 1989, 8). 
38 Edgerton-Tarpley, 2013, 140.
39 Newby, 2014, 72–3. 
40 Ertem, 2012, 232–40. 
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Regarding the latter realm (the economic dimensions of the crisis), the Crimean 
War had already born significant consequences for Ottoman fiscality. It started 
the long-term borrowing of the Ottoman governments from European markets 
and creditors in 1856, and caused a quasi-dependence of the Ottoman state on 
European financial sources for several decades. In his work on the Ottoman budgets 
during Abdülhamid II’s rule, Engin Akarli states: “Money, the reformers did find. They 
borrowed it liberally from wealthy West European countries for the principal purpose 
of covering budget deficits”, adding, “but not to improve the productive capacity of 
the country. Thus, they put a burden on future generations without bequeathing 
equivalent benefits.”41 Yet, as Akarli, Deringil and several other Ottoman historians 
also cautioned, this story of dependence has been imagined far too easily within 
an “Ottoman decline” paradigm for decades in Ottoman historiography.42 Several 
groups of Ottoman reformist statesmen constantly negotiated the terms of the 
Ottoman state despite prevailing domestic and international challenges, and unlike 
the dependent conditions that many of their counterparts in colonized India and 
Africa had to face, they “were nonetheless able to carve out a critical space for 
manouevre” within the international scene.43 They were also acutely aware of the 
political, financial, and infrastructural problems the empire faced, and especially 
during the years of Abdülhamid II’s reign, they attached special importance to raising 
agricultural production, social welfare policies, and infrastructural development.44 
Isa Blumi, developing solid arguments of modernization narratives in late-nineteenth 
century Ottoman historiography, writes: “To some crucial outside interests,  the 
Ottoman capacity to produce wealth proved both a long-term threat to their own 
expansionist aims and at the same time an attractive source of potential revenues if 
properly harnessed.”45 Thus, in contrast to  accounts interpreting Ottoman imperial 
collapse as a product  of a premodern, backward, “oriental” social order and violent 
sectarian rivalry, he focuses on the “emergent Euro-American financial oligarchy,” 
and “private banks that were extensions of vast family networks” as critical forces 
shaping the terms on which “Ottoman demise” took place.46Their role is crucial for 
understanding the imperial challenges of 1870s. 
41 Akarlı, 1992, 443. 
42 For a critical analysis of declinist and Eurocentric tendencies in Ottoman historiography, see 
Faroqhi, 2010. 
43 Deringil, 1999, 3. 
44 Akarlı, 1992, 443; see also Akarlı, 2010.Nevertheless, the “public good” was not necessarily 
the priority; they deemed these necessary in order to survive in both domestic and international 
arenas. For the relationship between power, legitimacy and welfare, Özbek, 2005.Their projects and 
solutions did not prevent / exclude the accelerating violence, the loss of legitimacy, and the eventual 
deposition of Abdülhamid II by the Young Turks in 1908.
45 Blumi, 2013, 19. 
46 Blumi, 2013, 19: “In other words, Ottoman collapse was contingent on a number of factors that 
as much reflect a variety of indigenous actors’ interests informed by local processes as those of the 
banking houses in Paris, London, Frankfurt, Vienna, and Milan.” 
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British India experienced similar developments within a colonial context. While 
comparing British and Ottoman Empires, Christopher Bayly suggests that they had 
parallel trajectories of “distorted development”, albeit for varying reasons. He explains 
the concept in relation to British India thus: “…the British government did “develop” 
India through infrastructural and social investment, but only to limited degree 
and only to an extent that was compatible with British strategic and commercial 
aims”.47 He found a parallel for this “distorted development” in the reform attempts 
of the Tanzimat and the Hamidian eras. He claimed that these attempts, which 
“were driven by a desire to save the dynasty,” were constrained by two factors. 
The first one  was “the external regimes of free trade, capitulations, and Ottoman 
debt repayments.” Bayly suggests the system created by these constraints was 
“remarkably similar in its outlines to the more direct imperial economic pressures 
that were felt in India.”48 He notes that the difference between British India and the 
Ottoman Empire lay in that fact that European resident commercial interests did not 
have a direct effect on government policy in the Ottoman Empire. However, their 
similarity was more striking: “During the age of capitalist imperialism after 1860 it is 
noteworthy that the drain of ‘home charges’ and debt repayments on the Ottoman 
and Indian exchequers amounted to about the same, 2.5 percent per annum.”49
The second constraint that laid the ground for a ‘distorted modernization’ was the 
“internal social structure” based on the use of intermediary groups such as “tribal” 
headships and religious millet [the system of religious communities—Muslims, 
Christians, Jews—having legal identities] divisions as a tool of local government 
and cooption. According to Bayly, “old religious, millet and tribal distinctions 
remained lines of fracture that could widen in the case of external enticement and 
local opportunism.”50
The famines did indeed strike the empire during such a period of compounded 
vulnerabilities. In the Balkans, the Serbs had gained autonomy and the Greeks had 
become independent. Egypt also gained wider autonomy from the Ottoman state in 
1873. There was civil strife in Herzegovina between 1874 and 1876, and intellectual 
groups such as the Young Ottomans, who stood for Ottoman patriotism and liberal 
constitutionalism, were gaining influence and would contribute to the deposition  of 
Sultan Abdülaziz in 1876.51
Throughout these years, besides military spending, further borrowing increased 
at ever higher interest rates in order to manage the existing debt. The “Great 
Depression” of 1873 in Europe and the United States triggered a world financial 
47 Bayly, 2007, 339.
48 Bayly, 2007, 339.Richard Horowitz develops similar arguments while comparing China, Siam and 
the Ottoman Empire. He writes, international law based on diplomacy and free trade agreements in 
the nineteenth century was an agent in the transformation of these states as “semi-colonial political 
systems.” Horowitz, 2004, 446–7.
49 Bayly, 2007, 339.
50 Bayly, 2007, 340. 
51 Somel, 2003, Ix–Ixi. 
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crisis that put Ottoman state finances in great trouble because of the difficulty 
of obtaining new credit and capital flight.52 The government managed to sign a 
new contract for loans in October 1874, an act, which prompted the following 
commentary on the pages of the Chicago Daily Tribune: 
[…] it may be doubted whether this loan, or indeed any financial measure will materially 
improve the desperate condition of the Turkish finances. Her national debt amounts 
to more than 700,000,000 dollars, the interest on which is 50,000,000 dollars or more 
than half of her last year’s revenue…In view of the famine in Asia Minor and other 
districts, the really collectable taxes will hardly be increased by one-fourth the amount 
anticipated.53
When the Ottoman government declared partial insolvency in 1875, inhabitants 
were still struggling with the severe consequences of the famine disaster in central 
Anatolia. Not long after, another drought followed by a harsh winter in 1879 hit this 
time eastern provinces, and aggravated the devastation caused by the Russo-
Ottoman War of 1877–78 in the region, especially in Erzurum, Van, and Diyarbekir. 
In 1880, just like in 1874, grain prices increased, bread was inadequate, peasants 
had to migrate to towns, and many lives were lost.54 The war  had already  made the 
lives of populations in north-eastern and eastern provinces miserable, especially in 
Erzurum, a major battlefield province. The Ottoman Empire lost much in terms of 
land and manpower. After diplomatic negotiations between the European powers, 
article 16 of the San Stefano Treaty was integrated into the Berlin Treaty (signed 
on 13 July 1878). This clause put pressure on Abdülhamid II and the Ottoman 
government to “carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms 
demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, 
and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians.”55 The Berlin Treaty 
pointed to the emergence of the politically comparable ‘Armenian’ and ‘Reform’ 
Questions regarding the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The intensity of 
the political and financial crises increased as the Empire faced three major issues: 
the re-settlement of Circassian and Muslim refugees arriving in these provinces 
from lands lost in the war, the burden of paying war indemnities, and the challenge 
of controlling the plunders committed by the Kurdish tribes especially in villages 
inhabited by Armenian peasants in eastern provinces. These acts intensified with 
the famine. 
52 Pamuk, 1984, 114.  
53 Chicago Daily Tribune, 18 Oct. 1874.
54 Around 10,000 people in the eastern provinces and 25,000 in Mosul died according to 
contemporary records. Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives [BOA], Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Correspondence Registers [DH.MKT], 1331/42, 9 May 1880; Duguid, 1973.
55 Rolin-Jaequemyns, 1891, 34. 
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An Overshadowed Memory: War and Famine
When famine hit the Ottoman east in 1880, it marked the beginning of a new 
configuration of circumstances. Unlike the previous famine in central Anatolia, this 
one closely related to war. The resultant loss of agricultural produce, as well as the 
scarcity, and high price of bread raised the intensity of violence and plundering in 
the eastern and north-eastern provinces. Conflicts over land and food deepened 
with the arrival of the first Muslim refugees in a period of general scarcity.56 As 
paper currency continued to depreciate, the price of bread increased even further. 
Several imperial decrees were issued to “maintain peace and order” through 
attempted stabilizations of bread prices, the provision of bread rations for the 
poor, and the assigned supervision of bakeries by zaptieh (police) and municipal 
authorities in order to prevent anyone from buying extra amounts of bread.57 The 
bakeries, however, usually refused to distribute free bread to the refugees.58 These 
events alerted the government to the fact that it needed new measures to curtail 
the rising cost of bread. Despite several attempts to relieve the distress, conflict over 
bread and small-scale bread riots (mostly initiated by Muslim refugees) persisted 
in Istanbul.59 Scarcity and the devaluation of currency by order of the Ottoman 
government  triggered discontent in the rest of Anatolian provinces as well. Another 
serious unrest in the Malatya district of Diyarbekir in March 1880 by Muslim and 
non-Muslim inhabitants alarmed the central authorities.60 An imperial fiscal crisis 
could translate into a severe political crisis in a province already struggling with 
famine and scarcity.
On 24 August 1879, Thomas Boyacıyan, Acting British Vice Consul in Diyarbekir, 
reported the first signs of famine:
The price of provisions is getting very high, and already the signs of poverty and 
famine are appearing. Hundreds of Arab families are located in the neighborhood of 
Diarbekir [sic]. Farmers are demanding seed for next year, but the Government does 
not care much about it. I pointed out, both to the Vali [Provincial Governor] and to the 
Commission [Local administration] the other day, the danger of neglecting an affair like 
this. They promised to consider the matter.61
56 Terzibaşoğlu, 2004, 102; Chochiev &Koç, 2006. See also Blumi, 2013, 43–66.  
57 BOA I-DH [Imperial Decrees of Internal Affairs] 783/63655–17, 17 Mar. 1879; BOA.Y.PRK. ŞH 
[Yıldız Palace, Municipality Documents]1–12, 23 Mar. 1879; BOA. Y.PRK.ŞH 1–14, 17 Apr. 1879; 
BOA. Y. PRK. ŞH 1–15, 22 Apr. 1879.
58 In the Beşiktaş neighbourhood of Istanbul, the bakeries refused to supply the refugees with free 
bread despite the coupons allocated to these refugees by the government. BOA. Y.PRK. ŞH 1–19, 
29 June 1879. 
59 For example, almost a year later, in the Çemberlitaş area of the capital city, refugees attempted 
to plunder a bakery. BOA. Y.PRK.ŞH 1–30, 11 Mar. 1880. 
60 Stephen Duguid was the first to mention this unrest, referring to foreign accounts of these events 
in his unpublished thesis from 1970. According to Duguid, it was “one of the few instances of civil 
protest during this period.” Duguid, 1970, 145.
61 Acting Vice-Consul Boyajian to Major Trotter, Diarbekir, 24 Aug. 1879, FO [British Foreign 
Office] 424–91, 4.
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Villages and towns on the Erzurum Plateau and in the area of Diyarbekir, 
provinces which had been ordered to provide relief to famine-stricken districts a 
couple of years earlier, were themselves hit by famine and scarcity in 1879–81. 
Messrs. Dewey and Thom, Protestant American missionaries stationed at Mardin, 
reported that the famine extended from Diyarbekir to the Persian Gulf.62 The scanty 
rainfall during the winter of 1878–79 resulted in the loss of summer crops and a rapid 
rise of prices. As it had occurred a couple of years earlier, the region experienced 
“[…] a winter of almost unexampled severity from cold and snow, so that not only 
did food and fuel rapidly vanish, but thousands of cattle and sheep perished […].”63 
In the countryside, the loss of cattle and other means of subsistence triggered 
increased plundering  by starving Kurdish nomadic tribes in frontier villages mainly 
composed of sedentary Armenian, Kurdish, Turkish, Syriac and Arab communities.
In urban areas, scarcity and high prices aggravated pre-existing economic 
hardships. In Diyarbekir, in June 1880, a bread riot directed at  two local council 
members, one of them a Catholic Armenian grain merchant, the other a Muslim 
notable, took place. The crowd, including many women and children, according 
to contemporary sources, was also composed of both Muslim and non-Muslim 
inhabitants (including Armenians and Turks).64 Economic problems cut across 
religious-ethnic lines, and when merged with famine, the former were expressed 
as communal conflicts as well as united actions against political and economic 
authorities by poor and deprived inhabitants. The problems in Diyarbekir, and 
news of violence against Armenian villages in the district of Van posed serious 
threats to political legitimacy and the heritage of the Tanzimat reforms in the first 
years of Abdülhamid II’s reign. Before it could address the financial crisis and 
the aftermath of war, the new Ottoman government  had to cope with famine.65 
While the legitimacy of the Ottoman state was being strongly undermined in the 
eastern provinces during the famine, its financial independence was also on the 
wane. In 1881, the Public Debt Commission (Düyun-u Umumiye), consisting of the 
representatives of Ottoman bondholders, was established in Istanbul. The duty 
of the commission was to administer and collect most of the taxes and revenues 
that would repay the foreign debt, as well as the recently added war indemnity to 
Russia.66 With the establishment of this institution, the Ottoman government placed 
about one third of its revenue under the control of foreign creditors, thus rendering 
it more vulnerable to the interventions of foreign powers. These developments in 
62 Kazemi, 2016.
63 Anon. “The Distress in Turkey” in Missionary Herald, Jun. 1880, 76:6, 211.
64 Ertem, 2010.
65 In order to fight the famine in the eastern provinces, an Ottoman Famine Commission was 
established in Istanbul in the last week of April 1880. BOA. I–DH 802–65028, 8 April 1880. It had 
two main duties: (1) to procure grain from neighboring provinces, either as gratuitous relief, or to 
purchase and transport it to famine-stricken provinces; (2) to encourage the organization of public 
and private charity through diverse campaigns and newspaper announcements in Istanbul.
66 Shaw & Shaw, 1995, 224. 
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the 1870s and the early 1880s forced the Ottoman administrators to re-evaluate 
the limits of Tanzimat reforms in the region, and search alternative methods of 
integration and order for these provinces.
• • •
Abdülhamid II managed to consolidate his modern autocratic rule in the empire 
throughout the 1880s and 1890s and several Kurdish tribes became his prominent 
political and economic allies  in maintaining “security” and “order” in the Anatolian 
countryside.67 After the Armenian massacres of the 1890s in the eastern provinces 
of the empire,68 memories of the latest famine became subsumed under this 
new heavy trauma much in the same way memories of the previous famine had 
dissolved into the trauma of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, and the hunger 
experience during the First World War. The Russo-Ottoman War (1877–78) erupted 
only a few years after the great central Anatolian famine. Thus, the intensity of war 
suffering overcame the painful memories of the previous famine period (1873–75). 
The famine that struck eastern provinces in the aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman 
War, on the other hand, was overshadowed by the emergence of the “Armenian 
Question” as an international political issue. The mainstream historiography of the 
Ottoman east has ignored the famine that killed at least 10,000 people in 1879–81 
for two main reasons: 1) the number of the deceased was not deemed significant to 
be analyzed separately; 2) the violent bloodshed during the Armenian massacres 
of 1895–96 and 1915 was a more powerful upheaval. It has dominated memory 
and historiography of the Ottoman east during the Ottoman era.69
In her excellent book on the cultural history of the Great Chinese famine [Dingwu 
qihuang, 1876–79], Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley stated that “few Chinese people 
outside the scholarly community have even heard the term Dingwu qihuang.”70 She 
explained why: 
Both local and national discussions of the disaster were … rapidly buried under layer 
upon layer of new upheavals – China’s loss to Japan in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, 
the invasion by eight allied armies after the Boxer Rebellion, the 1911 Revolution, the 
May 4th Movement, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and then of China proper, civil 
war between the Communists and the Nationalists, and the Communist Revolution. 
Nineteenth- and twentieth-century Chinese history was marked by one enormous 
disaster after another, and the horror of mass starvation was repeatedly ignored in 
favor of focusing on disasters with clearer-cut heroes and villains.71
67 Klein, 2011.
68 Maksudyan, 2014. 
69 The latest volume on the Ottoman East is a significant contribution to the historiography of 
Ottoman Anatolia, that goes beyond conventional paradigms and building on the previous literature, 
takes into account the perspectives of the locals. Sipahi, Derderian & Cora, 2016. 
70 Edgerton-Tarpley, 2008, 5.
71 Edgerton-Tarpley, 2008, 5. 
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The Ottoman famine history and historiography had similar problems. Hunger 
accounts in 1870s soon mixed with the succeeding traumas in Ottoman Anatolia 
and became ordinary details within stories of violence, bloodshed and misery in 
1890s. The daily struggles, pains, clashes, hopes, and frustrations of ordinary 
children, women, men, and already quiet  stories of starved animals in the region 
were silenced under the weight of ensuing wars, massacres, political, religious, 
ethnic upheavals in collective memory.
The trauma of famine was one which affected numerous regions and peoples 
during the nineteenth century, including Ireland, British India, China, Brazil, 
Iran, Europe, and Russia. Global, imperial, and colonial economic relations, 
consequent financial straits, repercussions of modern statehood, taxation policies, 
impoverishment, infrastructural problems, domestic political chaos, wars, violence, 
corruption, and political recklessness all compounded the devastating impact of 
climate and natural disasters. States and private actors took certain relief measures 
and actions, and international humanitarian agents developed relief missions and 
initiatives. However, millions of people still died of hunger and disease unnoticed 
in places whose rulers had been relying extensively upon discourses of science, 
physical and moral superiority, and modernization. Disease due to hunger, 
immigration, rising bread prices, grain hoarding, riots, theft, plunder, violence, moral 
corruption, transformation of values, dissolving of family and community bonds 
became widespread phenomena in the very same century of prevalent reform, 
progress, centralization, state power and development discourses. Starving men, 
women, and children could not make their true agony be heard.Notwithstanding 
their individual contexts, stories, and differences, the Ottoman famines were at the 
same time part of this broader history. The ordinary Ottomans had their share from 
nineteenth-century hunger(s) with all pecularities intact. Its memory might have 
remained dim; but it is not non-existent. 
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Finland’s “Great Hunger Years” 
Memorials: A Sesquicentennial Report.1
Andrew G. Newby
Department of World Cultures, University of Helsinki
This article provides an interim report, and gazetteer, on the enumeration and 
categorisation of memorials to Finland’s Great Famine Years, an element of the 
Academy of Finland’s 2012-17 project, “‘The Terrible Visitation’: Famine in Finland 
and Ireland ca. 1845-68 – Transnational, Comparative and Long-Term Perspectives”. 
To outside observers, it can sometimes seen as though Finland’s famine of the 
1860s has been “forgotten”, particularly in comparison with catastrophes in Ireland 
(1845-51) and Ukraine (1932-3). In the latter cases, political circumstances have 
influenced historic narratives, and placed the Great Famines at the centre of a 
national narrative that emphasises the baleful role of an external other. In Finland, 
which was responsible for its own economic and political administration by the 
1860s, commemoration has been more local in focus. The memorials nevertheless 
highlight the existence of an idealised national autostereotype, which stresses 
stoicism and forbearance, along with a persistent belief that the nation could be 
crystallised by shared suffering.
Introduction, Structure & Sources
This interim report is based on a combination of fieldwork, and primary / secondary 
source research, and is a step towards the creation of a comprehensive record of 
memorials to Finland’s Great Hunger Years [Suuret Nälkävuodet] of the 1860s. The 
150th anniversary of the great mortality crisis of 1867-68 represents an appropriate 
time take stock of these memorials, and this account is supplemented by a more 
analytical / comparative article which will be published in the summer of 2017.2
1 The extensive fieldwork that has been required for this article has been funded as a part of the 
broader Academy of Finland project, “The Terrible Visitation: Famine in Finland and Ireland c. 1845-
1868 – Comparative, Transnational and Long-Term Perspectives” (# 1264940 and #1257696). I 
am grateful to many individuals who have helped in the search for these memorials. These include 
Liisa Kortelainen (Juuka), Juha-Matti Junkari (Juuka), Rev. Jouko Ala-Prinkkila and Raija Kumpula 
(Kauhajoki Parish), and several good Samaritans from Kankaanpää and Nummikoski who in May 
2016 helped to rescue my car from a particularly deep and viscous ditch on Road 6700, near 
Ämmälä, after I took a misguided shortcut between the memorials at Lapinkaivo and Hämeenkyrö. 
Unless otherwise stated, photographs are by the author.
2 Newby, 2017.
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The content of the report is based on various types of source. As might be 
expected, many valuable clues about memorial locations were found in Finnish local 
newspapers from the twentieth century. The newspapers were particularly useful 
in reporting inauguration ceremonies, and the local campaigns / committees which 
formed in order to establish a memorial. In a similar vein, a diverse range of internet 
sources has proved important in either confirming, or hinting at, the existence of a 
particular memorial. These sources include: the websites of Finnish municipalities 
and Lutheran parishes; heritages websites such as Kirjastovirma3 which provides 
pictures and historical sketches of parishes in Northern Ostrobothnia; individual 
travel and heritage blogs (the Rastipukki4 photo collection, and Mauri Kinnunen’s 
Karelia-focussed Makkerin blogi5 have been especially interesting); and even online 
descriptions of geocache sites have given vital information.
The thirteen-volume series, Suomen Muistomerkit [Finland’s Memorials] gives 
a marvellous indication of the diversity of Finland’s public monuments, although 
it does not by any means record all of the memorials to the Great Hunger Years. 
Nevertheless, the series not only provided guidance and inspiration, it helped 
to contextualise the famine memorials in Finland alongside monuments to other 
historical events & individuals. While poring through these volumes in the library 
of the Board of Antiquities in Kallio, it was also possible to consult the myriad local 
histories of Finnish regions and municipalities, many of which highlight the famine 
to a greater extent than general national histories. 
My own fieldwork, which is due for completion in September 2017, has meant 
thousands of kilometres of travel around Finland. Without having employed 
“scientific” oral historical methods, the contribution of local informants, as well as 
colleagues, must be acknowledged. Antti Häkkinen’s work, in particular, has been 
a very important basis for this research into sites of famine memory, not least as 
Professor Häkkinen shared the results of some his own earlier fieldwork. Local 
residents have been extremely generous with their time and have helped in several 
instances to locate memorials. 
Models and Inspiration
Various stimuli coalesced into a motivation to explore the existence, location and 
form of memorials to the Great Finnish Famine. As a mere dilettante in relevant 
academic fields such as Material Culture, Memory Studies, or History of Art, I have 
remained mindful of Peter Gray’s warning that “the professional historian’s role 
in commenting on these manifestations of ‘public history’ is not straightforward”.6 
3 <www.kirjastovirma.fi> References to online sources are accurate as of 1 February 2017.
4 <www.rastipukki.kuvat.fi> features photographs of several 1860s memorials, amongst various 
other types of memorial, churches, statues etc. 
5 <http://maurikin.blogspot.fi>  
6 Gray, 2004, 46.  
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Moreover, I have necessarily approached the topic with a foreign gaze, but particularly 
the gaze of someone whose mode of thought around famine commemoration has 
been shaped by the Irish experience. In general, it is easy to understand why 
Irish academics have written of Finnish popular “amnesia” in relation to the 1860s 
famine, and that the famine years themselves have been “unduly neglected” by 
historians.7 It is important to remember, however, that the Irish have also been 
charged with collective amnesia in relation to the 1840s, particularly prior to the 
“famine fever” which gripped the country in 1997.8 We should take care not to 
suggest that the post-1990s historiography on the Great Irish Famine is “normal” 
in an international context, even though in many respects it provides a model for 
critical interdisciplinary research.
An examination of the general historical literature on nineteenth-century Finland 
– not by any means limited to English-language sources – confirms the primacy 
of an economic-historical narrative that posits a relatively short crisis, followed 
immediately by an economic and demographic recovery.9 Moreover, the 1860s was 
a decade that saw confirmation of Finland’s autonomy within the Russian Empire 
– indeed its emergence as a nation – and the famine years have scarcely been 
deemed worthy of analysis in a political context. In addressing the question of 
“historical amnesia”, Eliza Kraatari has recently written of the “silence” that surrounds 
the history of the famine years in Finland, and of the “hesitation to address the 
concept even in related historical research”.10 While academic studies of the 1860s 
seem to have increased again in recent years, after a lull since the 1980s and 
early 1990s, public awareness of the sesquicentenary remains limited, particularly 
as it is subsumed beneath the more celebratory centenary commemorations 
around Finland’s independence. And yet, an unqualified “amnesiac” hypothesis is 
problematic. The famine years are covered in Finnish children’s books (including 
on the national curriculum), in university courses, and it has even been claimed the 
famine years are “indelibly marked in the memory of the Finns”.11 
Recent academic work – in a variety of disciplines – on memorials to the 
“Great Famines” in Ireland and (to a lesser extent), Ukraine, have been important 
guides as this project has developed.  In its form and execution, it owes a debt to 
Emily Mark-FitzGerald’s comprehensive Irish Famine Memorials website12, itself 
a valuable adjunct to her academic analyses.13 Inspiration also came from Rob 
Gibson’s Highland Clearances Trail (1983, subsequently several revised editions), 
7 Ó Gráda, 1995, 208; Daly, 1997, 596.
8 Ní Dhomhnaill, 1997, 68–9; Ó Gráda, 2001; Haines, 2004, 17; Wilson, 2015, 145. Contrast Niall 
Ó Ciosáin’s analysis of popular remembrance (Ó Ciosáin, 2001). 
9 Häkkinen, 1992, 150. Newby & Myllyntaus, 2015, 145–6. 
10 Kraatari, 2016, 192. 
11 Reunala, 1989, 45; Hieta et al, 2012, 46–7; Kaakinen et al, 2005, 118–9. 
12 <https://irishfaminememorials.com>  
13 Inter alia, Mark-Fitzgerald, 2012; Mark-Fitzgerald, 2013; Mark-FitzGerald, 2014.  
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a book that identified, located and contextualised “Clearances” sites in the Scottish 
Gàidhealtachd, and which had a tremendous impact on me as a student.14 There 
is no intention on my part, however, to follow a path towards “heritage tourism”, or 
indeed “misery tourism”15, not least because of the size of Finland and the relative 
inaccessibility of some of the monuments noted. This research will, however, 
eventually form the basis of an open-access, interactive website, again inspired by 
Emily Mark-Fitzgerald’s work on Irish Famine Memorials, and will provide accurate 
locations and descriptions of these important Finnish sites of memory. 
Memorialising the 1860s – A Brief Overview
A Memory of the Years of Dearth: In the lower storage room of Karstula belfry is 
a knapsack preserved from the 1867-68 Years of Dearth, which contains inside the 
remainder of some poor starving individual’s bark-bread. This ever-so-nasty relic from 
the Dearth Years, which can be witnessed with one’s own eyes, should be preserved, 
to remind future generations of the our ancestors’ anguished history.16
By the time this “memorial” was discovered, in 1895, Finland’s famine years of the 
1860s were already a part of the nation’s history. “Hunger Bread”, although it was 
also used in non-famine years, became a recurrent symbol of the 1860s. Its use in 
memorialising the famine years had been noted by the British writer Emile Dillon 
(using the pseudonym E.B. Lanin) in 1892:
famine decimated the population [in the 1860s]…the museum of Helsingfors still 
possesses a gruesome collection of the “hunger bread” on which the peasantry was in 
those time of scarcity forced to live. They are all black or brown; as hard as a stone and 
generally as free from admixture of corn.17
Early written recollections focussed largely on the mortality crisis of 1868, and 
in emphasising the role of early frosts in September 1867 implied strongly that 
Finland’s devolved administration in Helsinki were helpless in the face of a natural 
disaster. Anders Svedberg, a Swedish-speaking Finnish teacher, journalist and 
editor who represented the peasantry in the House of Estates in Helsinki, produced 
one of the earliest retrospectives. Entitled “Famine [Hungersnöden] in Finland. 
1867”, Svedberg’s article was published in the Swedish newspaper Förre och Nu 
in September 1871. He noted the impact of the frost, as well as aid from overseas 
(particularly Sweden), and the redoubtable efforts of the Finns themselves. The 
emergence of a hegemonic elite narrative was already discernable: 
14 Gouriévidis, 2010, is also a key influence in this respect. 
15 Elliot, 2016, 35.
16 Hämäläinen, 3 Aug. 1895 (quoting Suomalainen, 31 Jul. 1895.
17 Lanin, 1892, 420. 
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However, when God strikes He heals well, and after the storm He lets the sun shine. 
This happened even here ... You could ask in conclusion, what Finland learned in the 
fiery trial it had just undergone. As the issue concerns the entire population, one cannot 
anticipate visible results immediately; but this much is certain, however, that greater 
diligence and thrift is notable as the first and immediate lesson of the time of trouble.18
Shortly after the publication of Svedberg’s article, the nationalist Suometar 
published a similar narrative for a Finnish audience – emphasising the sense of 
Divine challenge, and the opportunity that the economic troubles provided for 
crystallising the people into a nation.19 
The early 1890s, partly as a reaction to a renewed threat of famine, witnessed 
the emergence of literature dealing with the 1860s, and a potential challenge to 
the hegemonic narrative.20 The elite’s response was prompt, with the publication 
in 1892 of Agaton Meurman’s Hungeråren på 1860-talet [The Hunger Years of 
the 1860s].21 Meurman’s work reaffirmed a famine narrative that highlighted the 
people’s stoicism, and the benefits that accrued from the experience of shared 
suffering. His arguments provided the template for articles and books on the 
1860s until deep into the twentieth century. Of particular relevance to this report is 
Meurman’s assertion that the Riihimäki-St. Petersburg railway, constructed as part 
of the famine relief works and opened in 1870, provided the Finnish people with the 
only monument they needed to the “noble sacrifice” of the 1860s.22
In fact, the railway did become known colloquially as the “Skeleton Track” 
[Luurata], or “Hunger Track” [Nälkärata]. In 1907, a report in the railway workers’ 
newspaper Juna claimed that each kilometre of the St. Petersburg-Riihimäki railway 
represented a construction worker who died from starvation or disease.23 Memories 
faded, however. Writing in 1903 from Hausjärvi – a key railway construction site 
and a municipality which saw two contemporary memorials erected at Oitti and 
Hikiä – farmer and journalist Kalle Kajander complained that if someone in the 
south of Finland could not recall the 1860s, then they could have “no idea of what 
real hunger is”.24 By 1913 a concerned railwayman wrote to the press to highlight 
the “forgotten graveyard” at Kärkölä, which “nobody had touched for decades”, and 
which possessed not a single memorial to distinguish it from the surroundings.25 
The writer added that there was a “sacred responsibility” to care for sites such as 
the mass grave at Kärkölä.
18 Svedberg, 1871. 
19 Uusi Suometar, 25 Sep. 1871. Newby, 2017.
20 Newby, 2014, 392–3. 
21 Meurman, 1892; Jussila, 2013, 30–31.
22 Newby & Myllyntaus, 2015, 157–8; Meurman, 1892, 44, 78.
23 Juna, 30 May 1907. 
24 Kajander, 1903, 5.
25 Uusi Rautatielehti, 15 Aug. 1913. 
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Although this interim report is intended primarily as a gazetteer of sites, rather 
than an in-depth discussion of the place of the 1860s famine memorials in the 
construction of Finnish national history, it is possible to argue that the memorials 
can be used to construct / solidify both the hegemonic and the counter-hegemonic 
narratives:
1. HEGEMONIC: the location of many of these memorials in graveyards overseen 
by the state church, along with biblical quotations stressing forbearance and 
stoicism in the face of Divine challenge; the proximity in many cases of “Hero 
Graveyards”, the graves of locals who fell in battle in 1918 and 1939-44 (and in 
the case of the Civil War limited to those who fought the “White” cause) indicates 
adherence to a particular narrative of adversity; the inauguration ceremonies 
for these memorials often follow a well-established format, including the 
traditional interpretation of the famine years as a frost-induced natural disaster; 
the inclusion of the Great Hunger Years as a “building block” for the nation, 
alongside later traumas.
2. COUNTER-HEGEMONIC: highlighting regional tensions and divisions in 
the context of an overarching national famine narrative, particularly in areas 
with higher than the average excess mortality; taken as a whole, the widely 
divergent sets of dates which can be found on the memorials indicates that 
different areas of Finland suffered severe economic difficulties well in advance 
of the frost “trigger” of September 1867 – the inefficient reaction of the central 
administration in Helsinki is therefore thrust into sharper relief.26  
Summary of Findings
Geographical Spread of Monuments
It is notable that, in contrast to e.g. Ireland and Ukraine, there is no “national” 
famine monument, either in the capital or some other symbolically important site.27 
Indeed, the largest town to host a famine memorial in Finland is Lahti, which (in 
26 Newby, 2017; Ó Ciosáin, 1995, 9–10; Crowley, 2012. 
27 Although famine memorials are notable by their absence from Finland’s largest towns, there 
are nevertheless sites which are linked to the 1860s in, for example, Helsinki, Espoo, and Tampere. 
Perhaps the best-known example of this in Helsinki is the paving at the observatory in Ullanlinna 
Park (Tähtitorninvuori). Although landscaped by C.L. Engel some decades earlier, private iniatitives 
from the local residents used relief labour to flatten and tarmac the road. (Hufvudstadsbladet 27 
Jan., 12 Feb., 18 Feb., 1868; Suomalainen Wirallinen Lehti, 18 Feb. 1868.) In the neighbouring city 
of Espoo, the medieval cathedral is one of many examples of an unmarked famine-era mass-grave. 
It is recorded that 298 people were buried in the Espoo Churchyard in 1868, mainly unmarked. In at 
least one instance, though, there is the grave of an identifiable individual victim: Carl Birger Agricola, 
whose death in March 1868 was caused by “the raging typhus epidemic that was hitting all social 
classes.” (Hufvudstadsbladet, 24 Mar. 1868). In the city of Tampere, the pathway through Pyynikki 
churchyard was constructed by relief work in 1867, and the “puuportti” at Finlayson’s factory was also 
a site of gratuitous distribution of relief meal by the factory owners. See <www.tampere.fi/material/
attachments/p/jiSwrIyA0/pyynikin_kirkkopuisto_esite.pdf> <www.tampere.fi/liitteet/k/64kuOvsey/
nottbeckin.pdf> 
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2016) was the eighth most populous municipality. The local focus becomes more 
explicit when examining the distribution of memorials on Map 1, which exposes a 
close correlation between the presence of a memorial and higher mortality during 
the 1860s. Three main clusters of memorials can be identified: (i) sites associated 
with the Riihimäki-St. Petersburg railway; (ii) western sites in Pohjanmaa and (iii) 
eastern sites in Vaara-Suomi. The northernmost site found to date is at Pudasjärvi, 
some 700 km north of the capital Helsinki and 640 km from the most southerly 
memorial (Mäntsälä). This reflects the relatively minor impact that the famine made 
on the north of the country.28 On the west-east axis, Vaasa lies approximately 550 
km from Ilomantsi.
Environments
28 Newby, 2017; Voitto Viinanen’s account of the “Ruijan Reitti” – the northern road taken by some 
Finns in search of work in Norway or, indeed, onward passage to America, implies that some graves 
in Inari belonged to 1860s vagrants. See <www.voittoviinanen.com/albumi/ruijanreitilla/676142>  
Map 1: 
The seventy-eight memorial sites noted in this 
article correlated to excess mortality on the 
level of Lutheran deaneries (rovastikunnat) 
in 1868. Based on the territorial borders of 
the Grand Duchy of Finland 1833-1920 (see 
Jukarainen, 2002). I am grateful to Miikka 
Voutilainen for allowing me to use this map. 
See Voutilainen, 2016, 180 (Map 16). N.b. the 
eastermost (Greek Orthodox) deanery of Salmi 
lacks the relevant data. Details on deaneries 
taken from Finlands Statskalender, 1868.
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There is a strong tendency in Finland (over 70% of those noted in the gazetteer) 
for famine memorials to be located in churchyards, often in proximity to a famine-
era mass grave. The excellent records of the Lutheran church have arguably made 
it easier to locate these memorials, which might create a bias in the results until 
such time as all the memorials are found, but nevertheless the role of the church 
in famine commemoration is undeniably strong. Otherwise, mass-graves related to 
relief work sites are also common locations. Finnish famine memorials (in contrast 
to the Irish case) are only rarely afforded “public spaces” in towns – and in no case 
is there a memorial that would arrest the attention of a casual visitor or tourist. It can 
be said, therefore, that the intended “audience” of the Finnish famine memorials 
differs considerably from those of their post-1997 Irish famine equivalents.29  
Chronological Development of Monuments
The earliest memorials are contemporary, generally plain stones with a simple 
inscription, and hark back to an earlier tradition of marking significant events, 
including famine.30 An exception in this case appears to be the site at Oitti, where 
a gravestone-style memorial was erected in memory of lost railway workers. It 
was nearly sixty years after the famine years, however, that a new generation 
of memorials – planned by committees at particular lieux de mémoire, emerged. 
The earliest of these were at Varkaus (in the vicinity of the Taipale Canal relief 
work mass grave), and at Sotkamo.31 The events of the 1940s understandably 
interrupted famine memorialisation, but the first post-war monument at Piipola 
(1946) presaged a new burst of activity. The 1950s saw memorials established at 
Alajärvi (1951), Lahti (1953), Varpaisjärvi (1950s, precise date not yet established), 
Veteli (1954), Kiuruvesi (1955) and in Hämeenlinna’s old graveyard (1958), where 
four hundred victims of hunger and disease were buried during the famine. Reports 
of the Hämeenlinna memorial made specific mention of the 90th anniversary of 
1868, a sign of the increasing awareness around the importance of anniversaries.32 
This awareness was confirmed in the 1960s, with the famine’s centenary focussing 
the attention of parishes and local history societies, particularly in some of the 
places that had been worst affected: Lehtimäki (1962); Karttula, Kitee (1963); 
Lohtaja (1964); Nurmes (1965); Soini, Sievi (1966); Eno, Evijärvi Väinöntalo, 
Heinävesi, Lavia, Paltaniemi (1967); Leppävirta, Lieksa, Nilsiä, Ristiina (1968). 
Railway-related sites were also inaugurated in Kärkölä and Kuusankoski during the 
centenary period, as was a new memorial to the famine road at Tokerotie, in the 
 
29 Newby, 2017. 
30 For example, Vaarojen Sanomat, 5 Nov. 1969 notes the discovery of a contemporary stone 
commemorating a famine year in 1835. 
31 See also the gazetteer entry for Lieksa, where a plan for a monument was announced in 1935. 
32 Suomen Kuvalehti, 15 Nov. 1958. 
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Aronkylä neighbourhood of Kauhajoki.33 In the five decades since the centenary, 
the memorials have increased steadily in number, with more diverse artistic forms 
being employed. To date, the most recent additions have been at Vaasa (2008), 
Nivala (2009), and Kärsämäki (2014). There is no indication that the famine 
sesquicentenary will herald a new wave of memorialisation such as that seen in 
Ireland around 1997, although it is possible that local organisations will mark the 
occasion amidst the national-scale Suomi100 celebrations. 
Inscriptions
The most common euphemism for the 1860s famine years found on famine 
memorials is, unsurprisingly, “the (Great) Hunger Years” [(Suuret) Nälkävuodet], 
an expression that was popularised by Agaton Meurman’s 1892 book.34 Other 
expressions occur, including: Years of Dearth [Katovuodet]; Years of Frost 
[Hallavuodet]; Years of Disease [Tautivuodet], and Poor Years [Köyhät Vuodet]. To 
date, not a single example has been found of the word used to describe modern 
famines – nälänhätä.35 Many of the memorials also contain mortality figures specific 
to the locale. Moreover – unsurprisingly given the tendency for the memorials to 
be located in churchyards – biblical quotations proliferate. Details are given in the 
individual site descriptions below, although the most common quotation is “give us 
this day our daily bread”, or a variation. 
Varying Forms of Monuments
As might be expected, there is also a diversity in the form of the memorials, 
reflecting local or time-specific trends, or the use of particular tropes which might 
be considered local manifestations of more universal themes: grieving human 
(particularly female) forms, begging hands, or the failed foodstuff (generally 
depicted in Finland as rye). The re-appropriation of material germane to the site 
also occurs regularly, for example: the use of millstones in Evijärvi, Sonkajärvi and 
Ilmajoki; the reconfiguring of a bridge built as relief work into a memorial (Kivijärvi), 
or the symbolic use of iron railway tracks at mass-graves of railway workers (Lahti, 
Kärkölä). 
33 Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, 10 Feb. 1972. See also Suomen Kuvalehti, 22 May 1998. 
34 It was translated into Finnish as Nälkävuodet 1860-luvulla. 
35 An examination of these euphemisms is outside of the scope of the current report, but it will 
be important to analyse the Finnish and Swedish words used to describe “famine” events both in 
Finland and abroad. 
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Next Steps
Various gaps in the basic information of some of the memorials remain, and this 
is the immediate priority – viz. discovering the date / year of inauguration, and 
completing the task of visiting each one personally to record GPS coordinates and 
check inscriptions, form etc. To date, secondary information has been obtained 
from fieldwork, local informants, local newspapers and internet sources (particularly 
Lutheran parish websites). It will be important to consult archival sources – 
particularly church and municipal records – as a means of confirming inauguration 
dates etc. of the memorials. There are also plenty of local newspapers still awaiting 
analysis.
The development of a complete catalogue of 1860s memorials is intended to 
create a resource for further research, particularly allowing contextualisation: (i) 
alongside other “trauma” memorials in Finland (many of which have aesthetics, 
locations, and indeed sculptors in common with the famine memorials), it will 
be important to analyse the position of famine memorials within a “hierarchy of 
memory”36; and (ii) comparative work with other countries. 
In taking the comparative study with Ireland to its logical conclusion, it will of 
course be necessary to confirm whether any 1860s memorial sites exist outside 
of Finland. This includes among diasporic settlements in North America and the 
lands that comprised the Russian Empire, but also those “lost territories” of the 
1940s.37 It seems quite apparent that, despite the following pages describing over 
seventy memorials, more are waiting to be uncovered. Indeed, it is hoped that by 
publishing this interim report informants might contact the author with more sites, 
or more details of the memorials noted here (or errors in fact or interpretation). In 
the week before submission, two more memorials came to light which precipitated 
further road-trips, and there seems no doubt that this will not be a “final” list.38 
36 Conway, 2010, 7–8; Tuomisto, 1990; Tuomisto, 1998; Raivio, 2000; Worthen & Muir, 1–30; 
Kivimäki, 2012, 482–504.
37 Other than a memorial to the 1697 famine in Jääski (erected in 1916. See Uusi Suometar, 7 Sep. 
1916) I have not encountered references to any other memorials in the ceded parts of Karelia. 
38 To put this interim report into perspective, Petri Raivio’s study, based on fieldwork undertaken 
in 1997-99, was based on 546 sites of memory related to the Second World War in Finland. Raivio, 
2000, 164 (fn. 25). 
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Map 2: Locations of the seventy-eight memorials recorded in the gazetteer. Based on the territorial 
borders of Finland 1944 to present (see Jukarainen, 2002). Map by permission of ZeeMaps.
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Sites of Memory: The 1860s Great Hunger Years
An Interim Gazetteer of Finnish Famine Memorials
Organised Alphabetically by Location. 
NB: Finnish spelling conventions are used; translations of inscriptions are the 
author’s own, and attempt to take some account of style and cultural peculiarities; 
for reasons of space, original Finnish texts / inscriptions have been omitted here 
but, but the author can be contacted for further details if required.
As far as possible, the name of the municipality in 1868 has been used in the 
alphabetical arrangement. In cases where this municipality has been merged 
subsequently, the new entity is noted in square brackets before the region. Where 
it is considered useful, the name of the specific village within the municipality is 
noted in brackets. 
Naturally, there are numerous sites of memory around Finland which relate to 
the Great Hunger Years, but which are not explicitly indicated by a memorial or 
interpretive board. These include place names, former parish grain-stores, grave-
sites etc. The list of memorials adheres to the definition suggested by Emily Mark-
FitzGerald in her analysis of recent Irish memorials: a “Famine monument has 
been defined as a three-dimensional form set in public space”, and other existing 
historical sites, “famine roads”, or the remains of poor-houses, are not included 
unless they are also accompanied by a memorial or more extensive commemorative 
intervention.39
1. Alahärmä [Kauhava] 
Southern Ostrobothnia 
Alahärma Churchyard, Härmäntie 39 (63°14’45.6”N 22°51’28.6”E).40 Inaugurated on 10th 
July 1989 by Alahärmä Parish; natural stone with brass plaque (by Jussi Somppi): “In 
memory of those who died of starvation in the years 1867-1868. Alahärmä Parish 1989”. 
2. Alajärvi
Southern Ostrobothnia
Gabriel’s Church, Alajärvi; Kirkkotie 6 
(63°00’00.3”N 23°49’31.7”E).41 
Inaugurated 12 August 1951; gravestone 
with inscribed Christian cross and 
text: “This stone was erected in 1951 
by Alajärvi parish in memory of those 
who perished during the Great Hunger 
Years of 1866, -67 and -68. Father Give 
Us Our Daily Bread”.
39 <https://irishfaminememorials.com/user-guide/>
40 SM 1994c, 6.
41 Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, 20 Apr. 1967. 
Fig. 1: Alajärvi, July 2016. 
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3. Asikkala
Päijänne Tavastia
Vääksy Canal Park, off Kanavatie on the 
north side of the Vääksy Canal Bridge 
(61°10’36.6”N 25°32’10.7”E).42 The “Hard 
Times Memorial”, erected in advance of 
Finland’s sixtieth anniversary as a nation 
and inaugurated officially at a ceremony 
coinciding with this anniversary in December 
1977.43 Tall, cenotaph-style with stones 
embedded. Designed by Heikki Sipponen, 
built by volunteers. 24 standing stones 
represent the villages of Asikkala. “The Work 
of Previous Generations: Difficult Times – 
Winter and Continuation Wars 1939-1945; 
Events around independence 1917-1918; 
Hunger Years 1867-1868; Canal Building 
1868-1871; The Great Northern War (‘Great 
Hate’) 1713-1721. Memorial inaugurated by 
the people of Asikkala 7.1977 as a message 
to future generations”.
4. Elimäki (Koria) [Kouvola]
Kymenlaakso
In the vicinity of Kallioniemi Dancing Hall (60°51’07.2”N 26°36’60.0”E). A granite stone 
memorial (currently to the right of a wooden terrace with picnic table), which is dated 19 
August, 1869. The memorial features the initials of six people, and is said to be carved 
by the railway workers themselves in memory of their dead colleagues.
5. Eno [Joensuu]
North Karelia 
Eno Churchyard; Enontie 28 (62°47’25.4”N 
30°10’05.4”E). Inaugurated in 1967 on behalf 
of the parish society by mayor Emil Palonen. 
44 Tall Christian cross flanked by two low, 
rectangular / cuboid black stones. Designed 
by Pastor Esko Jalkanen. Inscribed on the 
left stone: “In memory of those who died of 
starvation 1866-1868”, and three healthy rye 
stems. Inscribed on the right stone: “Eno 
parish society, 1967”, and three broken rye 
stems.
42 SM 1996c, 8.
43 Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 4 Dec. 1977. 
44 Länsi-Savo, 5 Jun. 1967. Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 5 Jun. 1967; SM 2000a, 6.
Fig. 2: Asikkala, January 2017.
Fig. 3: Eno, October 2016. 
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6. Evijärvi 1
Southern Ostrobothnia
Evijärvi Churchyard, Kirkkotie 77 (63°22’31.7”N 23°28’27.4”E).45 Inaugurated in 1986. 
Re-used millstone, lying flat. Organised and funded by the local Lions Club. Millstone 
donated by Erkki Paalanen. Inscribed by Aleksi Kultalahti with: “Give us our daily bread. 
In memory of the hunger-dead of the 1800s. Lions Club Evijärvi 1986”.
7. Evijärvi 2
Southern Ostrobothnia
Väinöntalo Lake Region Museum, Latukantie 99. A memorial to the Great Hunger Years 
is located in the garden of Väinöntalo Museum. It was inaugurated in 1967. It is a natural 
stone slab, into which is carved: 18 1/6 67.46 
8. Haapajärvi
Northern Ostrobothnia
Haapajärvi Old Churchyard, off Kauppakatu (63°44’52.5”N 25°18’57.2”E).47 Inaugurated 
in 1988 and designed by Armas Kosonen. Stone memorial with inlaid black marble, 
featuring three emaciated hands praying and grasping for a single rye stem. Text “In 
memory of those who died of starvation in the 1860s”. Author Aki Ollikainen suggested 
that the memorial in Haapajärvi partly inspired his award-winning novel Nälkävuosi 
(White Hunger) (2012).48 
9. Halsua
Central Ostrobothnia
Halsua Churchyard, off Perhontie. Memorial in the form of a stone wall, inscribed with 
text: “Give Us This Day Our Daily Bread”. Designed by Sulo Kalliokoski and prepared by 
Kalle Jokela.49 
10. Hausjärvi (Hikiä)
Tavastia Proper
Hikiäntie, Pässinlukko, between Seppälä and Hikiä on Road 290 (60°44’32.4”N 
24°56’13.7”E). A contemporary memorial stone, in the vicinity of the Riihimäki-St. 
Petersburg railway relief work, resituated in 1988. Accompanied by a plaque: “The years 
of poverty, 1862-1868. As a consequence of the Years of Dearth, the parish of Hausjärvi 
lost one fifth of its five thousand inhabitants to contagious diseases. According to 
tradition, this stone was placed here on Pässinluko Hill in memory of those who died of 
typhoid”. Organised by the Hikiä Society. Confirmed by National Board of Antiquities in 
1987 as marking a mass grave.50 
45 SM 1994c, 16.
46 SM 1994c, 16. This seems to indicate a specific date (1 June 1867). The municipality of Evijärvi 
was founded around this time. The Väinöntalo museum is open during the summer and has an entry 
charge. 
47 Maaselkä, 22 Dec. 1994; SM 1996a, 9.
48 Kansan Uutiset, 16 Dec. 2012.
49 SM 1994c, 18; see <http://www.kase.fi/~joukohe/pappi.php> for an image.
50 Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 24 Oct. 1987. 
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11. Hausjärvi (Oitti)
Tavastia Proper
Vanha Valtatie, Hausjärvi, opposite junction with Viinikaisentie (60°47’28.8”N 
24°59’38.0”E).51 Railway Builders’ graveyard fenced, with sign “Radanrakentajien 
Hautausmaa” from the road. Gravestone with cross motif and inscription: “1867. The 
Railway Builders Lie Here”.
12. Heinävesi
Southern Savonia
Heinävesi Church, Kirkonmäki 
Graveyard, Museokuja (62°25’57.1”N 
28°37’44.2”E).52 Inaugurated in 1967 
and designed / executed by the noted 
sculptor Veikko Jalava (1911-1981, 
see also Nurmes). Granite relief 
featuring a grieving figure, and the 
inscription: “In commemoration of 
the suffering of the inhabitants of our 
area during the Great Hunger Years 
1866-1868. Erected by the Heinävesi 
Society, 1967”.
13. Hämeenkyrö
Pirkanmaa
Hämeenkyro Church, Härkikuja 13 (61°38’08.8”N 23°11’36.1”E). Tall natural stone, 
inscribed with: “Years of Dearth 1867-1868. Grave of the Hundreds of Dead. Lord You 
Kill, But You Restore Life”. 
14. Hämeenlinna
Tavastia Proper
Hämeenlinna Old Graveyard Park, Turuntie (60°59’41.4”N 24°27’10.4”E).53 Inaugurated 
in 1958, a gravestone with plaque: “In this graveyard lie four hundred who perished 
from hunger and disease during the Great Hunger Years 1867-68”. Nearby in the same 
graveyard is the tombstone of Pastor C.W. Appelqvist, who died in 1868 “from the fever 
that ravaged Hämeenlinna”.54  
51 SM 1996c, 19.
52 SM 2000c, 13.
53 Suomen Kuvalehti, 15 Nov. 1958. 
54 Hämeläinen, 24 Dec. 1868. 
Fig. 4: Heinävesi, October 2016.
“The Enormous Failure of Nature”: Famine and Society in the Nineteenth Century
188
15. Iisalmi
Northern Savonia
Old Churchyard, Kirkkotie 10 
(63°34’42.5”N 27°10’10.6”E). 
Inaugurated in 1977. Menhir-style 
memorial with two plaques: (1) “In 
memory of those who suffered during 
the 1860s Years of Dearth. Give Us This 
Day Our Daily Bread – 4th PETITION”. 
This indicates the fourth petition of the 
Lord’s Prayer; (2) on the reverse of the 
monument a second plaque records 
“this memorial was erected by Iisalmi 
Parish, in the year 1977”.
16. Ilmajoki
Southern Ostrobothnia
Ilmajoki Churchyard, Kirkkotie 18 
(62°43’37.6”N 22°33’44.6”E). Broken 
millstone, with metal Christian cross. 
Designed by Pentti Haapamäki. 
Prepared by Otto Talvitie (1914-2007). 
Inscribed with the text: “Victims of the 
Hunger Years – Known to God”.
17. Ilomantsi
North Karelia
A memorial to those who perished 
during the Hunger Years of the 1800s 
was inaugurated in 2003 in Mustamäki 
Churchyard.55
55 See <www.ilomantsi.fi/suur-ilomantsin-synty>; Pogostan Sanomat, 26 Nov. 2009; Karjalainen, 19 
May 2016; Ensio Kettunen, “Nälkävuodet,” Kettusviesti 2015 (accessed via <www.kuolismaankettuset.
fi/tiedostot/uusi_Kettusviesti_2._2015.pdf> 
Fig. 5: Iisalmi, February 2017. Image courtesy of 
Ronan Newby. 
Fig. 6: Ilmajoki, July 2016.
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18. Jalasjärvi [Kurikka] (Taivalmaa)
Southern Ostrobothnia
Taivalmaa Village Roadside, Tokerotie 
(Road 672), by junction with Vainiontie 
(62°33’21.7”N 22°54’08.6”E).56  
Tokerotie itself translates as “Slop 
Road”, as it was said that its builders 
were too weak to ingest anything other 
than a very “sloppy” mixture of flour 
and water.57 According to local tradition 
(via Antti Häkkinen), the sign was made 
by Joel Kanto the only local man who 
could write (Finnish?), who had learned 
to write while in prison.58 Original Stone: 
“Road Built 1867. Aleksander Nikoljv”. 
Plaque: “The Builders of Tokerotie – Did 
this text here during the Great Hunger 
Years. Villagers lifted the stone onto its 
pedestal in 1967 for it to be cherished 
by future generations”. 
19. Juuka
North Karelia
Juuka Churchyard; Kokkokalliontie 
3. In the vicinity of the famine-era 
mass-grave. Inaugurated in 1980. 
Menhir-style memorial, approx. 1.5 
metres high, comprising two natural 
stones (memorial and base), designed 
and executed by the well-known 
sculptor Kauko Kortelainen (1933-). 
Inscription “1689 – 1868. In memory 
of those who perished by hunger”, with 
representations of wilted rye stems 
carved into one flank. Commissioned 
by a local memorial committee, led 
by Pietari Korhonen, and fundraising 
organised by local entrepreneurs and 
Lions Club. The name of the memorial 
is “Katovuosi” (Year of Dearth), and the 
additional allusion to the crisis of the 
late seventeenth century is distinctive 
among the 1860s memorials.59 
56 <www.jalasjarvenkylat.fi/taivalmaa_tokerotien_muistomerkki> 
57 Vuorela, 1935; Knuuttila & Koivu, 1975, 115.
58 Antti Häkkinen was informed by a local resident, Yrjö Taivalmaa, in 1986 (Häkkinen, 1991a, 138, 
fn. 24) .. The Joel Kanto story is also noted in Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, 10 Feb. 1972. 
59 Karjalainen, 8 May 1980. A preliminary sketch, including some small differences from the 
finished monument, is included in this article. 
Fig. 24: Tokerotie, April 2016. 
Fig. 7: Juuka, October 2016. Image courtesy of 
Liisa Kortelainen.
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20. Jämsä
Central Finland
Jämsä Churchyard, Koskentie (61°52’27.2”N 25°11’01.7”E).60 Inaugurated in 1987. 
Abstract granite memorial with small plaque: “In Memory of those who were lost during the 
Hunger Years 1866-1868”. Designed by Paavo Keskinen, the monument lies in the main 
church’s “Memorial Graveyard”, situated next to the (White) Civil War and later Winter 
/ Continuation War graves, and a memorial to the Karelian refugees.61 An interpretive 
board notes the “Hunger Years, 1866-68”, and quotes the former Finnish President, 
P.E. Svinhufvud (1861-1944): “our people’s entire past is a guarantee of the future”. 
Moreover, the memorial was invested with explicit meaning by the artist: “the monument 
consists of a recumbent stone slab, cleaved into three sections […] the three-piece slab 
represents the tragedy of people lost to hunger, and their broken life cycle. The rough, 
untreated surface of the stone reflects the diversity and nuances of human existence”.62 
The interpretive panel gives the local context – 1,082 people perished in 1868 in Jämsä 
– and highlights the “awful weather conditions” which triggered the famine.
21. Kangasniemi 1
Southern Savonia
Joutsanmaantie 568, approx. 9km SW of Kangasniemi (61°56’42.6”N 26°31’34.8”E). 
Pylvänälä-Joutsa Road Memorial. Interpretive board explaining the history of the road, 
which was started at relief work in 1868. Vagrants in debt to the municipality were also 
ordered to help in the road’s construction. The road was completed in 1880, and was 
in use between Kangasniemi and Joutsa for around one hundred years. Moss-covered 
contemporary memorial, marked “Rauhoitettu Kivi” [Protected Stone] with sign from the 
main Road 616: “Muistokivi” [Memorial Stone].   
22. Kangasniemi 2
Southern Savonia
Museum of Local History & Culture, Joutsantie 1 (61°59’25.3”N 26°38’34.9”E). 
Inaugurated in 1970. Site of a famine-era grain store.63 Recumbent stone, with abstract 
relief.64 Accompanying plaque: “To the memory of those lost to hunger and deprivation 
60 Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 21 Sep. 1987. 
61 Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 21 Sep. 1987. 
62 Quoted on <http://www.museo24.fi>  
63 Länsi-Savo, 4 Oct. 1988, 15 Jan. 2013. 
64 For the memorials, Länsi-Savo, 29 Jun. 1970; 4 Oct. 1988. 
Fig. 8: Jämsä, April 2016.
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during the Great Years of Dearth in Kangasniemi. Kangasniemi Peasant Culture 
Foundation [Talonpoikaiskulttuurisäätiö] 1970”.  
23. Karttula [Kuopio]
Northern Savonia
Karttula Old Churchyard, Kirkkotie 28 (62°53’15.7”N 26°58’11.6”E).65 Inaugurated in 1963. 
Stone monument, reminiscent of a sarcophagus, with a cross on the right-hand side. A 
black marble inlay with the text “To the memory of those buried here during the Hunger 
Years of 1866-68. 1963. Karttulan Farmers’ Society Alliance [Maamiesseuraliitto]”.
24. Kauhajoki (Aronkylä)
Southern Ostrobothnia
Aronkuja 1, in the Aronkylä neighbourhood of Kauhajoki, by the start of Tokerotie (see 
Jalasjärvi).66 (62°27’17.3”N 22°13’42.1”E). Inaugurated in 1967.67 Menhir-type natural 
stone on a base of smaller stones. Designed by Matti Porkkala. Plaque with text: “In 
Memory of the Builders of Tokerotie during the Hungers Years 1867-68. Kauhajoki 
Society”. Organised by neighbourhood residents.68 
65 <www.kuopionseurakunnat.fi/hautausmaat/karttulan-hautausmaa>; SM 2000b, 28. This source 
notes that 200 were buried in the mass-grave at Karttula, including the uncle of future Finnish 
President, Urho Kekkonen.
66 SM 1994c, 35.
67 Suomen Kuvalehti, 22 May 1998.  
68 A play, “Tokerotie” had also been conceived a year earlier. Written by Kaarlo Peren and 
performed by Lauri Tuuri. Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, 13 Sep. 1966. 
Fig. 9: Karttula, February 2017. Memorial bottom right. Image courtesy of Ronan Newby.
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25. Kauhajoki (Lapinkaivo)
Southern Ostrobothnia
The memorial to “Juurakko Gustaf” 
at an isolated location in Kauhaneva-
Pohjakangas National Park (62°15’60.0”N 
22°26’26.0”E), simply records that he 
died of hunger at that spot in April 1868. 
Little is known about this memorial, 
other than the current stone monument 
supplemented a carving in a nearby tree. 
As “Gustaf” (Kustaa Salomoninpoika 
Ohmero) came from Kauhajoki, some 
30km distant, it seems as though he may 
have been in Lapinkaivo, a few weeks 
short of his 60th birthday, engaged in the 
marsh drainage that was being carried 
out as relief work.
26. Kiihtelysvaara [Joensuu]
North Karelia
Kiihtelysvaara Churchyard; Aprakkatie 3 
(62°29’37.7”N 30°15’06.7”E). 
Inaugurated in 1974.69 A 150cm tall 
installation by Eero Eronen, (see also 
Tohmajärvi) entitled “Tyhjentynyt kap-
pa”.70 Featuring a bronze sculpture of 
three hands (representing a child, an 
adult and an older person) grasping at 
the empty container, with an inscription 
on the dolerite base: “In memory of those 
who died of hunger 1864-1868”. Nearby, 
surrounded by an iron fence, is the tomb 
of a local victim, “Young Isidor”, who died 
aged two years and eight months, in April 
1868. According to the Kiihtelysvaara 
Society, on the day of Isidor’s burial, 
seventy other victims were waiting to be 
buried.71 
69 Kiihtelys-Pyhäselkä Lehti, 28 Sep. 1974. 
70 I translate “Tyhjentynyt Kappa” as “The Emptied Basket”, although “kappa” is a technical term 
referring to a container – and by extension weight – of produce, typically potatoes.  Details of the 
memorial at <https://erkkieronen.com/portfolio/tyhjentynyt-kappa/>  
71 See <http://kiihtelysvaara-seura.fi/nahtavyydet/muistomerkit/> 
Fig. 10: Kauhajoki (Juurakko Gustaf), April 2016. 
Fig. 11: Kiihtelysvaara, October 2016. 
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27. Kitee
North Karelia
Kitee Churchyard; Savikontie 5 (62°05’45.9”N 
30°09’00.7”E). Inaugurated in 1963. Granite 
gravestone with a relief of a mother and two 
children with small bags of provisions. Planned 
by art teacher Annikki Palosuo-Louhioja.72 
Inscription on the reverse: “In memory of those 
who died of hunger. The people of Kitee. 1963”.
28. Kiuruvesi
Northern Savonia
Pappilanranta, Kirkkokatu (63°38’47.2”N 26°38’30.1”E). 73 Inaugurated in 1955. Designed 
by local architect, Aarne Timonen. Site of a famine-era mass-grave, approximately one 
kilometre south-east of Kiuruvesi’s main Lutheran church. Pyramid with stones inlaid 
around the central plaque, topped with a granite cross. “Here lie those forest-clearers 
who perished through hunger during the great frost years of 1867-1868”.
72 Despite the centenary context, the reports around the inauguration of this memorial actually 
suggest it was erected to remember the 105 known – and many other unknown – victims of hunger 
in Kitee in 1809-10. Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 23 Sep. 1963. 
73 Leinonen, 2008, features a picture of the Kiuruvesi memorial on its front page. See also SM 
2000b, 38.
Fig. 12: Kitee (detail), October 2016.
Fig. 13: Kiuruvesi, February 2017.
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29. Kivijärvi
Central Finland
Hannonsalmi Bridge, junction of Sallatie and Kivijärventie (63°07’57.5”N 25°01’05.8”E).74 
Inaugurated in 1985. Memorial made from the stones of the Hannonsalmi and 
Matalasalmi Bridges, which had originally been constructed as relief work. Plaque with 
text: “HUNGER YEARS MEMORIAL erected from the old bridges. Eat your bread with 
gratitude and blessings. Lions Club Kivijärvi. Kivijärvi Municipality. 1985”. 
30. Kouvola (Kuusankoski)
Kymenlaakso 
At Ristikankaantie, location 60°50’33.1”N 26°42’39.5”E. Inaugurated in 1987. Established 
by Kouvolankylä Village Council, 7 Jun. 1987. Commemorating the Ristikangas 
Graveyard, and particularly: those buried as a result of wars in the 1700s; Russian army 
reservists from the Crimean War; residents of Kouvulankylä; and those who died while 
building the Riihimäki-St. Petersburg railway. 
31. Kuhmo
Kainuu
Hankaniemi Churchyard, Kappelikuja 1.75 Inaugurated 2 June 1991. Planned and prepared 
by gardener Jarmo Aalto. Erected by Mauno Hyvärinen. Asymmetric grey granite pillars: 
the taller “Hunger Years 1866-1868”, accompanied by biblical text: “Blessed is the one 
who will eat at the Feast in the Kingdom of God (Luke 14:15)”.
32. Kuhmo (Lentiira)
Kainuu
Lentiira Church Old Graveyard, Sutelantie. Inaugurated in 1980 at the instigation of 
Lentiira Men’s Circle [miestenpiiri]. Designed by “border-region pastor” [rajaseutupastori] 
Jukka Pirttijoki from Kuhmo.76 Iron cross and plaque on natural stone. Biblical quotation: 
“Never Again Will They Hunger (Rev. 7:16). 1867-68”. 
33. Kälviä [Kokkola]
Central Ostrobothnia
Kälviä Churchyard, Kälviäntie 22. A memorial to those of died of hunger is situated in 
the churchyard.77 
34. Kärkölä
Päijänne Tavastia
Tillolantie, Hähkäniemi (60°51’17.3”N 25°16’18.9”E). Inaugurated 1967.78 Cross made 
from railway tracks. Octagonal centre plaque “Hunger Years 1868-1869. Buried Railway 
Workers’ Resting Place. Kärkölä Parish, 1967”. Grave area fenced, with a signpost 
74 SM 1998, 66.
75 Kuhmolainen, 23 Sep. 2016; SM 1996a, 34.
76 SM 1996a, 34. 
77 See <www.kase.fi/~eharju/toimipisteet.htm> 
78 SM 1996c, 61; Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 29 May 1967. 
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“Radanrakentajien Kalmisto 1868-70” from the 
road. After falling into some disrepair the site was 
cleaned up by forty volunteers, and rededicated 
with the help of European Union rural development 
(LEADER II) funding in 1998.79
35. Kärsämäki
Northern Ostrobothnia
Kärsämäki Churchyard, Frosteruksenkatu 26.80 Inaugurated 2014. Donated by Teija and 
Timo Surakka. Natural stone with engraving: “Whoever is kind to the poor lends to the 
Lord. Proverbs 19:17”. 
36. Lahti
Päijänne Tavastia
Off Road 312, in the vicinity of Motorway 4 & Motorway 12 junction (60°58’16.8”N 
25°42’54.6”E). Inaugurated in 1953 (1954?). Again, this memorial was placed in the 
vicinity of a mass grave. The monument’s main text reads: “During the 1867-1868 Great 
Hunger Years, were buried in this place railway builders who died of hunger and disease 
from Hollola parish, the villages of Lahti and Järvenpää, and from other places. Monument 
erected by Lahti Parish, 1953.” Surrounded by a fence made of railway tracks, and in 
the style of a Finnish croft There is also a contemporary gravestone in the vicinity. Plans 
for dedicating the site were made from as early as 1947.81 In 1950, the “Lahti Society”, a 
typical Finnish community group, petitioned the town authorities to ensure that the “so-
called ‘Hunger Years Graveyard’, which has persistently been left completely untended”, 
should be protected and equipped with the appropriate symbols of a cemetery.82 In 
support of their argument, the Lahti Society provided a historical account of the famine 
years in the town, noted that popular memory still recalled these harsh times, and 
stressed that the mortality was so great at the time that the local churchyard was unable 
to accommodate the workers’ corpses. As a result, the railway authorities reserved 
land on a nearby ridge for the purpose. Although the site was revered for decades, the 
current generation had forgotten its significance, and it had become a “playground for 
the children and dogs” of local inhabitants. The existence of the railway had contributed 
greatly to the development of the town, the society argued, and so those who gave 
79 Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 24 Aug. 1998. 
80 <http://karsamaenseurakunta.fi/hautausmaa> 
81 Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 16 Oct. 1947. More generally, see Forsius, 1980. 
82 Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 24 Mar. 1950. 
Fig. 14: Kärkölä, April 2016.
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their lives in creating it should be given due recognition.83 The petition seemed to have 
some effect, a considerable amount of money was raised locally, and when the Railway 
Board transferred the cemetery to the care of the church in 1953, a monument was 
erected.84 The site’s centenary (of the start of the building work) was noted in 1968.85 
The 110th Anniversary of the railway opening was acknowledged at the site in 1980.86 
Nowadays, the site is completely surrounded by the Lahti intersection of Motorway 4, but 
it is signposted as the “Railway Builders’ Graveyard”.87 
37. Lapinlahti (Lapinlahden Kirkonkylä)
(Northern Savonia)
Lapinlahti, Linnansalmentie 2. Inaugurated in 1968. Large boulder with plaque.88 “Erected 
in memory of those who died during the Hunger Years of 1867-68. Lapinlahti Parish. 
Give us our daily bread”. Connected to relief work building the nearby Nerkoo Canal, 
which started in 1866 and cost over one hundred lives.89 A lieu de mémoire can also be 
found at nearby Akanoja (“Women’s Ditch”), where women – tired of circumnavigating 
a peninsula to bring food to the male labourers – dug a passage at the neck of the 
peninsula.90 
83 Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 24 Mar. 1950.
84 Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 21 Dec. 1950. Although the memorial stone is dated 1953, the 
inauguration ceremony seems to have taken place in the summer of 1954. See Etelä-Suomen 
Sanomat, 26 Jun. 1954. 
85 Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 18 May 1968. 
86 Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 12 Sep. 1980. 
87 A report of a commemoration at the site in 1980 notes that this fence was planned at the 
time. Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 12 Sep.1980. The symbolic use of railway track is repeated in the 
monumental cross at the Kärkölä railway workers’ memorial (1967). In a similar vein, the memorial 
at Hannonsalmi (Kivijärvi, 1985) is made from the remains of a stone bridge that was built as a relief 
work in 1868. 
88 See <www.pohjois-savonmuisti.fi/documents/10543/0/Lapinlahden+kirkonkylän+historiakierros> 
89 Nerkoo / Lapinlahti was also one of few sites which recorded a serious popular agitation during 
the famine years. See Häkkinen, 1992, 158.
90 <www.lapinlahti.fi/fi/Tietoa-kunnasta/Kylat/Nerkoo/Historia/Kanavatyon-uhrit> “Akka” is a slang 
and generally dismissive / derogatory word for a woman, and might be suited to a more colloquial 
translation.  
Fig. 15: Lahti, July 2014.
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38. Lavia [Pori]
Satakunta
Lavia Churchyard, Tampereentie 9 
(61°35’41.8”N 22°35’53.8”E).
Inaugurated in 1967.91 Tall sculpted 
stone, with “Hunger Years, 1866-68” 
text above a relief of a mother bending 
protectively over a pleading child. 
Small plaque on the base with text: “In 
this garden of God lie approximately 
800 Lavia residents, who during the 
sore trials of the Hunger Years died 
without leaving their home parish. 
Centenary Memorial Erected by 
Grateful Lavia Residents, 1967”.
39. Lehtimäki [Alajärvi]
Southern Ostrobothnia
Murtolampi Old Graveyard, Töysäntie. Inaugurated in 1962.92 Tall natural stone with relief 
of a mother giving food to children, designed by engraver Ensio Antikainen. Inscribed 
text: “Give Us This Day Our Daily Bread. Hunger Years, 1863-1868”. 
40. Leppävirta
Northern Savonia
Leppävirta Churchyard, Kirkkokaari (62°29’24.3”N 27°47’16.8”E). Inaugurated 1968.93 
Simple gravestone with plaque: “To the victims of the Hunger Years 1867-68”. It was 
reported at the inauguration that 1,536 parishioners were buried in the famine-era mass 
grave.   
41. Lestijärvi
Central Ostrobothnia
Lestijärvi Church Graveyard, Lestitie 16. A memorial to the 1868 Great Hunger Year is 
located in the graveyard.94 
91 Pitkäjärvi, 2008; Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, 18 Feb. 1967; Tyrvään Sanomat, 26 Sep. 2013 notes 
that Lavia has a “rare 1867–68 memorial”.  
92 Suomen Kuvalehti, 6 Oct. 1962; SM 1994c, 192.
93 Suomen Kuvalehti, 13 Jul. 1968. 
94 SM 1994c, 192.
Fig. 16: Lavia, April 2016. 
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42. Lieksa
North Karelia
Roadside memorial, Lamminkyläntie, near junction with Koulutie (63°18’24.7”N 
30°03’46.5”E). Inaugurated in 1968 at the instigation of the Lieksa-Pielisjärvi Society.95 
Boulder with motifs: (i) Christian cross; (ii) three broken stems of rye. Text: “1866-1868. 
Hunger Years”. Plans were afoot already in 1935 to erect a monument to the famine 
dead of the area.96 The Finnish Garden Alliance [Suomen Kotipuutarha-liitto] reported 
in 1937 (in a special “Graveyards and Churchyards” issue of their newspaper), that a 
memorial was planned for the Pielisjärvi Churchyard in the Rauhala neighbourhood, 
by the famine-era mass graves. The famous artist and designer Antti Salmenlinna, a 
member of the alliance, had designed a cuboid stone memorial with a text: “Here Lie 
Those Who Perished From Starvation”.97 The article only mentioned that this stone – a 
matter of 500 metres from the 1968 memorial – was intended for the churchyard, and so 
more research / fieldwork is needed to confirm what transpired.
43. Liperi (Ylämylly)
North Karelia
Roadside memorial, at an elevated site off Ylämyllyntie near junction with Lautasuontie 
(62°37’30.7”N 29°35’03.6”E). Rededicated September 2002. Original stone inscribed 
with “1867”, laid upon a flat stone with plaque: “Memorial Stone to the Hunger Dead. 
Maker Unknown. 30.9.2002. Liperi Society. Liperi Council”.
44. Lohtaja [Kokkola]
Central Ostrobothnia
Lohtaja Graveyard, Karhintie 143.98 Inaugurated in 1964. Memorial dedicated to those 
who died of hunger, 1867-1869. A gift of the Lohtaja Local Society [kotiseutuyhdistys]. 
350 local inhabitants and homeless vagrants were buried in the churchyard in the famine 
years. 
45. Merijärvi
Northern Ostrobothnia
Merijärvi Churchyard, Kirkkotie 14. Inaugurated in 1992.99 Approximately 65 inhabitants 
of Merijärvi died of hunger and related diseases in 1867-68, and a memorial in their 
memory was erected near the gates of the graveyard.100 Two broken rye stems on black 
stone and inscription: “To the victims of the Hunger Years 1866-1868. Merijärvi Parish”.
46. Mäntsälä
Uusimaa
Vanha Porvoontie 10 (60°37’50.2”N 25°19’23.9”E).101 Inaugurated in 1984. Relief 
of famine refugees, mounted on stone. The stone base has two natural dark bands, 
95 See <http://lieksapielisjarviseura.fi/45-artikkelit/100-seuran-historia> Note also footnote 29. 
96 Viena-Aunus, 1 Jun. 1935.
97 Puutarha ja Koti, 6–7 (1937). 
98 SM 1994c, 90. 
99 SM 1996a, 44.
100  See <www.kirjastovirma.fi/merijarvi/historia>  
101  Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 7 Nov. 1983; 23 Jul. 198
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which are intended to be reminiscent of mourning ribbons. Main text: “In memory of the 
victims of the 1866-68 Hunger Years” with a supplementary credit to “Mäntsälä Council. 
Mäntsälä Society”. The Mäntsälä monument is reminiscent, in some respects, of the 
much larger Irish Memorial (2003) in Philadelphia. Its development followed typical lines. 
In late 1983 it was reported that the Mäntsälä Society has undertaken to collect money 
in order to finance a monument to the “Hunger Refugees” of 1866-68. The money would 
purchase a large natural stone, which was located directly outside the old parish hall. The 
society’s chairman, Osmo Viljanen, stated that “famine refugees came in their droves 
to Mäntsälä […] the former parish hall, which was the largest building in the town, was 
the reception centre for those refugees”. The Mäntsälä Society’s active fundraising over 
the winter of 1983-4 was rewarded. The well-known sculptor Heikki Varja (1918-1986) 
produced the piece, which was unveiled to great acclaim at a wreath-laying ceremony 
in July 1984. Viljanen’s speech suggested a long crisis, as he alluded to the earlier hard 
year of 1856, but nevertheless the cause of the famine was again given as “the power of 
nature”, specifically “severe rainfall, ice and night frosts”, rather than any failures on the 
part of the Helsinki administration. He continued: “when the famine years were at their 
worst, entire families went around begging. Infected beggars spread diseases north 
and south. Animals were forced to eat roof thatch as there was no other food available”. 
The memorial depicts a scene of chaos and vagrancy, one of the most literary common 
tropes of the 1860s famine years in Finland.
Fig. 17: Mäntsälä, April 2016.
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47. Nastola [Lahti] (Uusikylä)
Päijänne Tavastia
Ylämaantie 213, Uusikylä (60°55’33.7”N 
26°06’35.0”E). Inaugurated in 1990.102 
Natural stone memorial with cross 
mounted. Text inscribed: “To the memory 
of the dead builders of the Riihimäki-St. 
Petersburg railway, 1868-1870. Nastola 
Council and Parish, 1990.” An article in a 
local newspaper in 1988 had bemoaned 
the fact that: “the existence and 
historical significance of railway-builders’ 
graveyards in Oitti, Järvelä (Kärkölä) and 
Pekanmäki (Lahti) is already recognised, 
and they have received deserved 
memorials, but for one reason or another, 
the neglect of the Uusikylä mass grave 
just continues…”103 A stone wall of 
approximately 10km in length, also part 
of the famine relief work, runs next to the 
memorial. 
48. Nilsiä [Kuopio]
Northern Savonia 
Nilsiä Old Churchyard, Pisantie 2 (63°12’08.1”N 28°05’24.9”E). Inaugurated in 1968. 
Large natural stone with a plaque: Memorial: To the blessed unknown in this graveyard, 
particularly the inhabitants of Nilsiä who died of hunger in the 1860s. 1253 souls perished 
in 1868. Town and Parish, 1968”. 
49. Nivala
Northern Ostrobothnia
Nivala Churchyard, Kirkkotie 6.104 Inaugurated in 2009. Black plaque with yellow-golden 
text, flanked by ten stylised rye stems. Inscription: “In memory of the 1867-1868 victims 
of hunger. [erected by their] Descendants, 2008. ‘Give us this day our daily bread’”. 
Designed by artist Riitta Latvala-Erkkilä. 
50. Nurmes
North Karelia
Kirkkoharju, Nurmes (Nurmeksen Sankarihautausmaa); via entrance and stairs on 
Pappilansuora (63°33’11.3”N 29°07’10.4”E).105 Inaugurated in 1965. The memorial in 
Nurmes was a pioneer among Finnish famine memorials in that it was a named piece 
of art, a relief by Veikko Jalava (see Heinävesi, above) entitled “Maaemon syli” (“In 
102  Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 7 Nov. 1990.
103  Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 17 Sep. 1988.
104  <www.kirjastovirma.fi/muistomerkit/nivala/15> 
105  Plans seem to have been under way as early as 1962 for the memorial in Nurmes. See Etelä-
Suomen Sanomat, 18 Sep. 1862. For the inauguration in 1965, see Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, 10 
Jun. 1965; Juustila, 1965, 6–8; SM 2000a, 63.
Fig. 26: Uusikylä (Nastola), May 2016.
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the Lap of Mother Earth”). On the base of 
the relief a text reads: “In memory of those 
who died of hunger in 1866, [this memorial] 
was erected in 1966. Nurmes Parish, 
Council, and Chamber of Commerce. 
Valtimo Parish and Council”. Another 
indication that famine memorialization 
was entering a new stage in 1965 is 
that the unveiling of “Maaemon syli” was 
accompanied by a 147-page book, edited 
by Yrjö Juustila. The local significance 
of the famine years is highlighted by the 
inclusion of the opening lines of Juho 
Reijonen’s Nälkävuonna (which focuses 
on the tribulations of a family from 
the Nurmes village of Kuohatti) in the 
preface of Juustila’s book. The foreword 
also explains that the Nurmes parish 
lost 1,218 inhabitants in 1868, buried 
in unmarked mass graves, and that to 
“honour these victims’ difficult battle for 
their daily bread”, the consortium of local organizations named on the memorial had 
commissioned Jalava’s sculpture. An additional aim was to connect those who died 
“to the members of the same families one hundred years later”, something that was 
achieved by naming all of the local famine dead, including date and cause of death.106 
106  Juustila, 1965, 6–7.
Fig. 18a: Nurmes, February 2017.
Fig. 18b: Louis Sparre’s sketch for Juho Reijonen’s short story Nälkävuonna: karjalainen kertomus 
(1893), largely set in the Nurmes parish of Kuohatti. This distressing tale of a family’s struggle to 
survive in 1868 featured prominently in the 1960s commemorations in Nurmes. Louis Sparre, On 
Hunger Year [undated]. Image by kind permission of the Finnish National Gallery (Ateneum Art 
Museum). Photographer Ainur Nasretdin.
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51. Nurmo [Seinäjoki]
Southern Ostrobothnia
Nurmo Churchyard, Nurmonjoentie 17 (62°50’18.8”N 22°54’25.5”E). Natural stone 
memorial with inscription: “In memory of the victims who died in the Great Famine Years 
of the 1860s: Give Us Our Daily Bread”. 
52. Paltaniemi [Kajaani]
Kainuu 
Paltaniemi Old Church [kuvakirkko], Palta-
niementie 851 (64°17’35.1”N 27°39’35.3”E).107 
Inaugurated in 1967. “In memory of those who 
died of hunger, 1866-1868”. Relief named 
“Anovat kädet” (Pleading Hands), featuring six 
hands reaching for rye stems, designed by Une 
Pihlman. Featured in Part 8 of YLE’s Finnish-
language radio series, “Kainuulaiset patsaat” 
(2014).108 
53. Perho
Central Ostrobothnia
Perho Churchyard, Sahintie 3. Simple 
contemporary stone memorial, inscribed 
with “1869”, and protected by a low, chained, 
fence.109
54. Pielavesi (Kirkosaari)
Northern Savonia
Museum Graveyard, Kirkkosaarentie.110 Inaugurated in 1967. Plaque on natural stone: 
“In memory of the 2,100 parishioners who died during the Hunger Years 1866-1868”. 
Inauguration speech by Provost Matti A. Castrén. The parish in 1868 included Tervo, 
Maaninka and Kiuruvesi. 
55. Pihlajavesi [Keuruu]
Central Finland
“Wilderness Church” [Erämaakirkko] Graveyard, Erämaakirkontie 100 (62°21’48.3”N 
24°21’29.8”E). The memorial was inaugurated in 1984, in the proximity of the mass-grave 
on the north side of the churchyard. A grey natural stone with a black granite plaque: 
“1862-1867: To the memory of those who died by starvation. Pihlajavesi parish”.111 The 
107  SM 1996a, 25.
108  Accessible via <http://areena.yle.fi/1-2202143> 
109  Pictured on the cover of Vartiaisten Viesti (2/2008), see <www.vartiaiset.fi/sites/default/files/
vartiaisten_v2_2008.pdf> 
110  Suomen Kuvalehti, 5 Aug. 1967; Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 24 Jul. 1967; Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, 
22 Aug. 1967; Savon Sanomat, 28 Sep. 2015.
111  See <www.keuruunmuseo.fi/kotiseututietoa/pihlajavesi> The best approach is from Hollikankaantie, 
where there is a sign directing people along Erämaakirkontie to the church. Depending on driving 
direction, a navigator might encourage crossing a small wooden bridge on Virransillantie (at 62°22’17.2”N 
24°21’30.9”E – about one kilometre north of the church). Travelling from Soini, I was directed along 
this road, but decided against crossing the bridge with my car, heading instead around Köminjärvi for 
Pihlajavesi Station and then approaching the church from the south. 
Fig. 19: Paltaniemi, February 2017. 
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grave of the parish priest at the time of the famine, Carl Nauklér, (1846-1868), is also 
in the cemetery. Nauklér was particularly active in raising relief funds from Germany in 
1867-68.112
56. Piipola [Siikalatva]
Northern Ostrobothnia
Piipola Churchyard, Keskustie 3. Inaugurated in 1946.113 Natural stone memorial with 
two inscriptions and central plaque. “Travelling Man. We had belief in prayer, and work. 
You reap the harvest. Sanctify your thoughts while you stand on our resting place”. 
[PLAQUE: In this place are buried five hundred of parishioners who died victims of 
hunger and disease in the years 1866-68. Give us this day our daily bread. Matt 6:11.] 
“Blessings on our ancestors and gratitude for their labours – from the current generation”. 
57. Pudasjärvi
Northern Ostrobothnia
Pudasjärvi Churchyard, Siuruantie. Plaque on natural stone. “In the Dearth Years of 
1866-1868, 962 people died in Pudasjärvi, to whose memory this stone is erected. Give 
Us This Day Our Daily Bread. Matthew 6:11”. Broken rye stems motif. 
58. Pyhäjärvi
Northern Ostrobothnia
Pyhäjärvi Old Graveyard, Pyhäjärventie 387. The section of the graveyard that was used 
from 1736-1875 is called “Jumalanpelto” (“God’s Field”). Surrounded by a stone wall with 
famine memorial in the centre.114 
59. Rantsila [Siikalatva]
Northern Ostrobothnia
Rantsila Church, Rantsilanraitti 10 
(64°30’19.4”N 25°39’15.9”E).115 “1866. 1867. 
To the Victims of the Hunger Years. Home 
District [Kotiseutu]”. Outstretched hands and 
Christian cross motif.
112  Kalliala, 1924. 
113  Suomen Kuvalehti, 10 Oct. 1975.
114  See <www.pyhajarvenseurakunta.fi/hautausmaat/hautausmaiden-historia> 
115  SM 1996a, 103.
Fig. 20: Rantsila, December 2016.
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60. Ristiina [Mikkeli]
Southern Savonia
Site of famine-era mass grave.116 Boulder memorial with plaque: “Peace to the living, 
rest to the dead”. Inauguration ceremony (July 1967) included an unveiling by council 
secretary Jarl Meling and local farmer Aulis Karhinen, a speech by Rev. Kalevi Toiviainen 
(1929-2015), and a play by local schoolchildren, written by their teacher Katri Pulkkinen 
(“Nälkävuosina 1867-1868”). Toiviainen’s speech described that disease was already 
present in 1866, but the mortality in Ristiina culminated with 271 deaths in 1868.  
61. Sievi
Northern Ostrobothnia
Sievi Graveyard, Haikolantie, 1966 (63°54’31.3”N 24°30’44.7”E). Black stone with 
inscription, “In Memory of the Victims of the Hunger Years, 1866-1868”. Accompanied 
by a motif of broken rye stem and a quotation from the poem Saarijärven Paavo (J.L. 
Runeberg, 1830) “Vaikka Kokee Eipä Hylkää Herra”. (“Although you may be tested, do 
not abandon the Lord”). The theme embodies important elements (forbearance, sedulity) 
of the Finnish national autostereotype.  
62. Soini
Southern Ostrobothnia
Soini Churchyard, Karstulantie 2, 1966 
(62°52’31.3”N 24°12’27.1”E).117 “During 
the Hunger Years of 1866-68, the people 
of Soini lost 354 souls. This stone was 
erected in their memory, V 1966. “Father 
Give Us This Day Our Daily Bread”.
63. Sonkajärvi
Northern Savonia
Sonkajärvi Churchyard, Rutakontie 3, 
1989.118 Central position (63°40’14.7”N 27° 
31’10.0”E). Millstone with accompanying 
stone plaque, inscribed with: – “In 
Memory of those who died of hunger 
during the Years of Dearth 1866-68. 
Sonkajärvi Parish. Give Us This Day Our 
Daily Bread”. Approximately 20km west-
northwest of Sonkajärvi, at Palomäki, is 
another memorial to the famine dead.119
116  Länsi-Savo, 23 Jul., 25 Jul., 29 Jul. 1968. The later of these articles also has a picture of the 
memorial, notes that there were “hundreds” in attendance and highlights the role of the Ristiina 
Society in arranging the memorial.
117  SM 1994c, 128.
118  SM 2000b, 93.
119  This site was mentioned on the Widgren Family’s 2009 annual reunion report. I have not yet 
visited the site personally and cannot confirm at this stage whether it accessible to the general 
public. See  <www.widgren.fi/sukukokoukset/sukukokous-2009-viereman.html> 
Fig. 21: Soini, July 2016. 
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64. Sotkamo
Kainuu
Sotkamo Parish Graveyard; 
Rauhantie 11.120 One of the 
earliest memorials in Finland 
to the 1860s famine years. 
Inaugurated in August 1938 at 
an event to commemorate the 
forgotten dead.121 Designed 
by architect Ulla Hjelt (née 
Lukkari), and constructed by 
stonemasons Juho Kivioja and 
Matti Lukkari. The memorial 
is situated at the eastern side 
of the Prayer Chapel. Large 
Christian cross on a square 
base.122 Inscribed on the base 
is: “In Memory of the Dead of the Great Hunger- and Disease-Years of 1867-68. This 
memorial erected by Sotkamo Parish, 1938. // To the Memory of all the unknown or 
forgotten victims buried here. // ‘Your cross be the only sign on my journey.’ Hymn 49”. 
This was a traditional verse adapted by Elias Lönnrot, and is Verse 49 in the Finnish 
Lutheran Hymnal (Virsikirja).
65. Tohmajärvi
North Karelia
Tohmajärvi Churchyard (Kirkkoniemi), 
Kirkkotie 590 (62°11’29.3”N 30°23’02.5”E). 
Inaugurated in 1994 after several years of 
planning.123 Sculpture by Eero Eronen (see 
also Kiihtelysvaara), named “Tuhoutuneet 
tähkät” (Destroyed Ears), depicting the 
failed rye harvest. Inscription: “Every Third 
Resident of Tohmajärvi Died of Hunger, 
1865-68”.
120  Kainuun Sanomat, 20 Aug., 28 Aug. 1938. See also Sotkamo-Lehti, 1 Dec. 2012, and 20 Aug. 
2013 for a photograph of the inauguration ceremony, and accompanying text by Väiniö Tervo. 
121  Kajaani-Lehti, 23 Aug. 1938. It was noted in a speech at the inauguration that 1,300 out of 6,000 
inhabitants in the parish died.  
122  Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, 15 Apr. 1967. 
123  Karjalainen, 23 Dec. 1991. 
Fig. 22: Sotkamo, February 2017. Image courtesy of 
Ronan Newby. 
Fig. 23: Tohmajärvi, October 2016.
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66. Toholampi
Central Ostrobothnia
Toholampi Churchyard, Kirkkotie 143 (63°45’48.5”N 24°16’09.1”E). Inaugurated 30 May 
1971. Approximately 180 victims were buried in the graveyard. Designed by Voitto Laine, 
and uses the stone step from Matti Koskela’s house.124 Text on the stone: “1866-1868. 
Others have done the hard work and now you have taken up their labour. John 4:38”. 
Arranged by Toholampi Local Society. 
67. Ullava [Kokkola]
Central Ostrobothnia
Ullava Old Churchyard, Ullavantie 
665 (63°42’27.9”N 23°53’36.9”E).125 
Some similar elements in form to the 
memorial in the neighbouring parish 
of Toholampi. Mortality rates were so 
sign in the worst years of the 1860s 
that three mass graves were dug in 
the Ullava churchyard. The memorial 
is natural stone with iron text in capital 
letters: “In Memory of the Dead of 
The Years of Hunger 1865-1868: My 
Grace Is Sufficient For You. Cor. 12:9”. 
Below the text is the image of an angel, 
kneeling and weeping.
68. Vaala
Northern Ostrobothnia
Säräisniemi (Old Graveyard). Two monuments for mass graves. One is for a boat 
accident in October 1856, the second is to commemorate those who died during a 
dysentery epidemic while draining the Pelonsuo swamp as relief work in the 1850s and 
1860s.126 
69. Vaasa
Ostrobothnia 
Kappelimäki Old Graveyard, Kappelimäentie, Ristinummi (memorial is at the north end 
of the graveyard 63°05’46.2”N 21°43’57.5”E). Erected by Ostrobothnia Historical Society 
(Pohjanmaan Historiallinen Seura) (proposed in June 2006), in collaboration with Vaasa 
124  SM 1994c, 137.
125  SM 1994c, 141.
126  Suometar, 11 Aug. 1863, Länsi-Savo, 19 Aug. 1985. For an illustration of the drainage channels 
see Asuttaja, 1 Nov. 1918. See also Turun Sanomat, 13 Nov. 2000; Nevanlinna, 1907, 98.   
Fig. 25: Ullava, July 2016.
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and Mustasaari Parish. Inauguration 
ceremony 18 October 2008.127 
Wooden cross with two plaques: (i) 
“Victims of the Hunger Years 1867-
1868 – Remembering. Blessing. 
Honouring”; (ii) “The mass graves of 
those who had to leave their homes 
and died from hunger and disease”. 
70. Varkaus
Northern Savonia
Könöpelto, signposted (“Hautamuisto-
merkki”) after Pitkälänniementie 24 
(62°18’33.5”N 27°55’49.5”E).128 
The Varkaus memorial stands in the 
vicinity of a mass grave for those who 
perished in the construction of the 
Taipale Canal. News of construction 
work spread quickly in 1867, and 
people streamed in to Varkaus – 
from nearby parishes but also from 
Ostrobothnia and Karelia – in the 
hope of finding employment and 
food.129 Located in a gap in the forest 
just outside the town, the monument 
itself is a striking truncated square 
pyramid, nowadays covered in moss. 
This is apparently the first example of 
a famine monument built specifically 
to reflect upon the suffering of the 
generations that had gone before. A 
text recalls 281 nameless victims who 
were buried in the mass grave from 51 
different parishes. As would become 
common, a New Testament quotation 
is included, in this case from the book 
127  <www.pohjanmaanhistoriallinenseura.com/pohja%20N%E4lk%E4vuosien%20muistomerkki.htm> 
128  SM 2000b, 108.
129  Tapio, 16 Nov., 7 Dec. 1867. 
Fig. 27: Vaasa, July 2016.
Fig. 28: Varkaus, October 2016.
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of Jeremiah: “You are my refuge in the day of disaster”.130 The inscription is completed 
by: “this statue was erected by Varkaus parish in memory of the deceased. 1936”. 
Local newspapers reflected on the historical context in their reports of the inauguration 
ceremony for the new memorial in September 1936, which was attended by inter alia, 
SDP politician Onni Hiltunen.131
71. Varpaisjärvi [Lapinlahti]
Northern Savonia
Site between Varpaisjärvi and Kangaslahti, off Road 582 (Rautavaarantie) at the 
settlement of Korpinen (63°26’03.1”N 27°59’09.8”E). Wooden memorial from 1950s 
replaced in June 2012 with a stone monument – “Buried here are approximately 60 
people, who died during the Great Hunger Years 1867-1868”. Accompanied by a Biblical 
text (Exodus 3:5 – “Take off your sandals, for the place where you are standing is holy 
ground”).132 Note: Exodus is known in Finnish as the Second Book of Moses.
72. Vehmersalmi [Kuopio]
Northern Savonia 
Horkanlahti Graveyard, Lempelänniementie 286 Vehmersalmi. The majority of the 
deceased in Horkanlahden Graveyard succumbed to tuberculosis or during the hunger 
years. There is a memorial to the victims of the hunger years, many of whom lie 
unmarked.133
73. Veteli
Central Ostrobothnia
Veteli Churchyard, Torpantie 130 (63°28’36.3”N 23°45’35.3”E). Inaugurated in 1954.134 
Elongated granite gravestone, featuring three stars and three broken stems of rye. Two 
inscriptions: (i) 1866-1867. Victims of the Hunger Years lie here in Veteli’s consecrated 
earth; (ii) “The hand of God lays heavily over us // Oh lift our harsh load just once! // 
Heaven, relieve your people’s burden!”. 
74. Viitasaari
Central Finland
Memorial in the vicinity of Viitasaari Church, Kirkkotie (location might be more accurately 
described as Haapasaarentie, at 63°28’36.3”N 23°45’35.3”E).135 The memorial was 
completed in 1977 by Elis Räsänen, and recalls specifically the construction of a hundred-
130  Jeremiah 17:17. 
131  Länsi-Savo, 3 Dec. 1935, 17 Sep. 1936; Nuori Kansa, 22 Oct. 1936; Rakennustaito, 13 May 
1938. 
132  Matti ja Liisa -lehden kesäliite 31 May 2012 accessed via <www.varpaisjarvenseurakunta.fi> 
133 Savon Sanomat Online (published 17 Aug. 2015), features a video tour of the Horkanlahti 
graveyard. See <www.savonsanomat.fi/kotimaa/Hautausmaa-on-t%C3%A4ynn%C3%A4-harvinaisia-
muistomerkkej%C3%A4/537959> 
134  Veteli’s Kotiseutuyhdistys noted that 1954 had been a very productive year, including the 
inauguration the “Famine Years Memorial.” Keskipohjanmaa, 4 May 1954. 
135  SM 1998, 92.
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metre long stone swing-bridge, as famine relief work.136 The memorial’s low stone base 
is supplemented by a relief with illustration of a man with a horse and belongings in the 
foreground, and silhouette of a line of workers in the background. An inscription reads: 
“This bridge was built as relief work during the Great Hunger Years of 1867-69”. 
In addition to the above memorials, the following sites feature plaques or 
interpretative boards highlighting a historical connection with the 1860s Famine 
Years. These sites are indicated by green markers on Map 2. 
A. Hämeenlinna
Tavastia Proper
Katisten Kartano, Katistentie 91 (60°59’43.5”N 24°29’53.0”E). Having bought the manor 
house at Katinen in 1856, the businessman J.F. Lönnholtz oversaw a private relief 
scheme during the Great Hunger Years. In return for constructing a stone fence around 
the house’s grounds, workers were offered a meal. Grateful recipients built a stone 
mound in the gardens.137
136  An interesting analysis of the rates of remuneration on this particular famine worksite can 
be found at: <http://blogit.ksml.fi/mehta-pena/sillanrakentajien-palkkaseurantaa/> (posted 30 Oct. 
2014). 
137  Ivars & Putkonen, 2003, 96-7.
Fig. 29: Katisten Kartano, Hämeenlinna, March 2017.
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B. Kauhajoki
Southern Ostrobothnia
Kauhajoki Church, Topeeka 9 (62°25’16.9”N 22°10’42.4”E). Plaque on the exterior wall 
of the main church sacristy [“Give us this day our daily bread. In memory of victims of the 
1867-68 hunger years”]. Designed by Arvo Lusa and organised by Kauhajoki Society.138 
C. Puolanka
Kainuu
Puolanka Old Church Graveyard. Kirkkokatu 1. An interpretive board notes that the dead 
from the Great Hunger Years are buried in this place.139 
D. Reisjärvi
Northern Ostrobothnia
Reisjärvi Church, Reisjärventie 15. On the wall of the church is a memorial to the Great 
Hunger years, unveiled in 1972, “which tells not only of the harsh experiences of the 
people, but also their faith in God”.140 
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